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ABSTRACT 
The sectarian tactics of the Comintern's Third Period 
prevented the Communist Party of Great Britain from 
articulating an effective response to the rise of fascism 
during 1933. The CPGB leadership saw the main threat of 
fascism in Britain coming from the National Government, 
whose measures were portrayed as leading to the gradual 
'fascisation' of British society. This led to the Party 
leadership ignoring the BUF as politically irrelevant. 
However, sections of the CPGB rank and file felt 
differently, linking up with their Labour movement 
counterparts; organising activity on a mass scale to 
prevent BUF activity on the streets of Britain. 
In mid 1934, reflecting pressure from below and the 
change in Comintern anti-fascist strategy as advocated by 
Dimitrov, the CPGB leadership changed tack and sanctioned 
counter-demonstrations to BUF meetings. In October 1934 it 
offered a united front electoral pact to the Labour Party. 
In 1935 the CPGB embraced the popular front policy 
adopted by the Comintern at its Seventh World Congress. The 
popular front movement was designed to change the 'pro- 
fascist' foreign policy of the National Government and 
replace it with a people's government favourable to a 
military pact with the USSR. This guiding principle lay 
behind the popular front activity of the CPGB during 1935- 
39. 
By 1939 after six years of hard work the CPGB had little 
to show for its struggle against fascism. Despite a small 
increase in membership, and a slight growth in influence 
amongst the trade unions and intelligentsia, it had failed 
to bring about a change in British foreign policy favourable 
to an alliance with the Soviet Union or to emerge as a 
significant force within the British Labour movement. This 
failure can be largely ascribed to its pursuit of an anti- 
fascist strategy determined mainly by the requirements of 
Soviet foreign policy and not by the concerns of British 
workers. 
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Introduction 
Until the mid-1970s there had been little debate amongst 
historians as to the role of the CPGB within British 
society. What work there was on the Communist Party was 
often written by individuals whose anti-communism coloured 
their historical judgement. 1 In contrast to this, official 
histories of the Communist Party followed the safe path of 
narrative description avoiding any critical analysis. James 
Klugmann the Communist Party's official historian was one of 
the first to recognize the need for a new approach to CPGB 
history, `... reflecting the changed political thinking within 
the Communist Party and the need to re-examine and debate 
the movement's past'. 2 Since Klugmann's death the CPGB 
history group actively took up the question of the Party's 
history. 
In 1979 the CPGB history group held a ground-breaking 
conference on the Party's role and political position during 
the first month of World War Two. 3 Here, for the first time, 
was a critical evaluation of a crucial turning point in the 
CPGB's history. It represented a qualitative step forward 
not only for the Communist Party and its attempts to 
understand its history, but also for all historians 
interested in the British Labour movement. For the first 
time historians were given a glimpse into the internal 
debates within the CPGB which has greatly enhanced our 
understanding of its development. 
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Following the publication of Attfield and Williams' book, 
there has been a marked increase in interest in the CPGB 
amongst historians. This ranges from Branson's two volumes 
on the CPGB, to the recent biographies of its two principal 
leaders Harry Pollitt and Rajani Palme Dutt. 4 Yet until the 
last decade most works on the CPGB carried little detail of 
its innermost workings, and even those which have, such as 
Branson's History Of The Communist Party Of Great Britain 
1927-1941 (1985) and Kevin Morgan's Against Fascism And War 
(1989), were hampered by a lack of access to internal 
documents. As Michelle Gabbidon has noted, the problems of 
conducting research into the CPGB have hinged to a large 
degree around the lack of access to internal documentary 
evidence: 
There are particular problems inherent in the study of 
the close-knit political party and the CPGB is no 
exception. A first problem is one of access to 
documentary evidence. Party records and documentation 
are fully available to Party members. The Party itself 
prefers to use its own historians. Non-Party members are 
forced to rely on Party publications ... for documentary 
evidence. 5 
However, with the collapse of Stalinism throughout Europe 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, new archive 
material has become available on the CPGB; as the 
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Comintern's archives in Moscow have been gradually opened up 
to historians. Large quantities of internal CPGB material 
has been sent from the Comintern archives to this country, 
with the prospect of more to come in the future. 
Kevin Morgan has observed that, `the new abundance of 
archival materials is likely in many ways to transform our 
understanding of communist politics'. 6 For the first time 
the CPGB archive is fully open to researchers at the 
National Museum of Labour History in Manchester, `Located 
alongside the national records of the Labour Party, these 
archives provide a rich source for the history of the 
British Left that is so far virtually untapped'.? 
Researchers will benefit particularly from the full verbatim 
accounts of Central Committee and Political Bureau meetings 
which, 'provide an immediacy and vividness of detail unique 
among formal records of the British labour movement'. 8 
In the light of Kevin Morgan's remarks, a re-evaluation 
of the CPGB and its relationship to the struggle against 
fascism would be of great value. It would help shed light 
upon areas of the CPGB's history which in many respects have 
only been touched upon by historians. Although work has been 
done on the CPGB during the period in question, the new 
archive material becoming available to historians is 
sufficient justification for a new study. The reason for 
focusing a proposed study on the CPGB and fascism is simple. 
The question of fascism dominated British society during 
1933-39 in a way no other international issue has done this 
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century. The CPGB's contribution to the struggle against 
fascism has yet to be fully documented and analysed. The 
opening up of the CPGB archive means that a re-evaluation of 
the CPGB's role can now be attempted with more confidence 
than ever before. 
This study will seek to question many conventional 
assumptions regarding the CPGB's role during the struggle 
against fascism 1933-39; and call to account the mythology 
surrounding this `golden era' of the Party's history. It 
will explore the interrelated themes of the united front 
against fascism and the rise of popular frontism during this 
period. In examining the united and popular front campaigns 
of the Communist Party, which were the main axis of its 
anti-fascist strategy, particular emphasis will be placed 
upon its relationship to the Labour movement. In the eyes of 
the CPGB leadership central to the success of the united and 
popular front strategy was the Party's problematical 
relationship to the British Labour movement. Throughout 
1933-39 the Communist Party attempted time and time again to 
involve both the leadership and rank and file of the Labour 
movement in its anti-fascist activities. The Party realised 
that in a country such as Britain, where the industrial 
working class carried a decisive social weight, that for any 
of its campaigns to have any chance of success then it 
needed to win the active support of the Labour movement. 
The themes pursued by this study can be set out briefly 
as follows. First of all, there is the CPGB's gradual 
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emergence from the sectarian strictures of the `Third 
Period' towards the united front against fascism during 
1933-34, which is not as straight forward as many historians 
assume. Concomitant with this is the question of the 
struggle against the BUF, an organisation led by Oswald 
Mosley. Again, historians have tended to portray this in a 
rather one-sided manner presenting the CPGB as the leading 
force in this struggle. However, this was far from the case 
as the Communist Party was riven by divisions over its 
attitude towards the struggle against the blackshirts. 
Indeed, in the first year after Hitler's ascension to power 
the CPGB leadership regarded the struggle against the BUF as 
politically irrelevant, while sections of the Party rank and 
file linked up with their Labour movement counterparts in 
confronting the blackshirts on the streets of Britain. 
In this study which is mindful of its limitations, such 
as the shortage of source material for the case studies on 
the local CPGB as well as the anti-Mosley movement and the 
limited scope of its investigation, it will be argued that 
a rank and file movement developed in the towns and cities 
of Britain to physically oppose the activities of Mosley's 
blackshirts. The main source for the case study of this rank 
and file anti-fascist movement has been the Daily Worker. 
The Daily Worker, which was not always in tune with the 
thinking of the CPGB leadership, recorded on a regular basis 
the numerous activities of this rank and file anti-fascist 
movement, turning a blind eye to the presence of Party 
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members in anti-blackshirt activities that were virtually 
ignored by the Central Committee and Political Bureau during 
1933 and the first half of 1934. In giving coverage to this 
movement from below during the aforementioned period, it 
would appear that a section of the Party leadership merely 
paid lip service to the Central Committee's policy of 
playing down the anti-Mosley struggle in favour of 
concentrating upon the struggle against the pro-fascist 
National Government. How else are we to account for the 
discrepancy between the Daily Worker's coverage of the 
grassroots anti-Mosley movement and the Party leaderships' 
negative attitude towards this branch of the anti-fascist 
movement? At the Central Committee in June 1933 the CPGB 
leadership came out unequivocally against the tactic of 
breaking up BUF meetings, indeed it was not until the early 
summer of 1934 that the Party leadership formally came out 
in support of the rank and file anti-Mosley movement, yet 
the Daily Worker continued to give coverage to this movement 
from below. 9 This state of affairs may well have indicated 
continuing differences between the Party leadership over 
anti-fascist strategy. During the spring of 1933 when the 
CPGB leadership was debating the Comintern's new turn 
towards the united front against fascism Jimmy Shields and 
Bill Rust, who were on the Daily Worker's editorial staff, 
opposed the united front from above, as described in the 
ECCI's 5 March manifesto, and supported the united front 
from below. The debates on the Central Committee and 
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Political Bureau over the new united front line during 1933 
reveal how Pollitt had to battle hard to get the Party 
leadership in line with the new Comintern directives. In May 
1933 he was forced to admit that the Party Secretariat was 
still divided and unable to come up with a commonly agreed 
position on this rather pressing question. 10 Shields and 
Rust may well have seen the grassroots anti-Mosley movement 
as a practical manifestation of the united front from below, 
with its emphasis upon rank and file activity to halt the 
growth of fascism. 
There is, however, another possible explanation for this 
seeming contradiction between the Daily Worker's coverage of 
the anti-Mosley movement and the Central Committee's 
position of playing down this movement in favour of 
concentrating upon the struggle against the `pro-fascist' 
National Government. The Daily Worker's coverage of the 
anti-Mosley struggle may well have reflected pressure upon 
the CPGB leadership from those sections of the Party 
membership involved in this movement from below. Let us not 
forget that it would not have been the first time that the 
Party leadership reversed its attitude towards the anti- 
Mosley movement in response to pressure from those sections 
of its membership active in the anti-BUF struggle. It was 
not until 2 October 1936 that the Communist Party leadership 
cancelled the YCL Aid-for Spain rally scheduled for the 4 
October and came out publicly, on the front page of the 
Daily Worker, with a call for mass opposition to prevent 
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Mosley's men marching on the same day through the East End 
of London. In October 1936 Pollitt admitted, in a discussion 
with Herbert Morrison on the `Battle of Cable Street', that 
he was, 'no enthusiast for such clashes but he insisted that 
his supporters would not be persuaded to surrender the 
streets to fascists'. 11 During 1933 and the first half of 
1934 the CPGB leadership may well have decided to allow the 
Daily Worker to cover the anti-Mosley movement out of fear 
of alienating the most militant sections of the Party 
membership. It would have been a small price to pay for 
keeping its most active members on board the campaign for 
the united front with the Labour Party. 
The case study on the grassroots anti-Mosley movement has 
drawn largely upon reports in the Daily Worker due to the 
scarcity of other national sources for this movement. It is 
worth pointing out that on the whole, rank and file 
movements, oblivious to the needs of historians in the 
future, do not leave many documents that illustrate their 
origins and development. Having said this, other national 
newspapers such as the Guardian and Daily Herald did comment 
upon some of the larger demonstrations in London, such as 
the 150,000 strong counter-demonstration in Hyde Park on 9 
September 1934. But on the whole they gave little coverage 
to the anti-fascist movement from below which was made up of 
hundreds of activities all over the country. Undoubtedly, 
there are difficulties in locating alternative sources to 
the Daily Worker in the CPGB archives, for the increasing 
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preoccupation of the CPGB leadership with fascism as an 
international threat meant that there was little mention of 
the anti-Mosley movement from below in the official records 
of the Party such as the minutes of the Central Committee 
and Political Bureau. However, this is not a serious 
problem as the case put forward for a rank and file anti- 
fascist movement from below can also be corroborated by the 
memoirs of rank and file communists such as Phil Piratin and 
Joe Jacobs and the study of anti-fascism in the North East 
by Nigel Todd, of anti-fascism in the North West by Neil 
Barrett and that by David Turner of anti-fascism in Kent. 12 
Undoubtedly there were regional variations between Party 
districts in their campaigning priorities however, the 
reports in the Daily Worker together with the regional 
studies mentioned above are sufficient evidence to back up 
the claim made in this study for a national anti-Mosley 
movement from below. Besides this, the case study of the 
West Yorkshire Communist Party in this thesis reveals that 
rank and file communists came together with their Labour 
movement counterparts to organize anti-Mosley activities 
without the sanction of King Street or the local Labour 
parties. This episode in the anti-fascist struggle has 
largely been ignored by historians and is a serious omission 
from the history of the 1930s. On a local level sources for 
the anti-Mosley movement include the Daily Worker as well as 
the memoirs of veteran Party members, such as Ernie Benson, 
and tape recorded interviews with CPGB members such as 
15 
Geoff Hodgson. 13 The evidence found in these local sources, 
of a rank and file anti-BUF movement in West Yorkshire, is 
corroborated by local Labour movement newspapers such as the 
Bradford Pioneer, which describes a 1,000 strong counter- 
demonstration to one of Mosley's meetings in Bradford during 
mid-November 1934.14 The Yorkshire Post is another local 
source for the anti-Mosley movement in West Yorkshire, its 
comprehensive account of the `Battle of Holbeck Moor' in 
September 1936 is heavily drawn upon by the Daily Worker in 
its description of this event. 15 The case studies of the 
anti-Mosley movement from below and the West Yorkshire 
Communist Party reveal a dichotomy over anti-fascist 
strategy, between the national leadership and sections of 
the rank and file, that questions the image of the CPGB as a 
monolithic entity. 
The CPGB's popular front phase will also be examined 
taking into account the controversy over its activities 
during this period. The Communist Party's campaign for 
affiliation to Labour in 1936 and the Unity Campaign of 1937 
will be shown to have been undermined by its defence of the 
Moscow show trials and the class collaboration policies 
which it pursued. Finally the electoral manoeuvres of the 
CPGB's popular front activities during 1938-39 will be 
examined. These electoral tactics failed due to their 
attempt to compromise the political independence of the 
Labour Party, and were a reversion to the discredited Lib- 
Lab policies of Labour's political infancy. 
16 
In examining the popular front period this study will not 
delve into the question of the Spanish Civil War. This study 
acknowledges that the Communist Party's intervention in the 
Aid-for-Spain movement brought it hundreds of new recruits 
and considerable respect and kudos. 16 The visit by Clement 
Attlee, who was strongly anti-communist, to the British 
Battalion of the International Brigades in 1937 was tacit 
recognition of the CPGB's leading role in the Aid-for Spain 
movement. 
The omission of Spain from this study should not lead to 
the conclusion that Spain was not relevant to the CPGB's 
anti-fascist strategy or its relationship to the Labour 
movement. However, there is a tendency by many historians of 
this period to over emphasise the importance of the Aid-for- 
Spain movement in the CPGB's development during the late 
1930s while neglecting or downplaying the importance of 
other issues such as the Moscow Show Trials. 17 The Spanish 
issue is beyond the remit of this study which as noted 
before attempts to assess the CPGB's failure to become a 
mass party against the background of its relationship to the 
Labour movement. Ultimately, it was the Party's failure to 
win the active support of large sections of the Labour 
movement, which was due to the pro-Soviet orientation of its 
anti-fascist strategy, that explains its failure to emerge 
as a mass party of the British working class. The CPGB's 
intervention in the Aid-for-Spain movement undoubtedly had 
a beneficial effect upon its political fortunes and has 
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little bearing on the question of why it failed to become a 
mass party during this period. This study will contend that 
it was other issues such as the popular front campaigns for 
affiliation to the Labour Party, the CPGB's support of the 
Moscow Show Trials as a vital part of the international 
struggle against fascism, and the Party's failure to fully 
support the rank and file campaigns against Mosley that help 
explain its relatively small size. Besides this there is 
already a fairly comprehensive range of literature that 
deals with the Communist Party and the Spanish Civil War-18 
This study makes no pretensions at being a comprehensive 
study of the CPGB's anti-fascist activities during 1933-39 
for, besides the omission of the Spanish Civil War, this 
study effectively ends its examination of the CPGB in the 
spring of 1939 with the failure of the Communist Crusade For 
The Defence Of The British People and the Cripps Memorandum. 
By this time the united and popular fronts were dead as a 
political issue and with their demise went the Party's last 
chance for making any impression upon the British Labour 
movement before the imminent world war. Chapter five notes 
the detrimental effect of the CPGB's abstention from the 
Labour movement based No Conscription League during the 
spring and summer of 1939, and the debates within the Party 
leadership over its change of line from opposing to a 
conditional support for conscription. It is worthwhile 
pointing out how the very divisive debates, within the CPGB 
leadership, over changing the Party line over conscription 
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and its attitude towards the Second World War broadly 
confirm one of the central arguments of this thesis that the 
Communist Party's policies were effectively worked out in 
accordance with the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. 
Beside the availability of new archive material, concern 
about the re-emergence of fascism throughout Europe in the 
last decade provides much of the impetus for research into 
the CPGB and its struggle against fascism 1933-39. In France 
and Belgium the National Front and Vlams Bloc have emerged 
as powerful forces on the national political stage taking 
between fifteen and twenty per cent of the vote in various 
elections. In Italy the renamed fascist party (with its 
roots leading directly back to Mussolini), became a 
coalition partner in the Berlusconi government of 1993-94. 
In Germany, Austria and the rest of Eastern Europe quasi- 
fascist organisations have re-emerged and are rapidly 
gaining support on a national basis. In his pioneering study 
of the Labour movement's struggle against fascism 1933-36 
Michael Newman has commented on the relevance of studying 
the anti-fascist struggles of the 1930s for today: 
It is my belief that an examination of the British 
Left's debates on fascism in the 1930s is not only of 
historical importance but will also be politically 
instructive in the situation today. 19 
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Newman argues that his analysis of the Labour movement's 
role in the struggle against fascism, `will prove justified 
if it provokes further research and discussion about fascist 
potential, and the means of countering it, both in the 1930s 
and today'. 20 Amongst historians of British fascism there is 
a common belief that on the whole the different varieties of 
British fascism have been negligible forces held in check by 
the strength of Britain's democratic traditions and the 
interventions of the state. 21 The reality of the struggle 
against fascism has been somewhat different. 
In the 1930s the hundreds of thousands who turned out 
against the BUF were instrumental in preventing Mosley's 
blackshirts emerging as a mass force in British society. As 
Nigel Todd has observed: 
From political platforms, police stations and newspaper 
barons came the golden wisdom that if you ignored the 
blackshirts then they would simply go away.... the fate 
elsewhere of democrats, trade unionists, Jews, Africans, 
Socialists, Liberals, entire countries - the list was 
vast - illustrated the extreme danger of leaving Fascism 
to its own devices. Anti-fascism was a response of the 
common people who, detecting the nightmare, took a fine 
stand for life and liberty. Fortunately for us all, they 
won through in the end. 22 
20 
Nina Fishman has noted the abundance of historical writing 
on British economic and social history during this period; 
while in the arena of political history the trade unions and 
the CPGB have been ill-served. As she points out, British 
political history is almost exclusively Westminster- 
centred. 23 Fishman notes that despite considerable 
differences in the conduct of communist activists, 'rigidly 
monolithic stereotypes of communist activities continue to 
permeate British historiography'. 24 She has observed that 
two opposing mythologies, both Communist and Labour, have 
obstructed her attempts at accurate historical vision. 
Communist mythology puts the CPGB and its activists behind 
every serious union struggle 1930-45, which is reflected in 
the official Party histories and the memoirs of many of its 
members. 
In contrast to this is Labour mythology which denounces 
the CPGB's inflated claims of influence within the Labour 
movement. This mythology goes on to portray communists as 
unscrupulous perpetrators of notorious strikes, while at the 
same time contriving to disrupt trade union affairs. Fishman 
claims that this Labour mythology is reflected in many 
standard histories of this period and the autobiographies of 
many trade union leaders. 25 Thus while communist mythology 
has continued to conceal the CPGB's leaders consistent 
espousal -of trade union loyalism above militant rank and 
file activity; Labour mythology has failed to reveal the 
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appeals of CPGB leaders for their members to abide by 
official trade union rules and decisions. 
Fishman has observed that Kevin Morgan's Against Fascism 
and War (1989) marked an important new beginning. 26 She 
argues that its importance lay in its attempt to cut through 
the two opposing mythologies in order to get a clearer 
picture of the Communist Party during the 1935-41 period. 
Fishman further argues that her approach to writing CPGB 
history became revisionist because she found that the Party 
members she interviewed, did not conform to the stereotypes 
of communist or labour mythology. She found most CPGB 
members who she interviewed were not interested in repeating 
the myths of Party heroism and self-sacrifice. 27 
This study follows in the footsteps of what may be termed 
the 'revisionist school' of CPGB history. For the same 
communist and labour mythologies which Fishman found to have 
obstructed her attempts at accurate historical vision apply 
with just as much force in the field of anti-fascist history 
during the 1930s. Communist mythology, with regard to the 
struggle against fascism, portrays the CPGB as the leading 
force in this struggle. This mythology claims that the 
Party's leading role in the Aid-for-Spain movement directly 
follows on from and was a direct consequence of its leading 
role in the struggles against Mosley. In other words it 
claims that there was a direct continuity in the anti- 
fascist activities of the Party running from 1933 through to 
the late 1930s. This study argues that the emphasis placed 
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upon the continuity in the Party's anti-fascist activity by 
communist mythology is incorrect. In the late 1930s the CPGB 
undoubtedly was in the vanguard of the Aid-for Spain 
movement, however, in the period 1933-36 the struggle 
against Mosley was led by a rank and file movement composed 
of communist and Labour movement activists not the Communist 
Party. Communist mythology claims that if it had not been 
for the role played by the Communist Party then there would 
never have been such notable victories over the BUF as the 
`Battle of Cable Street' or the British Battalion of the 
International Brigades. This viewpoint is reflected in 
Branson's official Party history covering the years 1927-41, 
the account of anti-fascism in South Wales by Francis and in 
the collection of essays edited by Jim Fyrth on the popular 
front in Britain. 28 
This study does not dispute the claims made about the 
CPGB playing a leading role in the formation and running of 
the British Battalion of the International Brigades. 
However, it is worthwhile mentioning that recent studies of 
the Aid-for-Spain movement record the contribution of the 
Labour movement towards supporting Republican Spain in a 
variety of initiatives, whose importance has been downplayed 
by communist mythology in its account of the Spanish 
conflict. 29 In stark contrast to communist mythology is 
labour mythology, which points to the disruptive effects of 
communist activity in opposing the BUF. This gives the 
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`democratic' British state the credit for defeating the 
threat from Mosley's blackshirts. 30 
There is another historical mythology which must be taken 
into account when examining the CPGB and its struggle 
against fascism, and that is the Trotskyist one. This 
stresses the class collaboration approach of the CPGB, which 
is somewhat crudely portrayed as a monolithic entity whose 
policies were always determined by Moscow, which consciously 
tried to subvert the political independence of the Labour 
movement by allying it with non-socialist forces. This is 
best exemplified in the works of Sam Bornstein and Al 
Richardson. 31 This study while in many respects is in broad 
agreement with much of the Trotskyist writing upon the CPGB 
takes issue with the rather simplistic mono-causal 
explanations put forward in the works of writers such as 
Bornstein and Richardson. 
It is the intention of this study to critically examine 
these mythologies, for they have had a decisive impact upon 
most accounts of the period in question. In re-evaluating 
the role of the CPGB certain questions need to be asked. 
Taking into account that the period in question is 
universally portrayed as the 'golden era' of the CPGB, why 
did it fail in its intended aim of becoming a mass party? 
This period of radicalization of the West European working 
class saw the development of the PCE and PCF into mass 
parties. To what degree should the CPGB's anti-fascist 
strategy be held accountable for its failure to emerge as a 
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mass party? Did the CPGB lead the anti-Mosley movement or 
was the anti-Mosley struggle a mass movement from below led 
by rank and file communists and their Labour movement 
counterparts? 
It is worthwhile stressing that while this study defines 
the Communist party's basic failure against the yardstick of 
a possible mass party, it acknowledges this failure as a 
relative failure. The CPGB tripled its membership between 
1933-39 from around 5,000 to over 17,000 despite the failure 
of the united and popular front campaigns. In chapter three 
the failure of the CPGB is explored in a comparative 
context. This notes how the Spanish and French communist 
parties, during the era of the popular front, emerged as 
mass parties with considerable influence over the national 
political scene in their respective countries. This is in 
sharp contrast to the position of the CPGB which only saw a 
small scale improvement in its position as. a result of its 
popular front activities. Both in France and Spain the PCF 
and PCE saw a growth in their membership and influence due 
largely to the huge social upheavals that gripped both 
countries; social upheavals which were signally absent from 
Britain for most of the 1930s. The absence of mass social 
upheavals in Britain together with the CPGB's failure to 
fully capitalise upon the opportunities presented by the 
struggle against fascism, help explain its relatively small 
size. In other words the Communist Party's failure to emerge 
as a mass party can be found in the dialectical interplay 
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between objective and subjective factors. At certain times 
during the decade subjective factors, such as the Party's 
continued sectarianism during 1933-34, help to explain its 
continuing isolation within the Labour movement. On other 
occasions objective factors such as the Moscow Show Trials 
cut across the appeal of British Stalinism. In its essence 
the anti-fascist strategy of the PCF, PCE and CPGB differed 
little, the popular front strategy which they pursued 
entailed class collaboration with non-socialist forces and 
which involved the downplaying of the class struggle and 
militant anti-fascism. All three communist parties were to 
pay a heavy political price for their pursuit of an anti- 
fascist strategy that in certain respects was inimical to 
working class interests. 
Central to this examination of the CPGB will be its 
relationship with the CPSU and the Comintern, which were the 
ultimate arbiters of its political line. It will draw upon 
new research into the CPSU and Comintern that sheds a fresh 
perspective upon the international communist movement and 
developments in the USSR. These works show that internal 
developments within the USSR had an enormous impact upon the 
international communist movement. The Comintern's turn 
towards the united and popular front during 1933-35 was 
heavily influenced by Stalin's search for a military 
alliance with Britain and France to restrain German fascism. 
They also show how the Stalinist Terror which swept through 
the USSR 1936-39 and was exported to the civil war in Spain 
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had a very damaging impact upon the popular front campaigns 
of the European Communist Parties. 32 
However, any examination of the CPGB would be incomplete 
if it took the view that it was a mere mouthpiece of the 
Soviet government. We need to look at the interaction 
between Comintern directives and the political situation in 
this country to see how the CPGB took up the anti-fascist 
struggle and with what success. 
This study attempts to offer a history of the CPGB from 
both above and below. However, due to the shortage of local 
source material, this study will take as its main focus the 
activities of the Party on a national scale. Having said 
this, it will try to explore the dichotomy between the 
national Party line and the practice of local communists; 
and will treat the CPGB as an organic entity which developed 
through an interaction between the national leadership and 
the rank and file members. As Michelle Gabbidon has 
observed, `As yet however, scant attention has been paid to 
branch life, as opposed to the life of the leadership at 
King Street, the Party headquarters between the wars'. 33 
Kevin Morgan has commented that to write CPGB history is 
in part to trace the relationship, not always harmonious, 
between official pronouncements and the activities of its 
members. He has revealed the potential which existed for 
some discrepancy between the official Party line and the 
line followed by the rank and file: 
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That is one reason why it is so inadequate to write a 
history of the Communist Party based solely on its 
official and quasi-official statements of policy, with 
the sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit assumption 
that its membership consisted of docile, or steel 
hardened, cadres subordinating all other interests to 
the current party line. 34 
This dichotomy between national policy and the activities of 
local communists has also been noted by Gabbidon in her 
study of CPGB branches in Brighton, Glasgow and North 
London. 35 It is important, therefore, to try and give 
weight to the variety of influences on local Communist Party 
activists. At the same time taking into account that the 
CPGB leadership, whilst having a substantial degree of 
autonomy in running the day-to-day affairs of the Party, 
looked towards the Comintern for guidance and approval for 
new developments in its anti-fascist strategy. Central to 
communist anti-fascist strategy was its problematical 
relationship with the British Labour movement. The dynamics 
of this relationship, and in turn the CPGB's anti-fascist 
strategy, can be more thoroughly examined by a local 
dimension to a national study. By relating the anti-fascist 
strategy of the national Party to an examination of the West 
Yorkshire Labour movement during this period, some 
indication will be gained as to how far and with what 
success, the Communist Party's strategy was applied by the 
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rank and file. This will give a greater insight into the 
question: why did the CPGB fail to gain a leading position 
of influence within the Labour movement? During this period 
of radicalization of the working class of Western Europe, 
most British workers never really questioned their 
allegiance to the Labour Party, never mind consider changing 
it. 
As Morgan has pointed out, to judge the CPGB merely by 
the Party line laid down by its leadership is inadequate 
without also considering its application by `quite human' 
communists, in social and political conditions which were 
not laid down by the Comintern, and which often bore no 
relation to the latter's theories as to the crisis of 
capitalism: 
And in fact, the most enlightening works on British 
Communism have been studies, not of the `Party line', 
but of specific areas of Communist politics or 
particular industries and communities in which its 
members were firmly embedded. 36 
Stuart Macintyre, in his study of Communism and working 
class militancy in inter-war Britain, has pointed out that 
much labour history is merely a history of institutions 
which neglects the crucial relationship between classes and 
party. He suggests that if we are to better understand the 
limited appeal of Communism in this country, then we need to 
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know more about the social dynamics of the Labour movement, 
`How do men and women constitute such a movement and under 
what conditions are they drawn into struggle? '37 As 
Macintyre has observed the value of local studies lie in 
that they enable, 'us to say much more about the dynamics of 
Communism and militant working class politics than has so 
far emerged from national and institutional accounts'. 38 
When examining the application of the CPGB's anti-fascist 
strategy in the West Yorkshire Labour movement, attention 
will be focused on the trades councils which were the 
backbone of the local Labour parties. The reasons for this 
are that the CPGB built up quite a strong position in the 
trade unions during the 1930s which was never reflected in a 
similar position in the Labour Party. The influence of the 
CPGB in the West Yorkshire Labour Party has already been 
examined by the study of Keith Laybourn and Jack Reynolds. 39 
By comparing and contrasting communist activity within the 
local Labour movement with the national Party line it will 
bring out more fully the reasons for the failure of the 
CPGB's anti-fascist strategy. 
In its examination of the CPGB on a local scale this 
study will draw heavily upon the recently opened CPGB 
archives. The reports on the West Yorkshire Communist Party 
given to the Central Committee and Political Bureau by 
Maurice Ferguson and Marion Jessop provide an immense amount 
of detail about the growth of local communist membership and 
the campaigning activities of local Party members. The 
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picture which is drawn by these reports, of a small 
communist membership whose campaigning priorities were just 
as often determined by local conditions as by King Street 
directives, is largely corroborated by the minutes of the 
Trade Councils in Bradford, Huddersfield and Leeds. 
The united front against fascism 1933-35 
The rapidity and ease with which fascism crushed the German 
Labour movement following Hitler's assumption of the 
chancellorship in January 1933 was a matter of great concern 
to the European Labour movement. Following the crushing of 
the KPD the Comintern failed to offer a coherent analysis of 
the fascist phenomenon, and throughout 1933 was paralysed by 
the sectarian principles of the `Third Period' which 
prevented it from playing a meaningful role in the struggle 
against fascism. As McDermott and Agnew have observed, `it 
is not surprising that communist approaches for a united 
front with the social democrats were rebuffed at this 
time'. 40 
During 1934 the Comintern gradually abandoned its 
sectarianism towards social democracy and embraced the 
working class united front against fascism. This took place 
against a background of much internal wrangling within the 
ECCI which sought to dovetail its strategy with the 
interests of Soviet foreign policy for alliances with 
Britain and France. 41 In the autumn of 1934 the united front 
was broadened out into the popular front against fascism 
which involved the Labour movement collaborating with non- 
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socialist parties. This class collaboration approach was 
formally adopted by the Communist International at its 
Seventh World Congress during July-August 1935 and set in 
motion, `a highly contradictory period in Comintern 
history'. 42 
The contradictory process whereby the Comintern adopted 
the united front and popular front will be examined in some 
detail against the background of developments in Soviet 
foreign policy in chapters one and two. This background 
knowledge is essential in helping us to understand the 
evolution of the CPGB's anti-fascist strategy, which took as 
its reference point developments in Soviet state policy. 
Throughout the 1930s the CPGB took the defence of the Soviet 
Union as the basic determinant of its anti-fascist policies. 
In an article for Labour Monthly in October 1935 on the 
decisions of the Comintern's Seventh World Congress Harry 
Pollitt commented that defence of the USSR which had seen 
`The irrevocable victory of socialism' was `the test of our 
socialist faith'. 43 He went on to declare that: 
we of the Communist Party of Great Britain, in line with 
every section of the Communist International support 100 
per cent, and without any reservations everything that 
the Soviet Union does in its foreign policy, because we 
understand that this foreign policy is in accord with 
the interests of the international working class. 44 
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J. R. Campbell was even franker in admitting that defence of 
the USSR was the basic determinant of CPGB policy: 
Make no mistake about it. If we want the overthrow of 
capitalism, we must defend the country that has already 
overthrown capitalism... It means different tactics 
according to whether one's capitalist government is in 
the combination against the Soviet Union or is - for its 
own purposes - fighting alongside the Soviet Union. 45 
The failure of the Comintern to develop an effective 
response to the rise of fascism in Germany raises the 
question of how did the CPGB react to the Nazi victory? Did 
its political line during 1933 reflect the Comintern's 
sectarian policy which blamed the 'social fascists' of 
social democracy for the victory of fascism in Germany; if 
so, what were the implications of this for its relationship 
with the Labour movement? 
The persistence of stubborn disagreements within the 
Comintern leadership during 1933-34 raises several 
questions. To what degree were divisions within the ECCI 
reflected within the leadership of the CPGB? Was the CPGB's 
anti-fascist strategy shaped by a particular definition of 
fascism? The answers to these questions determined how the 
CPGB orientated itself to the British political scene. 
Throughout 1933 and for much of 1934 when the Comintern was 
paralysed by inaction due to a lack of direction from the 
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CPSU, was the CPGB affected in a similar manner, or did it 
go out and actively oppose fascism? 
Many historians of the CPGB have portrayed its response 
to fascism in a rather simplistic manner, failing to take 
account of the nuances in its anti-fascist strategy; and the 
divisions within the leadership over the united front in 
1933 and those between the leadership and sections of the 
membership over the Party's attitude towards the struggle 
against the BUF during 1933-34. There is a common perception 
that, from the rise of fascism in Germany, the CPGB led the 
struggle against the BUF and that it immediately adopted the 
united front against fascism. 46 
Chapters one and two of this study will attempt to reveal 
that the CPGB during 1933 and for much of 1934 was crippled 
by the same sectarianism prevalent within the Comintern. 
This lack of firm direction from the ECCI created serious 
divisions within the CPGB leadership over the united front 
during 1933. It was not until October 1934 that the CPGB 
with Comintern approval threw over the sectarian principles 
of the `Third Period' and finally adopted the united front 
from above. 
Throughout 1933-34 the CPGB was also divided by its 
attitude to the struggle against the BUF. The leadership 
held a conception of fascism which saw the main threat of 
such reaction in Britain as stemming from the measures of 
the National Government which were leading to the gradual 
`fascisation' of society; consequently it saw the struggle 
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against the BUF as politically irrelevant. To most workers 
and a significant minority of its membership the Communist 
Party's call for the overthrow of the `pro-fascist' National 
Government seemed rather utopian. However, the fight against 
the BUF offered them an openly pro-fascist target which they 
linked with the fascist parties on the continent. 
Consequently during 1933 and 1934 sections of the CPGB 
membership linked up with their Labour movement counterparts 
to confront the blackshirts on the streets of Britain; in 
defiance of the Central Committee's disapproval for such 
tactics. By the summer of 1934 the CPGB leadership had 
changed its position in favour of participating in the 
struggle against the BUF. This change in attitude was 
brought about by pressure `from below' of the anti-Mosley 
movement, and the new thinking in anti-fascist strategy 
pioneered within the Comintern by Dimitrov. 
Taking this down to a local level: how did communists in 
West Yorkshire react to, and campaign against, the threat 
posed by fascism? Were they as slow as the national CPGB 
leadership in realising the mobilising potential of the 
anti-Mosley struggle, or did they get involved in the 
struggle against the BUF before the national leadership 
changed its position on this issue? Concomitant with this, 
was the local Communist Party gripped by the same 
sectarianism towards the Labour movement which during 1933- 
34 held back the Party's united front campaigns nationally? 
35 
The popular front against fascism 1935-39 
Chapters three to five seek to examine how the CPGB sought 
to implement the new popular front policy adopted by the 
Comintern at its Seventh World Congress in 1935. Throughout 
these years Soviet foreign policy requirements were to 
determine the anti-fascist strategy of Comintern more openly 
than in the 1933-34 period. As McDermott and Agnew have 
observed: 
From 1935 the on-going search for indigenous forms of 
the Popular Front became inextricably interwoven with, 
and indeed increasingly subservient to, the foreign 
policy requirements of the Soviet state. 47 
The CPGB too, was not exempt from this process, its anti- 
fascist strategy during 1935-39 was geared towards the 
formation of a popular front movement capable of changing 
the direction of British foreign policy, from its pro-German 
orientation to one favouring a military pact with the USSR. 
In Britain the Communist Party's struggle for the popular 
front passed through several stages taking a more circuitous 
route than in France and Spain. 
There has been considerable debate amongst historians as 
to the role of the CPGB's popular front campaigns in the 
second half of the 1930s. As Branson has noted the dominant 
conception amongst historians of the popular front has been 
that it was essentially an electoral manoeuvre which was 
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largely ineffective in realising its objective of an anti- 
government combination powerful enough to defeat the 
government. 48 Bornstein and Richardson, Grant and Jacobs go 
further in their criticisms of the popular front arguing 
that it led the CPGB to refrain from militant anti-fascist 
activity, such as the struggle against the BUF, in favour of 
popular front style alliances with non-socialists. 49 
In assessing the veracity of such charges it would be 
most instructive to examine the claims of Joe Jacobs (who 
was secretary of the Stepney Communist Party in 1936) in his 
autobiography that the CPGB leadership refused to 
participate in the build up to the `Battle of Cable Street' 
on October 4 1936. Indeed, he claims that it was only due to 
the strong pressure from the Party rank and file that the 
leadership changed its position, at the beginning of 
October, to one that opposed Mosley's march through the East 
End. This pressure led the CPGB leadership to sanction the 
Party's participation in the activities to block the 
blackshirts' march, thereby saving it from a humiliating 
loss of face and a considerable drop in support. 50 Chapter 
three of this study will provide evidence to substantiate 
the claims made by Jacobs, illustrating how there was a 
considerable distance between the position of the national 
leadership on anti-fascist strategy and sections of the rank 
and file. 
There are, however, those such as Branson, Fyrth and 
Morgan who strongly dispute the above views. They believe 
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that the popular front had a considerable degree of success 
and dispute the view that it was an electoral contrivance 
which led the Communist Party to refrain from militant anti- 
fascist activity. They point to the key role played by the 
CPGB in delivering aid to Republican Spain, and how it 
mobilised tens of thousands in the campaign for peace. 51 
In defence of the CPGB Kevin Morgan has claimed that at 
the Comintern's Seventh World Congress both Dutt and 
Dimitrov insisted that fighting fascism in Britain meant 
fighting the National Government and its reactionary 
measures both at home and abroad. This view was central to 
the Party's understanding of capitalist development in 
Britain and is at the root of the contradictions in CPGB 
policy after the outbreak of war in September 1939.52 By the 
time of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War it was the 
spread of fascism on the continent and the attendant threats 
to peace that increasingly preoccupied Pollitt who began to 
regard the BUF as politically irrelevant. 53 
In assessing the CPGB's popular front strategy in the 
late 1930s it will be necessary to establish the nature of 
the popular front. Was it an electoral contrivance, or was 
it a series of mass anti-fascist movements? It will be 
necessary to examine how the Comintern envisaged the popular 
front and then look at how the CPGB interpreted this and how 
it proposed to implement the new policy. From there the 
activity of the West Yorkshire Communist Party during 1935- 
39 can be examined to see how it reacted to the new policy 
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and what effect it had upon its standing in the local Labour 
movement. Finally, any examination of the CPGB's popular 
front strategy needs to ask did this bring it any nearer to 
the goal of gaining a leading position in the British Labour 
movement? 
Chapters three and four examine the united front 
campaigns of 1936 and 1937 by which the CPGB sought to gain 
affiliation to the Labour Party, which was seen as the first 
essential step towards establishing a popular front movement 
in Britain. Previous accounts of these campaigns have not 
explored in any depth the CPGB's motives for participating 
in these campaigns, nor what the Party hoped to gain from 
participation in them. The answers to such questions will 
help provide a better understanding of these campaigns and 
what brought about their demise. 54 The role of the Moscow 
show trials in undermining support for them will be stressed 
in particular. 
Chapters three to five of this study will assess what 
truth there is to the allegations that the CPGB, from the 
Comintern's adoption of the popular front, began to `soft 
pedal' socialist propaganda and downplay the class struggle 
leading to a gradual withdrawal from militant anti-fascist 
activity, so as not to offend non-socialist allies away from 
supporting the popular front. Detailed study of the anti- 
Mosley movement during 1935-36 confirms that the Communist 
Party leadership put little emphasis upon the struggle 
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against the blackshirts, due to its pursuit of the popular 
front. 
Chapter five of this study examines what truth there is 
in the allegations that the Communist Party's popular front 
campaigns of 1938-39 were electoral manoeuvres which tried 
to compromise the independence of the Labour movement in 
order to form an electoral coalition strong enough to change 
the direction of British foreign policy. This chapter will 
highlight the role of Soviet foreign policy in determining 
the popular front policy of the CPGB during these years. 
During 1938-39 the Soviet government tried to obtain a 
military alliance with Britain to no avail. The CPGB 
leadership, taking its cue from the diplomatic requirements 
of Moscow, continued to pursue affiliation to the Labour 
Party. It hoped that once communist affiliation to Labour 
had been achieved the latter could be persuaded to take a 
leading role in a popular front combination whose aim would 
be to bring down the government, and replace it with a 
people's government favourable to a pact with the USSR. 
However, these attempts at affiliation were undermined by 
the CPGB's leading role in the United Peace Alliance and the 
Communist Crusades of 1938-39. Communist affiliation failed 
because these campaigns sought to compromise the electoral 
independence of Labour by linking it up in a popular front 
coalition with non-socialists from the anti-appeasement 
wings of the Liberal and Conservative Parties. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A Year Of Paralysis - 1933 
"... in reality the victory of Hitler is the greatest 
defeat of the proletariat in the history of the world". 
Leon Trotsky, August 1933.1 
The complete destruction of the German Labour movement, 
which followed Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship, 
was viewed with great concern by the international Labour 
movement. It opened up the perspective of world war as 
Hitler undertook a massive rearmament programme. 2 The 
victory of fascism in Germany set in motion a chain of 
events that led to World War Two. The international 
struggle against fascism which was ignited by the Nazi 
victory in Germany, came to dominate world history for 
the next twelve years and reached its conclusion in May 
1945. 
The emergence of German fascism in 1933 led to a 
crisis in Soviet and Comintern policy. Their ineffective 
response to the fascist phenomenon had considerable 
repercussions for the CPGB. The central argument of 
chapter one will be that the British Communist Party's 
response to the struggle against fascism was conditioned 
primarily by the requirements of Soviet, and in turn, 
Comintern policy. With its anti-fascist policies guided 
in the main by edicts coming from Moscow, the British 
Communist Party often found itself out of touch with 
indigenous anti-fascist sentiment. This account will 
challenge the conventional view of this period that the 
Communist Party was the leading force in the struggle 
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against the British Union of Fascists (BUF). 3 It will 
also bring to attention the numerous divisions which 
gripped the Communist Party during 1933, over its 
response to the emergence of German fascism; divisions 
which have largely gone unacknowledged by historians. 
In the first section of chapter one the contradictory 
Policies of Comintern will be examined against the 
background of developments in Soviet foreign policy. 
Following on from this, we shall look at how the CPGB 
responded to the victory of fascism in Germany. Did its 
political line faithfully reflect Comintern's sectarian 
line? If so, what were the implications of this for its 
relationship with the British labour movement? Did the 
Comintern line help or hinder the CPGB in developing an 
effective anti-fascist strategy, that would end its 
political isolation? 
After examining the response of the Communist Party to 
the struggle against fascism, attention will be paid to 
how the rank and file responded to this phenomenon. 
Constrained by the sectarian principles of the `Third 
Period' and the requirements of Soviet 
foreign policy, 
the national leadership of the CPGB remained aloof from 
the struggle against the blackshirts 
during 1933 and the 
first half of 1934. Meanwhile a section of the Party 
membership got actively involved in the struggle against 
the BUF; revealing a clear division of opinion over anti- 
fascist strategy between the 
leadership and sections of 
the membership who felt 
less constrained by the policy 
edicts of Moscow. The CPGB's response to the struggle 
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against fascism was conditioned primarily by the 
requirements of Soviet and Comintern policy, which led it 
becoming out of touch with indigenous anti-fascist 
sentiment when it came to the struggle against the BUF. 
The international situation 
The victory of fascism in Germany brought a new threat to 
the security of the Soviet Union. Throughout 1933 the 
leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) developed a two-fold strategy to try and counter 
the threat posed by German fascism. This involved the 
Soviet Union trying to maintain the pro-German 
orientation of its foreign policy. As Soviet-German 
relations began to worsen in the second half of 1933, 
the leadership of the CPSU began to look towards 
improving its diplomatic relations with the Versailles 
powers (France and Britain). 
The preoccupation of the Soviet leadership with 
internal and diplomatic affairs, meant that the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) during 
1933 was usually left to its own devices when it came to 
working out a response to the new menace posed by German 
fascism. On the one occasion Stalin turned his attention 
to Comintern he instructed the ECCI to direct all 
communist parties, `to step up the campaign against the 
Second International and its sections [which] are 
subverting the struggle against fascism... '. 4 Apart from 
this one occasion, the lack of guidance from the CPSU 
(which was the ultimate arbiter of Comintern policy), 
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meant the ECCI dared not take any independent initiatives 
of its own; while waiting for a signal from the Kremlin, 
it merely carried on with the sectarian policies which 
had played such a part in helping the fascists to power 
in Germany. Thus the Comintern and its constituent 
sections were unable to work out an effective response to 
the emergence of fascism in Germany. 
Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship on 30 
January 1933 left the European Labour movement in a 
state of shock. 5 The first response from the European 
Labour movement came on 6 February 1933 in Paris, at an 
anti-fascist conference called by seven socialist 
parties. 6 All parties present, called upon Comintern and 
the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) to convene a 
conference of the two internationals to work out a joint 
plan of action against fascism. 
The LSI responded on 19 February 1933 with an appeal 
for workers' unity to defeat fascism. In its manifesto 
the LSI agreed to participate in joint anti-fascist 
action with Comintern provided that it ceased its 
sectarian attacks on social democracy.? The Comintern's 
initial response was one of silence, this exemplified the 
sectarianism that had played such a major role in the 
defeat of the German Labour movement. 8 The Nazi burning 
of the Reichstag on 27 February 1933, which was used as 
the pretext for the crushing of the German Communist 
Party (KPD), forced Comintern to respond to the L. S. I's 
overture. The Comintern manifesto of 5 March 1933, 
attempted to minimize the magnitude of the disaster in 
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Germany. Avoiding a critical appraisal of the Comintern's 
failure in Germany, it blamed the SPD for Hitler's 
victory and praised the KPD's anti-fascist strategy. 9 To 
have criticised the KPD would have thrown some 
responsibility for Hitler's victory onto the Comintern. 
This in turn would have meant an implicit criticism of 
the CPSU which was the ultimate arbiter of Comintern 
strategy. 
The Comintern manifesto of 5 March 1933 was a very 
contradictory document. It called upon its sections to 
approach the leadership of all the parties belonging to 
the LSI with united front proposals for joint anti- 
fascist action. At the same time Comintern believed that 
regardless of what attitude the social democratic leaders 
adopted, the united front from below could be built by 
communist and social democratic workers. 10 As E. H. Carr 
has observed it was a `half-hearted response to a half- 
hearted appeal' which invited rejection by the social 
democratic parties. 11 The Comintern manifesto of 5 March 
1933, was a sop to the growing desire for unity within 
the European labour movement, in the face of the fascist 
menace, for after this, Comintern maintained the 
sectarian tactics of the `Third Period' with renewed 
vigour. 12 To understand the reaction of Comintern, and in 
turn the CPGB, to fascism during the period 1933-1935 it 
is essential to look at communist anti-fascist strategy 
during the early 1930s. 
In the early 1930s Comintern supported the idea of the 
united front from below, between communist and social 
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democratic workers. During this period Comintern pursued 
a sectarian policy that criticized the 'social 
fascist' leaders of the social democratic parties for 
their class collaboration with capitalism; and for 
refusing to organise any anti-fascist action with the 
communist parties. This policy injected fratricidal 
strife into the German Labour movement. The consequences 
of this were that there was no serious resistance from 
the German Labour movement to Hitler's rise to power. The 
German SPD leaders played an equally negative role in 
refusing to organise any mass struggles against the 
Nazis. In Britain, the 'social fascist' line led to the 
CPGB losing a large section of its membership and to its 
isolation within the British Labour movement. If it had 
not been for the financial and organisational support of 
Comintern then the CPGB would probably have collapsed as 
a result of the 'social fascist' line. 13 
As far as the Soviet government was concerned Hitler's 
victory changed nothing in its relations with Germany. 
Faced with acute internal economic problems and the 
perceived danger of intervention from the Versailles 
powers, the Soviet government was determined to maintain 
friendly relations with Germany. Following Hitler's 
ratification of the protocol extending the Soviet-German 
treaty of April 1926, Izvestia commented on 6 May 1933, 
'The cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy is peace..., in 
this spirit the Soviet Union does not wish to alter 
anything in its attitude to Germany'. 14 Trotsky observed 
at the time that the diplomatic pact which the Soviet 
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government had signed with Nazi Germany created revulsion 
within the European labour movement at such crude 
opportunism. 15 The Comintern's uncritical defence of 
Soviet foreign policy was a source of serious friction 
between the ILP and the CPGB. 16 
At the Presidium of the ECCI on 1 April 1933, came the 
first formal assessment by Comintern of Hitler's victory; 
it blamed social democracy for Hitler's victory. While 
appealing for a, `united front of social-democratic and 
communist workers', it maintained that the chief obstacle 
to a successful struggle against fascism was the 
socialist parties policy of, `collaboration with the 
bourgeoisie and help for reaction under the pretence of 
pursuing the tactic of the "lesser evil"'. 17 
Alarmed by the increasingly hostile tone of Hitler's 
foreign policy pronouncements, the Soviet government sent 
out feelers to France and Britain. The second half of 
1933 saw the steady improvement of relations between 
France and the Soviet Union and the slow decay of Soviet- 
German relations. 18 Thus the Soviet government evolved a 
two-fold diplomatic strategy. It continued to seek good 
relations with Germany but as a kind of insurance policy 
against this relationship turning sour, the Soviet 
government secretly sought a rapprochement with France. 
The end of 1933 saw a new turn in Soviet foreign 
policy signalled by Stalin in an interview given to the 
New York Times. By this time the desire to maintain good 
relations with Germany had been replaced by fear of 
Germany. In his interview on 25 December Stalin hinted at 
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a major reorientation in Soviet foreign policy, following 
Germany and Japan's withdrawal from the League of 
Nations, `... if the League were to turn out to be an 
obstacle, even a small one, that made war more 
difficult.... then it is not impossible we shall support 
the League'. 19 On 28 December 1933, this new turn was 
made clear when the Soviet ambassador in Paris informed 
the French government of the conditions under which his 
government would join the League of Nations. 20 
The Comintern resolution of 1 April 1933 set the tone 
for its anti-fascist policy for the rest of the year. 
Over the next eight months the Comintern carried on with 
the same contradictory line, attacking social democracy 
for paving the way for fascism while also calling for a 
united front with its various parties. 21 This raises the 
question of whether or not the CPGB's political line 
during 1933 reflected Comintern's sectarian line? If so, 
what were the implications of this for its relationship 
with the British labour movement? Did the Comintern line 
help or hinder the CPGB develop an effective anti-fascist 
strategy, which would help it break out of its political 
isolation? 
At the Thirteenth ECCI Plenum during December 1933, 
the resolutions adopted revealed that Stalin was 
gradually shifting his attitude from opposition to the 
Versailles Treaty to support for it as a means of 
restraining Germany. 22 For example, the resolution on war 
referred to Germany as the chief instigator of war in 
Europe. 23 It reaffirmed the contradictory policies of the 
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5 March and 1 April manifestos, which combined hostility 
to social democracy with approaches to social democracy 
for the united front from above and below. 24 This 
contradiction in its anti-fascist policy left Comintern 
and its sections isolated bystanders to the struggle 
against fascism. As McDermott and Agnew have commented in 
their recent of history of Comintern, during 1933 it was, 
`paralysed by the sectarian postulates of the Third 
Period... '. 25 
The failure of Comintern to admit any responsibility 
for the German defeat and to critically re-evaluate its 
policies, confirmed Trotsky's assessment, made at the 
time, that there had been a qualitative change in 
Comintern's character. Trotsky observed that Comintern 
had degenerated from a `revolutionary' organisation to a 
`counter-revolutionary' organisation. In other words the 
Comintern no longer stood for organising the world 
revolution, which had been identified at its first 
congress in 1919 as its principal objective. Instead 
Comintern now was to adapt itself to supporting, 
uncritically, the goals of Soviet foreign policy. 
Comintern's refusal to learn from the mistakes of the 
German defeat confirmed its departure from the goal of 
world revolution. From that time on, the role of the 
various communist parties was that of border guards in 
defence of the Soviet Union. Increasingly the national 
sections of Comintern were to be used as pawns in 
furthering the goals of Soviet foreign policy. 26 
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It is no coincidence that just as Comintern was 
abandoning the goal of world revolution the CPGB 
leadership were privately revising their own views about 
the proximity of a revolutionary crisis in Britain. 
Fishman has noted how Harry Pollitt and J. R. Campbell 
began the process of changing the British Party's 
position and adjusting the expectations of its members; 
telling them socialism was not just around the corner but 
a whole historical era away. 27 The long-term consequences 
for the CPGB and its anti-fascist strategy were to be 
profound. It helps to explain the later direction of CPGB 
policy with its championing of popular frontism in many 
guises and forms in the mid to late 1930s. The reaction 
of the CPGB to the emergence of fascism in Germany 
reveals how it was held back by the sectarian policies of 
the Comintern. The paralysis of the Communist Party 
leadership contrasted sharply with the desire of its 
members to campaign against the activities of the BUF 
alongside their Labour movement counterparts. 
The CPGB and the united front against fascism 
What were the consequences of the German workers' defeat 
for the CPGB? The Labour Party leadership on many 
occasions cited the German defeat as a prime example of 
the failure of communist policy. 28 More importantly the 
failure of the CPGB leadership to critically analyse the 
German workers' defeat condemned them to the sterile path 
of the united front from below during 1933. Throughout 
1933 the CPGB obediently followed the ultra-left 
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sectarian line of Comintern, and not surprisingly failed 
to break out of its isolation within the British labour 
movement. Lacking any clear guidance from Comintern over 
its anti-fascist strategy, apart from the perennial 
attacks on the 'social fascists' of social democracy, the 
CPGB leadership, when left to their own devices, 
proceeded with great difficulty to come to any agreement 
over united front strategy. 
While struggling to come to agreement over united 
front strategy, the Communist Party leadership remained 
firmly aloof from the campaign against the British Union 
of Fascists. During 1933 a spontaneous movement of 
thousands of workers arose to fight the BUF up and down 
the country. This movement which gained increasing 
momentum during 1933 was to peak in the summer and autumn 
of 1934 in a series of mass activities which were to 
temporarily stem the growth of the BUF. It would appear 
that a clear division of opinion emerged between the CPGB 
leadership and large sections of its membership over 
this question. The leadership maintained the line which 
had played such a disastrous role in Germany; namely to 
attack the 'social fascists' of social democracy for 
their class collaborationist policies and to refuse to 
engage in any practical action designed to combat the 
fascists. The theoretical justification for this line 
sprang from the conception that the danger of fascism in 
Britain, came from the National Government and not from 
the BUF. Although a majority of the Communist Party 
membership remained passively immersed in the sectarian 
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attitudes of the 'Third Period', a significant minority 
of its rank and file members engaged in united front 
activity with thousands of non-communist workers in 
confronting the BUF on the streets of Britain. 
Divisions within the leadership 
At an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau on 9 March 
1933, which was the first meeting of the CPGB leadership 
after the Comintern manifesto of 5 March, the sudden 
imposition of this new line sparked off a fierce debate 
with three different interpretations of the new Comintern 
line being put forward. Pollitt opened the discussion 
complaining that the manifesto had come as a complete 
surprise and that the CPGB should have been consulted by 
Moscow. He castigated the Communist Party for failing to 
see the new international situation brought about by 
Hitler's victory and for under-estimating the desire for 
unity amongst the working class. 29 In his view the new 
united front line, gave the `approach to the masses of 
workers we are at present isolated from', and a means to 
mobilise the working class against the capitalists and 
the National Government: 
This is an entirely new departure from the old line. 
Previously we have only been concerned with the 
United Front from below. Of course, our basis for 
this new form of activity is still the factories, the 
trade union branches, and the streets, but this must 
be done in cooperation and agreement with the 
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reformist parties. This will not only extend the 
basis of the class fight and develop it to a point 
when it will repel the advance of the capitalists, 
but it will accelerate the end of capitalist 
exploitation. 30 
Gallacher agreed with Pollitt that the new line offered 
the Communist Party an opportunity to break down its 
political isolation, yet he emphasised that it was on the 
electoral front that this could be best achieved. He 
argued that the new line meant the united front from 
above in the form of an electoral bloc with the Labour 
Party at local and national level. Gallacher declared 
that in the impending East Rhondda by-election, the 
Communist Party should call a local united front 
conference of all working-class organisations, to choose 
a single candidate around which they could unite in order 
to defeat the National Government candidate. Such a 
policy if implemented nationally by the CPGB would not 
only bring it parliamentary representation; but would 
also bring it wide acceptance within the Labour movement 
by abandoning its past sectarian practice of standing 
against Labour. 31 
Not surprisingly this interpretation of the new united 
front line from Comintern came in for much criticism. 
Shields, who led the way for the sectarian old guard, 
accused Gallacher of wanting to dissolve the CPGB in an 
unprincipled bloc with reformism: 
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Does it mean that we are now in a situation where all 
we have learned of the leading role of the Party is 
pushed aside. No. Now the leading role of the Party 
is brought more to the front. 32 
His call for the Communist Party to stand as an 
independent party in elections was endorsed by a majority 
of those present including Pollitt. Shields, however, 
came in for strong criticism from Pollitt when he argued 
that the Comintern manifesto should be used to help 
expose the `social fascist' leaders of the Labour Party 
as being unwilling and unable to join in the fight 
against fascism. Throughout his contribution Shields 
emphasised the united front from below. 33 
Springhall warned the Political Bureau that in 
carrying through the change in policy, it would have to 
guard against right and left deviations from the new line 
amongst the membership. But he did feel that it would be 
a less divisive issue than when they had to swing the 
Party behind the `Third Period' line. Despite all of the 
disagreements it was agreed to write to the Labour Party 
calling for a united front agreement between the two 
parties. 34 
Springhall turned out to be right in his estimation 
that the new united front line would be less damaging to 
the Communist Party than the debates over the `Third 
Period' policy in the late 1920s. During 1933 the CPGB 
leadership would be left alone to interpret the new line 
because the ECCI itself was paralysed by a lack of 
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direction from the CPSU. As a result of this lack of firm 
direction from Comintern the CPGB leadership was to be 
plagued by divisions over the united front. Fierce 
controversy raged for months on both the Central 
Committee and Political Bureau over the new united front 
line. 
At the Political Bureau on 6 April 1933, we find 
Pollitt complaining, 'If by this time we are not clear on 
the meaning of the CC letter and ECCI manifesto we will 
never get it clear'. He referred to the fierce 
controversy over the united front and electoral tactics 
as a side issue. 35 Yet a month later at the Political 
Bureau on 4 May 1933, Pollitt in giving a report from the 
secretariat, was forced to admit that the secretariat was 
divided and unable to come up with a commonly agreed 
position on this question. 36 
At this meeting Gallacher reiterated his call for an 
electoral selection conference of all the workers 
parties, to choose a common united front candidate in all 
constituencies. In opposition, Pollitt argued that where 
Party branches had the resources they should stand 
independently in elections. Only if the branch was not 
standing in an area and if the local Labour or ILP 
candidate fully endorsed the Communist Party's united 
front programme would it be possible to advocate a vote 
for them. Shields called for the Communist Party to run 
candidates in the elections, `no matter whether they 
conflict with the ILP or anybody else'. He was in a 
minority of one when he demanded that in areas where the 
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Communist Party had no candidate it should advise workers 
to write `Communist' on their ballot paper. 37 
Anxious to press on with the Communist Party's united 
front campaign, which had been held back by the divisions 
within the leadership, Pollitt was successful in his 
attempt to paper over these divisions. He proposed that 
the secretariat draw up a statement based on his majority 
point of view. However, owing to the controversial nature 
of the discussion, he proposed that the secretariat send 
a draft of this statement on the united front to the 
Political Bureau for approval, before sending it out to 
the membership as official policy. 38 This artificial 
unity within the leadership was to greatly hamper the 
Communist Party's united front campaigns. 
The continuing divisions within the leadership found 
their reflection in the activities of the membership. In 
districts such as the Bradford, where the Central 
Committee member was an enthusiastic advocate of the 
Pollitt line, CPGB branches were far less sectarian in 
their attitudes towards the local Labour movement. This 
undoubtedly contributed to their united front successes; 
whereas in the neighbouring Sheffield district, which was 
led by Macilhone, who was a firm advocate of the united 
front from below, the branches revealed evidence of 
strong sectarian attitudes to the local Labour movement. 
At the Political Bureau in September 1933, the 
controversial question of united front strategy was 
raised once more by Pollitt, when he called for the 
Communist Party to change its position on the forthcoming 
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municipal elections, in order to breathe new life into 
its united front campaign. Yet only two days previously 
Pollitt had declared, `The whole truth of the matter is 
that the united front is as dead as a doornail. No united 
front exists as we thought to achieve it'. 39 He was 
referring to the Communist Party's failure to achieve any 
kind of united front activity with the Labour Party and 
TUC at a national level. Meanwhile its tenuous united 
front with the ILP lacked any real substance and was 
largely confined to the odd joint meeting. 
The new united front proposals put forward by Pollitt, 
called for the leadership of the various districts of the 
Communist Party to approach the ILP candidates for the 
municipal elections, with the demand for an electoral 
bloc between the two parties. Where no agreement was 
reached local communists would stand candidates as 
before. 40 This represented a considerable softening of 
the CPGB's line with regard to the united front. However 
when it came to the municipal elections in November 1933, 
the Communist Party had reverted back to the sectarianism 
of the 5 March Comintern manifesto. In a Daily Worker 
editorial on election day the Communist Party called on 
workers to vote for communist candidates who constituted, 
e a clear class challenge to the moderate and Labour 
representatives of capitalist policy'; where there was no 
communist candidate it called on workers to write 
`communist' on the ballot paper. 41 
Throughout 1933 the Communist Party leadership despite 
its divisions over united front policy, kept up a steady 
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stream of sectarian invective against the Labour Party 
and the ILP leadership. This coupled with the numerous 
declarations against communism by the Labour Party and 
TUC, played a considerable part in the CPGB's poor 
performance in the November municipal elections. The 
Communist Party only put up 97 candidates, in contrast to 
the 150 candidates in 1932, which in itself was a sign of 
its continuing weakness, the vast majority of whom polled 
less than five percent of the vote. 42 Above all else, its 
poor results revealed the desire of most workers for 
class unity against the Tory enemy around their 
traditional organisations. They also revealed working 
class rejection of a tiny party, which had shown little 
sign of having overcome its reputation for strident 
sectarianism. In his report to the Thirteenth ECCI Plenum 
in December 1933 on the united front in Britain, Pollitt 
noted the negative effect upon the CPGB of its sectarian 
tactics: 
In fact so strong is this hostility to the National 
Government that in all the recent elections the 
question of the Communists splitting the workers 
votes now takes a sharper form than ever before, and 
this is fed by the Labour Party propaganda. 43 
As will emerge later, when examining the Bradford 
district, the membership did not move uniformly behind 
the conception of the united front held by the national 
leadership. Reports from the districts to the Central 
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Committee and Political Bureau, reveal that a majority of 
the membership remained passively stuck to the sectarian 
line of the united front from below. 44 Yet a minority of the 
membership did shake off the sectarianism of the past, and 
managed to gain partial acceptance by local Labour movement 
activists. This was achieved in many areas through local 
communists getting involved in the campaign against the BUF. 
It is this particular struggle, which revealed divisions 
over anti-fascist strategy between the national CPGB 
leadership and sections of the rank and file, that we will 
now move onto. 
The Communist Party and the struggle against the BUF 
During 1933 the Communist Party leadership was preoccupied 
with the question of the united front and virtually ignored 
the growing movement of the BUF. It focused instead on what 
it saw as the emergence of fascism in British society, 
through constitutional channels by the National 
Government. 45 The CPGB leadership held the belief that the 
main fascist threat in Britain came from the National 
Government, and not from the BUF, this merely followed the 
line laid down by Comintern. 46 In declaring that the main 
threat of fascism came from the National Government, the 
Communist Party leadership failed to see the mobilising 
potential of the fight against the BUF. It also showed how 
out of touch they were with the majority of workers who saw 
the main threat of fascism in Britain coming from the BUF. 
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To most workers and a significant minority of its 
membership, the Communist Party's call for the overthrow of 
the National Government seemed rather utopian. However, the 
fight against the BUF offered them an openly fascist target 
which they linked with the victorious far-right parties on 
the continent. 
The debates over the united front which dominated the 
meetings of the Central Committee and Political Bureau 
during the spring of 1933, meant that it was not until the 
summer that the Communist Party leadership got to discuss 
the question of fascism in Britain. At the Central Committee 
in June, which discussed a report back on the European Anti- 
Fascist Congress, of 4 June 1933, there was a large degree 
of unanimity that the main threat of fascism in Britain came 
from the National Government. In his report back from this 
congress organised by the Comintern, Ted Bramley stated 
that: 
the big thing is to develop in the reporting campaign of 
what fascism is here in England and show what the so- 
called constitutional methods of the British Government 
are and the forces inside the government of a fascist 
character in order to give the workers a correct 
perspective. 47 
Bramley went on to declare that the fight against the 
`reactionary' TUC leaders will, 'need to be made part of the 
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fight against fascism'. In dismissing the fight against the 
BUF as irrelevant to the main anti-fascist struggle in 
Britain, he declared, `We have already waged a fight against 
the line of breaking up fascist meetings'. Rejecting such 
activity as counter-productive, he argued for an ideological 
campaign exposing the reactionary nature of fascism in 
power. 48 
Several other contributions to the meeting made similar 
points dismissing the struggle against the BUF. However, 
Willie Gallacher observed that many workers saw the BUF, 
rather than the National Government, as the main fascist 
enemy in Britain, `The impression exists in many parts of 
the country that when a group of fascists come out that we 
should go out and beat them up'. 49 
It was agreed by this meeting that the CPGB branches 
should build up local anti-fascist committees, and consider 
organising a national anti-fascist conference in September 
1934. The Communist Party membership was called upon to step 
up its campaign for the Reichstag fire trial defendants. 50 
The Party leadership also came out against the demand from 
sections of the membership, for a workers defence force to 
protect Labour movement events from fascist attack. 51 
Despite the refusal of the CPGB leadership to come out in 
support of the fight against the BUF, and their disapproval 
of the tactic of breaking up fascist meetings, it appears 
that sections of the membership ignored the line of the 
leadership on this question. Recent accounts of anti-fascist 
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activity in Lancashire and the North East reveal that local 
communists linked up with other Labour movement activists to 
physically confront the BUF and break up its activities. 52 
While not encouraging action against the BUF, it would 
appear that the Communist Party leadership turned a blind 
eye to the involvement of its members in such activities; 
for as one Central Committee member put it: 
Whilst I agree with everything that has been said on the 
subject at the same time, we must be careful not to push 
the workers from action, for fear of alienating then 
from the Party. 53 
Detailed study of the Daily Worker throughout 1933, reveals 
that in towns and cities up and down the country, thousands 
of workers turned out on demonstrations to oppose the menace 
of European fascism, and to oppose the meetings and 
activities of the BUF. The reports of these clashes with the 
BUF clearly reveal the presence of Communist Party members. 
In a majority of cases the workers' hatred for the fascists 
led them to disrupt and break up BUF meetings. This usually 
took the form of either vocally drowning out the fascist 
speaker or knocking over the platform. There were instances 
where fascist meetings went undisputed, but this was usually 
due to a large police presence. 54 
To compound their failure to actively intervene in this 
movement against the BUF, the CPGB leadership, taking their 
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cue from Comintern, adopted the sectarian position of 
refusing to give any support to the Labour movement campaign 
boycotting German goods. In an article in Communist 
International, the point was made that the proposed boycott 
campaign was designed by the `social fascists' of social 
democracy to draw the masses into a united front with their 
own bourgeoisie. 55 Following the Comintern line on this 
issue, which itself reflected the Soviet government's 
attempt to maintain good relations with the Hitler regime, 
the Daily Worker commented: 
They talk of boycotting goods, but they are much 
concerned in boycotting the building of the workers' 
united front... Fascism can be beaten not by the boycott 
of German goods but by the building of the workers' 
front. 56 
Needless to say that by boycotting this Labour movement 
campaign, the Communist Party was to reinforce its 
reputation for sectarianism within the Labour movement. The 
fact that this action of Comintern and the CPGB was dictated 
by the needs of Soviet foreign policy with its pro-German 
orientation, would not have been lost on many Labour 
movement activists. 
The dichotomy between the national Party leadership and 
sections of the rank and file over the questions of anti- 
fascism and the united front will be explored further in the 
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next section. Close examination of the Communist Party in 
West Yorkshire will reveal that local communists often 
proved to be more in tune with the anti-fascist sentiment of 
ordinary workers than the national leadership, which was 
constrained by the dictates of Moscow. Having said this, the 
local membership still adhered to many of the sectarian 
beliefs of the national leadership. 
The Communist Party in West Yorkshire - 1933 
In January 1933 the Bradford district of the Communist 
Party, which covered the old West Riding, was reduced to the 
status of a sub-district, owing to its grave weakness and 
isolation and became part of the enormous Sheffield 
district. 57 Under the impetus of the new united front 
tactics, the membership of the Bradford sub-district grew 
from 92 in January to 162 by July and reached 190 by 
December 1933.58 This growth led the Political Bureau to 
reconstitute Bradford as a district in its own right in 
August. It was also felt that the new Bradford district 
would benefit from its newly-found political autonomy. The 
Political Bureau felt that it would be more able to apply 
the new united front line to suit local conditions, than the 
Sheffield district leadership. 
What emerges from the reports given to the Political 
Bureau is of a numerically small district, the smallest in 
the CPGB at that time, whose two principal centres were in 
Bradford and Leeds. Under the stewardship of Maurice 
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Ferguson, the district organiser and Central Committee for 
the area, the local Communist Party notched up some notable 
successes in its united front work, particularly in the 
trade unions. 59 
In his contributions to the Central Committee, Ferguson 
emerges as a supporter of the Pollitt line in the united 
front debate. Out of all the district reports given at the 
Political Bureau and Central Committee, Bradford emerges as 
one of the least sectarian districts of the Communist Party. 
Districts such as Lancashire and Tyneside appear to have 
been gripped by sectarian attitudes towards the Labour 
movement, where a majority of the membership that was in 
work refused to get active in trade unions. By contrast, the 
Bradford district had one of the highest proportions of 
members active in a union in the country. The following 
figures illustrate the growing success of the district 
leadership in weaning members away from sectarian attitudes 
to the Labour movement: 61 
Bradford Leeds Keighly 
July August July August July August 
Members 50 50 55 55 29 30 
in 1933 
Active in union 15 23 17 25 18 
Eligible for 
union membership 9-9-2 
At the Political Bureau in July 1933 it was noted of the 
Bradford district, 'In general we can see a remarkable 
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improvement in the mass work of the Party in this district, 
particularly in regard to trade union work and work in the 
Trades Council'. 61 In the last section of this chapter the 
activities of the CPGB branches in Bradford and Leeds will 
be examined in some detail, with particular attention 
focused on their activities on the local trades councils, 
which were the backbone of the local Labour movement. 
As Richard Stevens has commented, the influence and 
activities of communists on trades councils during this 
period have, `often been referred to by historians, but has 
apparently been little investigated in detail'. 62 On the 
Trades Councils of Bradford and Leeds the local communists 
exercised an influence out of proportion to their small 
numbers. Stevens study of communist influence on the trades 
councils of the East Midlands also reveals a similar 
picture. 63 In Bradford and Leeds as in the West Midlands, 
the key to the disproportionate influence exerted by 
communist activists was the support they got from left 
Labour activists. 64 In both areas local communists enjoyed 
rather mixed fortunes in the face of stiff opposition from 
Labour loyalists who sought to contain communist 
influence. 65 By examining the extent to which the local 
trades councils adopted left-wing stances, the depth of 
communist influence will be revealed. 
Leeds Communist Party 
The Communist Party had only a couple of delegates on the 
Leeds Trades Council in 1933. This together with the 
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weakness of the ILP in Leeds, meant that the local 
communists united front campaign started from a low base of 
support. Their united front approaches to the Leeds City 
Labour Party and the Trades Council were rejected out of 
hand. Undeterred the Leeds communists carried their united 
front campaign into the lower echelons of the local Labour 
movement, with a limited degree of success. 
In April 1933 Blenheim Ward Labour Party and North Leeds 
Divisional Labour Party, declared their support for a united 
front with the Communist Party. 66 The local Communist Party 
focused in particular upon the local League of Youth 
branches. This proved to be a much more fruitful area of 
work, with communist speakers becoming a regular feature at 
League of Youth meetings. At least three of the League of 
Youth branches came out in favour of joint action with the 
Communist Party. This was the result of slow patient work by 
the Leeds communists, in cultivating contacts within the 
local Leagues of Youth. 67 Work such as this was all the more 
impressive given the anti-communist atmosphere, which 
prevailed at times within the Leeds Labour movement. 
The Leeds Communist Party initially made some headway on 
the Trades Council with its anti-war united front work. Up 
until the end of May the Leeds Trades Council actively 
participated in the work of the Leeds Anti-War Committee, 
sending delegates to its conferences. 68 However, during the 
spring of 1933 alarm at the activity of the Communist Party 
within the local Labour movement led to the right-wing of 
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the Leeds City Labour Party launching a counter-offensive 
against the united front work of the local communists. 
At the April executive of Leeds Trades Council a letter 
was read out from the City Labour Party; calling on the 
Trades Council to withdraw its support for the Leeds Anti- 
War Committee, for it was a communist front proscribed by 
the national Labour Party. The Trades Council executive 
unsure of how to proceed, wrote to the TUC for guidance in 
this matter. 69 Dissatisfied with the response of the Trades 
Council executive, Leeds Labour Party sent another letter 
this time to the April meeting of the full Trades Council, 
questioning the wisdom of the Trades Council in reading out 
correspondence from the Leeds Anti-War Committee. When the 
issue was put to the vote the Trades Council rejected the 
anti-communist manoeuvres of the local Labour Party; and 
voted 49 to 28 to carry on reading out correspondence from 
the Leeds Anti-War Committee. 70 
Undaunted by this set back, Leeds Labour Party sent yet 
another letter to the Trades Council in May calling for 
loyalty to `our own movement' which played upon memories of 
the sectarianism of the Communist Party's `class-against- 
class' period. This together with the TUC reply to its 
enquiry about the British Anti-War Movement led the Trades 
Council, after a long and heated discussion, to agree to 
sever its ties with the local anti-war committee. 71 
Ultimately it was loyalty to national decisions rather than 
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any hostility to communism which explains the actions of 
Leeds Trades Council. 
The offensive against the united front activities of the 
local Communist Party by Labour loyalists took many forms. 
In the Leeds branch of the National Union of Tailors and 
Garment workers (NUTGW) a full scale witch-hunt of local 
communists developed, with several of them being expelled 
from the union for producing a factory paper. 72 Yet, 
sections of the Leeds Communist Party did play into the 
hands of the local Labour Party right wing, through 
sectarian activities at several Labour movement events. 
At both the May Day rally in 1933 and at a Trades Council 
rally in June, local communists heckled Labour speakers and 
disrupted their meetings. 73 This would tend to suggest that 
the Leeds Communist Party was not solidly behind the less 
sectarian line as promulgated by Pollitt and Ferguson. While 
sections of the local Party engaged in slow patient work, 
winning over support for the united front in the Leeds 
Labour movement, others remained entrenched in the old 
sectarian attitudes. Take for example, the local branch 
secretary, Ernie Benson, who when he found work on the 
railways had to be convinced by J. R. Campbell of the 
importance of him joining a union. 74 
On hearing of the BUF booking Town Hall Square for a 
meeting, the local communists saw an opportunity for going 
on the offensive against fascism. Ignoring the policy of the 
national leadership not to confront the BUF on the streets, 
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the local Communist Party organised a counter-demonstration 
of 1,200 people to a fascist meeting on 8 October 1933. The 
Daily Worker reported that the fascist speaker was, `greeted 
with boos and catcalls and refused a hearing ... the platform 
was rushed... ', while the police had to escort the fascists 
away from the angry crowd. The crowd then listened to an 
anti-fascist speech by Ferguson of the Communist Party. 75 
During 1933 the Communist Party in Leeds tried with 
limited success to implement the new united front policy as 
promulgated by the Comintern and the King Street leadership. 
However this turn towards the local Labour movement was to 
be severely hampered by the vigorous counter-offensive of 
Labour loyalists determined to implement the anti-communist 
directives of Transport House. The partial nature of the 
turn towards the Labour movement signalled by the new united 
front line is illustrated by the sectarian activities of 
local communists on occasions. 
Bradford Communist Party 
Writing in the Communist Review in October 1933, Maurice 
Ferguson, the Bradford district organiser, stated that the 
successes of the Bradford Communist Party in its united 
front work, were due to a complete transformation in the 
attitude of local Party members to the local Labour 
movement. From a position of total isolation within the 
local Labour movement, in the short space of ten months, the 
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Bradford Communist Party had gained a position of 
considerable influence. 
In 1932 the local Communist Party had only one delegate 
on the Trades Council, this had mushroomed to eight 
delegates by 1933.76 Ferguson pointed out how over the 
previous few months the hard work of local communists in 
trade union recruitment drives had broken down a lot of 
suspicion and hostility of workers to the Communist Party; 
which was largely a legacy of the its past sectarianism. 
Ferguson observed how: 
The attitude of the active trade union workers to our 
party has completely changed. A man would be laughed at 
in Bradford who said the Communist Party were opposed to 
trade unionism. 77 
Ferguson cited the example of the President of the Bradford 
TGWU, Luther Horner, as someone who changed from being 
hostile to the Party to someone supporting its united front 
activities. Apparently at the start of the year Horner had 
been very wary of the Communist Party but had commented to 
Ferguson in a recent discussion, `I used to be scared to 
pass the car park (meeting place) when a communist meeting 
was on; I used to be pointed at as `one of those trade union 
officials who let the workers down'. 78 However, by late 
spring of 1933 Horner had become an ally of the local 
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Communist Party, fighting for the united front both in the 
TGWU and on the Bradford Trades Council. 79 
The work of the local Communist Party on the Trades 
Council, and in the campaign against war were the most 
successful examples of its united front work. In his article 
in the October issue of the Communist Review, Ferguson put 
this successful united front activity down to the persistent 
work of Party members getting anti-war council members as 
speakers into union meetings; and, `the intense personal 
work carried on among the best "Left" wing trade 
unionists... '. 80 
Following the Bermondsey anti-war congress in early March 
1933, the Communist Party leadership called upon its local 
branches to organise local anti-war committees of a united 
front character. In many areas these were mere talking shops 
consisting of local communists and, maybe, a few ILP 
members. In Bradford, the Communist Party developed the 
local anti-war council into a representative body, which 
soon laid down roots within the Bradford Labour movement. 81 
By October 1933 the Bradford Anti-War Council had gained the 
affiliation of 21 different organisations, the majority of 
whom were trade union branches. 82 
In July 1933 the Trades Council, which was by that time 
affiliated to the local anti-war council, passed a 
resolution moved by Communist Party members declaring its 
opposition to the TUC circular which called on trade unions 
to boycott all anti-war and anti-fascist organisations 
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linked to the Communist Party. The same meeting appointed 
Luther Horner, as Trades Council delegate to the anti-war 
demonstration on 30 July in Hyde Park organised by the 
proscribed British Anti-War Movement. 83 In the autumn the 
Trades Council sent delegates to two conferences organised 
by the Bradford Anti-War Council. These were held to 
organise opposition to a proposed military tattoo in 
Bradford. 84 
The Bradford Communist Party's campaign for a united 
front against fascism got off to solid start, with the 
formation of an official united front agreement with the 
local ILP on 12 March 1933. However, the local communists' 
approaches to the Bradford Labour Party were rejected out of 
hand. As in Leeds the Bradford Labour Party remained 
staunchly loyal to the anti-communist pronouncements of 
Transport House. It was to be on the Trades Council that the 
local Communist Party was to obtain its greatest success. 
After some prevarication, the Trades Council executive at 
its May meeting, finally agreed to receive a deputation from 
the local ILP and Communist Party. After a long discussion 
the executive, which had no communist members, agreed to 
recommend to the full council meeting that the Bradford 
Trades Council should form a united front with the local ILP 
and Communist Party. 85 This prevarication reflected the 
struggle between Labour loyalists and the left for the 
support of the, `non-dogmatic, less ideologically 
committed... centre group'. 86 The bitterly contested debate 
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at the May meeting of the Trades Council brings out the full 
range of attitudes within the local Labour movement towards 
the Communist Party and the united front. It also 
illustrates the approach of the local Communist Party to 
this controversial question. 
W. Illingworth, secretary of the NUGMW, moved the 
executive's recommendation for the united front. He was soon 
interrupted by M. Titterington, who asked if any reason was 
to be given by the executive for their decision. Fred 
Ratcliffe, the Trades Council President, replied that the 
executive felt that there was an urgent necessity for 
cooperation of all working-class organisations against the 
menace of fascism and war. Foster Sunderland of the NUT, and 
a leading figure in the Bradford Labour Party, seconded an 
amendment that the executive minutes be accepted with 
deletion of the recommendation for a united front. He argued 
that there could be no cooperation between trade unionists 
who believed in democracy and communists who were out to 
destroy the trade unions. Sunderland's fellow delegate from 
the NUT, C. Gibbs, stressed that a united front with the tiny 
Communist Party could be of no value to the movement. 87 
Maurice Ferguson, of the TGWU, upon rising to participate 
in the discussion, was assailed by questions as to his 
legitimacy as a delegate. Luther Horner, President of the 
local TGWU, rose to Ferguson's defence, stating that such 
comments were an insult to his union. In his contribution 
Ferguson pointed out how the Nazis made no distinction in 
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their attacks upon workers, as to whether they were 
communists or socialists. He added that this was not a 
discussion about communism, and those who tried to make it 
so were trying to deflect attention away from the real issue 
at stake, which was cooperation against a common menace. The 
common menace in this country being the National Government, 
which was taking steps in the direction of fascism. - Ferguson 
concluded by noting that the recent trade-union recruitment 
campaign had been successfully conducted by Labour and 
Communist Party members, along with workers of no political 
affiliation. He appealed for unity in a mass campaign 
against fascism and war. 88 
Speaking in support of the united front, Luther Horner 
argued that in view of the destruction of the German Labour 
movement, it did not matter who brought forward proposals to 
combat fascism, the essential thing was unity. The speech of 
R. Barber, the Trades Council secretary, was constantly 
interrupted, causing him to strongly protest. His speech 
summed up most of the points made by those speakers opposed 
to the united front. 
Barber noted that the proposal for unity came from an 
organisation of fewer than 5,000 members to an organisation 
of four million. He pointed out that the Communist Party was 
still bitterly opposed to the trade unions' political 
instrument, i. e. the Labour Party; which the trade unions had 
spent energy building up as a bulwark of defence against the 
attacks made upon them. Barber finished by asking if the 
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Trades Council still believed in that political instrument. 
Many of those speakers opposed to the united front also 
commented that in the Labour movement consisting of the 
Labour Party, the TUC and Cooperative Party, there already 
existed a broad united front covering the working class. 89 
In closing the debate, W. Illingworth stated that every 
speaker agreed that unity was essential, and that fascism 
was the last attempt of capitalism to keep power, and 
appealed for a united front to defeat this mortal enemy of 
the Labour movement. On being put to the vote the 
executive's recommendation for a united front was carried 50 
to 39.90 
Undaunted by this defeat the opponents of the united 
front pulled off a sharp tactical manoeuvre to deny the 
communists a major victory. An emergency amendment was 
moved, which declared that since the delegates had been so 
bitterly divided the whole matter should be referred back to 
all the affiliated unions, which could ballot their 
respective memberships on the question. This amendment was 
carried 55 to 27.91 The outcome of this decision was a rare 
consultation of the rank and file of the Labour movement. 
The results of the ballot given at the July Trades Council 
were as follows: 92 
FOR THE UNITED FRONT AGAINST THE UNITED FRONT 
24 branches 28 branches 
5,095 Votes (32.56%) 10,554 Votes (67.44%) 
85 trade union branches affiliated, membership 18,000. 
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These figures reveal a big gulf in attitudes to the 
united front and the Communist Party, between activists on 
the Trades Council and the inactive lay membership of the 
trade unions. It would appear that the local communists were 
much more successful in convincing ideologically committed 
activists, who were in the front line of the government's 
attacks upon workers rights and living standards, than they 
were the average lay member whose political inactivity 
reflected a lower political consciousness. Yet, the local 
Communist Party could take some comfort form the ballot 
result which revealed that a large number of politically 
inactive workers were prepared to put party differences 
aside for the sake of unity against a fascism. 
At the same July meeting of the Trades Council in spite 
of the united front ballot result, there was another long 
and acrimonious debate on the united front, which arose from 
a TUC circular on communist auxiliary organisations. In this 
debate the majority of delegates saw the TUC circular as an 
infringement upon their local autonomy and expressed 
approval, 44 to 33, for a resolution moved by Maurice 
Ferguson along the following lines: 
That this Trades Council regards the circular of the 
General Council of the TUC as a disservice to the Trade 
Unions and considers that the General Council would be 
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better employed in warning the workers of the real 
dangers of capitalism and fascism. 93 
In Bradford the local Communist Party enjoyed considerably 
more success with its united front work than the branch in 
Leeds. Certainly the Bradford Communist Party benefited from 
the absence of an organised opposition, which proved to be 
so effective in undermining the united front activities of 
the Leeds Communist Party. In Bradford the local communists 
benefited from a politically tolerant atmosphere, as did the 
communists in the East Midlands, which was signally absent 
in Leeds. 94 However, it would appear that the Bradford 
Communist Party under the direction of Maurice Ferguson 
managed to shake off much more of the old sectarian 
attitudes towards the Labour movement than the Leeds 
Communist Party did, which proved to be an element in their 
success. 
The results of the municipal elections in November 1933 
were to reveal the very limited progress of the local 
Communist Party branches out of their political isolation 
after six months of united front campaigning. The Bradford 
district results reflected the Party's poor showing 
nationally by receiving under five per cent of the vote. The 
electoral results of the Communist Party on a national and 
local basis showed that it had barely emerged from the self- 
imposed isolation of the `class-against-class' period. 
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In following the leadership line with regard to the 
united front and elections, the Bradford district fielded 
four candidates in the municipal elections. The best result 
came in Manningham ward (Bradford) reflecting the Communist 
Party's enhanced standing within the local Labour movement 
in that area. This result was the product of its turn to the 
unions, and united front campaigns over the question of war 
and high rents for tenants. The Leeds result would have done 
the Communist Party's standing in that city no good at all, 
and would have merely given further ammunition to the 
opponents of the united front within the Leeds Labour 
movement. This was due to the fact that the 173 votes cast 
for the communist candidate in Leeds came close to depriving 
Labour of victory in a close run contest with the 
Conservatives. The results for the Bradford district were as 
follows: 95 
BRADFORD HALIFAX 
Labour - 3,136 Labour - 1,034 
Communist - 249 Communist - 74 
LEEDS KEIGHLEY 
Labour - 1,921 Conservative - 680 
Conservative - 1,916 Communist - 62 
Communist - 173 
Conclusion 
In this examination of the Communist Party's reaction to the 
emergence of German fascism the rather limited and 
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ineffectual nature of this response has become apparent. 
Likewise the Comintern's response to the emergence of German 
fascism was similarly ineffective. The new turn towards the 
united front as reflected in the 5 March manifesto was both 
ambiguous and contradictory. This ambiguity was a hallmark 
of Comintern in the 1930s, in that it tried to cater for 
sudden turns either to the left or right in Soviet foreign 
policy. The hostility to social democracy combined with the 
sanction for communist parties to approach social democracy 
for the united front from above and below reflected this 
ambiguity and was the contradiction which effectively 
paralysed the Comintern's anti-fascist activities. This 
division between left and right in Comintern was reflected 
in the leadership of the CPGB. 
There were the ultra-left sectarians such as Shields and 
Rust, who believed the new united front offer of Comintern 
to be a manoeuvre with which to expose social democracy. In 
opposition to the ultra-lefts were those on the right of the 
Party leadership grouped around Pollitt, who believed that 
the new united front campaign offered the Communist Party an 
opportunity to become accepted into the mainstream of the 
Labour movement. Despite these intentions, Pollitt's 
interpretation of the united front was effectively 
undermined by the need to keep up sectarian attacks upon 
Labour in line with Comintern policy. The divisions within 
the leadership of the Communist Party over united front 
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policy found their most cogent expression in the debates 
over electoral policy. 
The balance sheet for the CPGB from 1933 was extremely 
meagre. In all of its major united front objectives on the 
electoral front, for a united front with Labour, for an ILP 
affiliated to Comintern and a substantial increase in 
membership the Communist Party had very little to show 
for its efforts. The CPGB's failure to formulate an 
effective response to the emergence of German fascism, 
whose origins lay in the Party's continuing sectarianism, is 
revealed by the drop in membership during 1933. In 
November 1932 CPGB membership stood at 5,600 this had fallen 
to 5,500 by September 1933 and continued declining, falling 
to around 5,000 in January 1934.96 Reports from the 
districts to the Political Bureau and Central Committee 
during the year, reveal that a majority of the membership 
remained passively stuck to the sectarian line of the united 
front from below, while a minority of the membership did 
shake off the sectarianism of the past, and managed to gain 
partial acceptance by local Labour movement activists. When 
local communists did manage to engage in joint campaigns 
with the local Labour movement, more often than not it was 
over the issue of confronting the BUF on the streets of 
Britain. Yet such activity was frowned upon by the Party 
leadership which saw the struggle against the BUF as 
irrelevant. This division of opinion over anti-fascist 
strategy between the national leadership and sections of 
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the rank and file revealed how the local membership was 
often more in touch with the anti-fascist sentiments of 
British workers than the national leadership which proved 
more responsive to the edicts of Moscow. 
On a local scale, the Bradford district proved to be one 
of the most successful districts in the country, having some 
results to show for its united front work. This success 
needs to be put into perspective and in reality the West 
Yorkshire Communist Party remained a marginal force within 
the local Labour movement, reflecting the position of the 
Communist Party on a national scale. Another thing about the 
local Communist Party which stands out is how the membership 
did not move uniformly behind the national leadership's 
conception of the united front. Study of the branches in 
Bradford and Leeds reveals differences of emphasis in their 
anti-fascist activities. 
During 1933 the Communist Party was riven by numerous 
divisions over its response to the emergence of German 
fascism, which have largely gone unacknowledged by 
historians. The divisions between the Communist Party 
leadership over the application of the new united front 
go 
tactics from Comintern, together with the divisions between 
the national leadership and sections of the membership over 
attitudes to the struggle against the BUF, shatter the 
conventional image of the Communist Party as a monolithic 
body which smoothly assumed the leadership of the struggle 
against fascism in Britain, once Hitler came to power. 97 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The united front and popular front against fascism 1934- 
1935 
The rise of fascism on the continent during 1934-1935 
led to a radical overhaul in Soviet and Comintern policy. 
Their response to fascism was to play a major part in the 
development of the CPGB's anti-fascist strategy. Chapter 
two of this study will attempt to reveal how the CPGB's 
anti-fascist strategy developed in response both to 
changes in Soviet and Comintern policy, along with the 
pressure of mass action `from below' for an active fight 
against the BUF from sections of the Party membership. 
In the first half of 1934 with its anti-fascist policy 
still conditioned by the sectarian principles of the 
`Third Period' and the view that the main threat of 
fascism in Britain came from the National Government, the 
CPGB's isolation from the Labour movement continued. The 
division between the Communist Party leadership and 
sections of the rank and file over participation in the 
anti-Mosley struggle gradually narrowed during this 
period. However, in the second half of 1934 the CPGB's 
influence began to grow and break down its isolation as 
it developed a more pro-active anti-fascist policy which 
saw it intervene in the anti-Mosley movement and abandon 
much of its sectarianism toward the Labour Party. This 
was in response to changes in Comintern thinking and the 
pressure of indigenous anti-fascist sentiment. 
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The origins of the Comintern's turn towards the united 
front with social democracy and the popular front with 
both socialist and capitalist parties during 1934-1935 
has been a source of great controversy amongst 
historians. There is one school of thought which 
proclaims that Comintern's anti-fascist strategy 
developed in accordance with the requirements of Soviet 
foreign policy; reflecting the USSR's search for military 
alliances with Britain and France against German 
aggression. The Comintern's sudden abandonment of the 
sectarian tactics of the `Third Period' and its move 
towards multi-class anti-fascist alliances embracing both 
socialist and capitalist parties has been portrayed as a 
result of Stalin's intervention in Comintern affairs and 
determined by the requirements of Soviet foreign policy-1 
In opposition to this a school of thought has emerged 
which denies that Comintern was a mere mouthpiece for the 
Kremlin and argues that Comintern enjoyed a considerable 
degree of autonomy in its policy-making during this 
period. The pressure for change in Comintern policy came 
not only from Stalin, but most decisively from the 
membership of the various Communist parties and sections 
of the Comintern leadership, who believed that the 
tactics of the `Third Period' had failed to halt the rise 
of fascism. 2 Another approach which is a synthesis of the 
first two viewpoints is that the origins of the Popular 
Front are to be found in the 'triple interaction' of: 
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mass action `from below' in national sections; 
internal debates and initiatives in the Comintern 
Executive; and the Soviet Union's quest for security 
in the face of perceived Nazi aggression. 3 
In the first section of this chapter examination of 
Soviet and Comintern policy documents, will reveal that 
the latter view is a more accurate expression of how 
Comintern responded to the threat posed by German 
fascism. Having said this, the Comintern leadership was 
gripped by sharp divisions over anti-fascist strategy 
during 1934.4 This raises the question of how did the 
CPGB respond to the gradual changes in Comintern 
strategy? How far was its anti-fascist strategy 
determined by international as opposed to national 
considerations? What were the implications of these 
changes in policy for its relationship to the Labour 
movement? After examining the response of the CPGB to the 
struggle against fascism, attention will then be focused 
on the response of the rank and file in West Yorkshire. 
During 1934-35 the CPGB's anti-fascist strategy developed 
in response to changes in Soviet and Comintern thinking 
and the pressure of mass action from the anti-Mosley 
movement. The Communist Party was to abandon its 
sectarianism towards the Labour Party and embrace the 
united front 'from above', as well as actively supporting 
the mass movement against the BUF. 
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The international situation 
In a speech to the Central Executive Committee of the 
CPSU on 29 December, 1933, Molotov translated the hints 
which Stalin had made a few days earlier, in an interview 
with the New York Times, into a new direction for Soviet 
foreign policy. Molotov stated that in the new diplomatic 
era they were in, it was necessary to make a distinction 
between the handful of countries which were making 
preparations for war, and those capitalist states which, 
`... are for the time being interested in the maintenance 
of peace and are prepared so to conduct their policy as 
to defend peace'. 5 This new interpretation of Soviet 
foreign policy dispensed with the Leninist goal of world 
revolution as the best form of defence for the first 
workers state; substituting in its place, a policy of 
forming military alliances with those capitalist states 
interested in restraining Germany and support for the 
League of Nations. In response to this change in Soviet 
foreign policy objectives, Comintern was to abandon the 
`Third Period' policy and embrace united front agreements 
with the parties of social democracy. The culmination of 
this new tactical turn by Comintern came in its support 
for multi-class alliances otherwise known as the popular 
front. This entailed Comintern abandoning its 
revolutionary objectives and led to communists 
participating in capitalist governments in France and 
Spain. 
Throughout the spring of 1934, Stalin, alarmed by 
Hitler's increasingly aggressive attitude and the 
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victories of fascism in Austria, Latvia and Bulgaria, 
encouraged Litvinov to bring the Soviet Union 
diplomatically closer to the major western powers. Having 
left Soviet diplomacy in the hands of Litvinov, Stalin 
concentrated his energies on the second Five-Year Plan. 
At that time he had no intention of extending the new 
diplomatic changes to the activities of Comintern. This 
absence of a clear lead from Stalin, who never paused to 
consider the implications for Comintern of the new turn 
in Soviet foreign policy, meant that Comintern officials 
spoke with different voices, sending conflicting and 
indecisive advice to the various Communist parties. 
However, by late spring the growing momentum of the 
fascist offensive throughout Europe, together with the 
interventions of Dimitrov, forced Stalin to consider how 
Comintern could be used to support the policy of 
rapprochement with the western powers. 
In the face of the commonly held threat from German 
fascism, the French and Soviet governments were faced 
with the question of how to neutralise this threat to 
their security. This bond of common interest, led the 
French government, at the request of Moscow, to take the 
step of formally inviting the Soviet Union to join the 
League of Nations. 6 The Soviet Union joined the League of 
Nations in September 1934, signalling its adoption of the 
collective security system upheld by the League of 
Nations as a means of restraining Germany. Having been 
formally accepted by the capitalist world, the Soviet 
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Union pushed ahead with its objective of seeking military 
alliances with the major imperialist powers. 
Shortly after signing the Franco-Soviet Pact on 2 May 
1935, Stalin publicly expressed his approval for the 
French government's defence policy; in doing so he 
jettisoned at one stroke the Leninist attitude to war and 
peace. In effect he publicly declared himself for popular 
frontism, with his call on Comintern and all its sections 
to subordinate every other consideration to the foreign 
policy requirements of the Soviet Union in its defence 
against fascism.? As will be revealed later when looking 
at the Seventh World Congress of Comintern, Stalin's 
comments on that day were to have profound implications 
for Comintern's anti-fascist policy. From that time 
onwards Comintern abandoned the Leninist attitude to war 
and the goal of world revolution. Having considered 
Soviet foreign policy in the eighteen months leading up 
to the Seventh World Congress of Comintern in July 1935, 
let us now look at how this affected Comintern anti- 
fascist strategy. 
The arrival of Dimitrov in Moscow in late February 
1934, was a crucial turning point for Comintern. During 
the next ten months a debate raged within the Comintern 
leadership, between Dimitrov's faction in support of the 
new united and popular front line and those supporting 
the old `Third Period' policies. The debate revolved 
around the question of how best to defend the Soviet 
Union from imperialist attack. The Comintern leadership 
saw the role of its different sections as that of acting 
98 
as border guards for the Soviet Union. Increasingly, the 
ECCI divided into two camps of opinion: those grouped 
around Bela Kun, who stuck to the discredited `Third 
Period' policies, which were responsible for the disaster 
in Germany and in effect meant do nothing, whilst a new 
tendency of thought emerged based around Dimitrov. He 
believed that the defence of the Soviet Union could be 
best assured through the support, not of the various 
communist parties too weak to overthrow their own 
governments, but of those capitalist governments exposed 
to the same fascist menace as itself. The new role of the 
communist parties would be to encourage their respective 
governments to provide the Soviet Union with their 
military support against the fascist powers. 8 
Dimitrov arrived in Moscow to find the ECCI struggling 
with the demands made by recent events in France. The 
attempted coup d'etat by the fascists on 6 February 1934 
posed a grave dilemma for the French Communist Party 
(PCF) and the ECCI of how to respond. 9 The spontaneous 
mass demonstrations of socialist and communist workers 
which defeated the fascists, temporarily resolved the 
problem for them. However when the French Socialist Party 
(SFIO) leaders, reflecting the enormous pressure from 
below for action, called for an anti-fascist general 
strike on 12 February 1934, Comintern was faced with an 
even greater dilemma. Haslam in his study of Comintern 
and the origins of the popular front has commented, `In 
Moscow it was apparently decided that an exception had to 
be made, at least temporarily, in view of the urgency of 
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the situation. The Communists joined in the [general] 
strike'. 10 
Laid up in hospital until early April 1934 and unable 
to act Dimitrov became convinced by events in France, and 
the suppression of the Austrian workers in February, that 
Comintern's anti-fascist strategy had to be changed. He 
came to believe that the 'Third Period' policies of 
Comintern were mistaken and that nothing must be allowed 
to stand in the way of unity of all anti-fascist 
forces. 11 
At the CPSU Politburo on 7 April 1934, Dimitrov put 
Comintern's failure to win the allegiance of the masses 
to 'our incorrect approach to the European workers', 
arguing for a new anti-fascist strategy based on 
cooperation with social democracy. At Stalin's suggestion 
Dimitrov joined the ECCI, and was promised the support of 
the Soviet Politburo for his campaign to change 
Comintern's anti-fascist strategy. 12 It would not have 
been lost on Stalin how the new anti-fascist strategy 
outlined by Dimitrov dovetailed perfectly with the 
requirements of Soviet foreign policy. 13 
It can be no accident that just as the Soviet and 
French governments had agreed in principle to a pact of 
mutual assistance, Thorez, leader of the PCF, was 
summoned to Moscow and given orders by Dimitrov to 
abandon the 'Third Period' line. 14 At this meeting on 11 
May 1934, Thorez was told that, 'the walls between 
communist and social democratic workers must be broken 
down', and that the united front from above had to be 
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pursued. 15 In late May the CPSU leadership gave the 
signal to the PCF for a new turn in its anti-fascist 
strategy. 16 This was backed up on 11 June by the ECCI 
recommendation that once the united front with the SFIO 
was established it should be extended to incorporate the 
petty bourgeoisie. At the same time, the ECCI advised a 
number of other communist parties to be more bold in 
their approach to developing the united front, by 
endeavouring to draw the petty bourgeoisie into the anti- 
fascist camp. 17 
At its congress on 23-26 June 1934, the PCF reversed 
its sectarian policy of opposition to social democracy 
and came out for the new Dimitrov line. The congress 
declared that the defeat of fascism was its chief 
objective, and in pursuit of this it aimed to draw into 
the anti-fascist struggle not just the working class, but 
also the broad masses of the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie 
and intelligentsia. In outline this was the policy of 
popular frontism adopted by Comintern at its Seventh 
World Congress in 1935. On 2 July 1934, L'Humanite 
carried proposals for an anti-fascist pact with the SFIO; 
on 27 July 1934 both parties signed a formal anti-fascist 
pact. 18 
The example set by the PCF was rapidly followed by 
several communist parties, which adopted united front 
proposals along similar lines as those of the French. At 
the beginning of July 1934, the French, British, German, 
and Polish communist parties issued a joint manifesto 
which avoided criticizing social democracy, appealing 
instead for unity of all working people, whatever party 
or trade union they belonged to. 
The role of Soviet foreign policy in determining the 
anti-fascist strategy of Comintern at this time is 
illustrated further by a hitherto unknown resolution of 
the Presidium of the ECCI. On 9 July the Presidium of the 
ECCI directed the KPD to seek a united front with 
dissident elements in the Nazi party, in the belief that 
the events of 30 June (when Hitler purged the SA) showed 
that Hitler's regime was tottering. 19 
During 1934 most communist parties met with little 
success, in their campaigns for a united front with 
social democratic parties. This was due to the reluctance 
of many social democratic parties to join forces 
overnight with their former enemies; and also that the 
Comintern leadership was far from unanimous in support of 
Dimitrov's new policy. For even those supporting the new 
Dimitrov policy in the leadership of many communist 
parties were unsure how far to go in pursuing them. 
Within the Comintern leadership great controversy 
raged throughout the summer of 1934 over the question of 
anti-fascist strategy. Despite the approval for a united 
front from above given to the PCF by Moscow, for the 
purpose of Soviet foreign policy requirements, it would 
appear that domestic problems such as the second Five- 
Year plan preoccupied the Soviet leadership for the rest 
of 1934, which meant that they failed to give a clear 
lead to the Comintern leadership. It was not until 
December 1934, at a meeting of the ECCI Presidium, that 
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Stalin declared himself for the new popular front line, 
developed by Dimitrov and his co-thinkers during the 
debates on the ECCI during the summer of 1934.20 
The extension of the united front into the popular 
front in France came in a speech by Thorez on 2 October 
1934, on the eve of the Radical Party's conference. 
Thorez, with the support of Dimitrov, called for the 
Radical Party to join the anti-fascist united front 
established by the two main workers parties. 21 He made 
this declaration in the teeth of an attempt by Togliatti, 
of the sectarian old guard on the ECCI, to prevent this 
expansion of the united front into a popular front. This 
appeal to the Radical Party coincided perfectly with the 
objectives of Soviet diplomacy i. e. a Franco-Soviet 
military pact. For when in October 1934 Laval became 
French Foreign Minister, he made it clear to the Soviet 
government that he favoured a rapprochement with Germany. 
Thus the popular front came to be seen by Stalin as an 
important source of pressure against a pro-German 
orientation of French foreign policy, and also a 
potential substitute for the French government. 22 
Soon after the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact 
Thorez put forward the slogan of the 'French Front', 
arguing that the popular front should be expanded in a 
rightward direction, to include all anti-fascists 
irrespective of political colour. In July 1935 the 
popular front of the PCF and SFIO, together with the 
Radical Party, came into being. Thus by the time of the 
Seventh World Congress, which had been called to proclaim 
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the popular front as the new direction for Comintern, the 
French version of the popular front was already 
established. 
The following section reveals how the CPGB's progress 
away from the sectarian postulates of the `Third Period' 
was much slower than its sister party in France. 
Influenced by events in France and the new thinking 
promoted by Dimitrov together with the pressure from 
sections of its own membership, the CPGB leadership 
slowly progressed towards an active involvement in the 
anti-Mosley movement and away from its previous 
sectarianism towards the Labour Party. This led to a 
gradual increase in communist influence. 
The CPGB and the united front 
In his report to the 13th ECCI Plenum in December 1933 on 
the CPGB's united front campaign, Pollitt noted that the 
British Government with its open preparations for war had 
taken over from France as the main organiser of the 
international anti-Soviet front. Dismissing claims that 
what had happened in Germany could never happen in 
Britain he commented that: 
In actual fact we are proceeding at a rapid rate 
towards fascism in Britain, carried out under slogans 
of democracy and achieved by so-called constitutional 
means... But most significant of all are the 
tendencies towards Fascism contained in the National 
Government's new unemployment bill. 23 
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Pollitt reiterated the CPGB's adherence to the `Third 
Period' line, with regard to: 
the social fascist policy of social democracy, the 
Communist Party must much more concretely expose the 
whole line of the policy of the reformist leaders, 
and reveal them to the masses in the most simple and 
convincing manner as the agents of the capitalist 
class in the working class movement. 24 
He put the British Communist Party's failure to make a 
breakthrough with its united front campaign down to its 
inability to expose the reasons behind the refusal of the 
reformist organisations to participate in the united 
front. Pollitt also added that the CPGB's, `fight against 
reformism not being as consistent and sharp as the 
situation demanded... ' was another factor. 25 He admitted 
that the most frequent objections of British workers to 
the Communist Party's call for the united front, revolved 
around the continuing sectarianism of the British Party. 
Pollitt noted that most workers saw the CPGB's united 
front campaigns as an unprincipled manoeuvre. He 
concluded by observing the great resentment caused by the 
splitting of the Labour vote, as a result of the 
Communist Party putting up candidates against Labour. 26 
Pollitt declared that one of the main emphases of the 
CPGB's united front activities in 1934 would be the 
convening of a national united front congress in 
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February, and the organisation of a national hunger march 
to that congress. He believed this new united front 
initiative offered the British Communist Party a great 
opportunity to break out of its isolation, and gain 
acceptance into the mainstream of the Labour movement. 27 
In his report back to the CPGB Central Committee on 5 
January 1934, Pollitt stressed that : 
much criticism was levelled against all Parties for 
their neglect in much more concretely taking 
advantage of this position [of crisis within the 
Second International] to be able to unmask social 
democracy before the eyes of the masses who still 
believe in them. [Success in the struggle against 
fascism depended particularly] upon the rate at which 
the Communist Parties overcome and wipe out the 
influence of social democracy over the organised 
worker. 28 
Having said this, Pollitt then stated that while the 
main efforts of the Communist Party were to be directed 
towards the united front from below, future approaches to 
the Labour Party were not ruled out. He added that the 
reluctance of CPGB members to work in `reformist' unions 
had been criticised at the Thirteenth ECCI Plenum. 29 
When it came to the question of the threat of fascism 
in Britain, Pollitt reiterated the position he had argued 
for at the plenum. 30 He noted with some alarm the 
increasing amount of activity the BUF was engaged in on a 
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national basis, `Therefore the question of what our line 
should be demands careful consideration'. 31 However, 
Pollitt came out strongly against the activities of 
workers, and sections of the Communist Party rank and 
file, who broke up or disrupted fascist meetings, 4... it 
will be fatal for us if the Communist Party's opposition 
to Mosley is looked upon by the working class as being in 
the nature of a brawl and not a real political 
struggle'. 32 He called upon Communist Party members to 
refrain from attacks on fascist meetings, instead through 
questions to the speaker they should try and expose 
fascism to those workers in the audience. Meanwhile the 
CPGB should concentrate its efforts against the fascist 
measures of the government. 33 
At the Thirteenth ECCI Plenum four central tasks were 
laid out for the British Communist Party in its 
forthcoming united front work. Firstly, that it should 
lead the struggle against the National Government and 
therefore should step up its activities for the united 
front congress and hunger march. Secondly, there was to 
be a drive within the Party for every member in work to 
join and become active in a trade union. Thirdly, the 
Party should carry on the campaign to win the ILP for 
sympathetic affiliation to Comintern, with the 
perspective of a merger between the two parties. Finally, 
the aim was to double the membership by the time of the 
Seventh World Congress of Comintern in the autumn of 
1934.34 
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In the ensuing discussion a large measure of agreement 
was expressed with Pollitt's report, while a depressing 
picture of the Communist Party's united front work 
emerged. Speaker after speaker commented upon the 
continuing sectarianism of large sections of the 
membership, and the great reluctance of many to even get 
active in the trade unions. Such remarks can be summed up 
by the following observation of one Central Committee 
member (Robson): 
But with all the good prospects facing the Party I 
want to say that it is disheartening to go amongst 
the ranks of the Party membership. And this is our 
responsibility as the leadership. One can go to local 
after local in important centres and find that the 
whole politics of the situation which have been so 
carefully and clearly analysed by our Party 
leadership have completely passed over the heads of 
our membership. As a result of this only a relatively 
small proportion of the membership is able to work 
effectively. Many of the locals are living a life 
exactly the same as they were doing ten years ago. 35 
Shields noted, that in the face of the growing war 
preparations of the National Government the, `work of the 
[Party's] anti-war movement has gone back, the movement 
remains passive and practically no anti-war activity is 
being carried out in a real sense'. 36 Faced with such a 
poor state of affairs the CPGB leadership went into the 
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campaign for the hunger march and united front congress 
with high hopes, that this at last would help break down 
the Communist Party's isolation. 
The 1934 hunger march and united front congress 
With less than three weeks to go to the united front 
congress and with the hunger marchers on the road, 
Pollitt commented at the Political Bureau on 8 February 
1934, that the NUWM (with only 800 dues-paying members) 
was in a catastrophic position. Alarm was expressed over 
the failure of the Communist Party membership in many 
areas to mobilise support within the the Labour movement 
for the united front congress and hunger march. Robson 
commented, `There has been a complete failure to get the 
comrades to see the possibilities of getting delegates 
sent to the congress and support for the march from the 
employed workers'. 37 He gave the example of Manchester, 
where the Party fraction on the Trades Council had not 
even raised the question of the united front congress, 
never mind organise support for it. 38 The London district 
gave greatest cause for concern, with a majority of Party 
members not even prepared to take the campaign into the 
local Labour movement. 39 
In London as in most other areas, the local united 
front committees organising support for the hunger march 
and united front congress were made up in the main of 
Communist Party and ILP members, with little effort being 
made to involve local Labour movement activists. The 
local united front committees in most areas substituted 
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themselves for a mass campaign of the employed and 
unemployed workers. In the discussions on the Central 
Committee and Political Bureau after the united front 
congress, the sectarianism of the membership, revealed by 
the failure to try and involve Labour movement activists 
in the campaign, was viewed with great concern. As in 
most other united front campaigns what little work was 
done had been carried out by the same thin layer of 
Communist Party activists. After the united front 
congress Pollitt complained: 
We did not have as many trade union branches 
represented as we have comrades active in these in 
London. We had to send out a special call [prior to 
the congress] for trade union representation... If we 
examine representation at this Congress it is less in 
proportion to the number of delegates we have had at 
such conferences in the past. 40 
In the run up to the united front congress the 
subdivision of organising work for the congress broke 
down. Instead of many practical tasks being carried out 
as planned by rank and file bodies, a large amount of the 
organising work flooded back to the Central Committee. 
Not surprisingly, the Central Committee became rapidly 
overloaded by this sudden influx of practical tasks, and 
was not able to concentrate fully on the political 
oversight of the hunger march and united front 
congress. 41 This found expression in the remarkable clash 
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between the Central Committee members present at the 
united front congress. 
The origins of this clash lay in the Communist 
Party's original call for the hunger march and united 
front congress in November 1933. At the Thirteenth ECCI 
Plenum the CPGB's call for the hunger march and united 
front congress met with disapproval for, 'in that call 
there was no criticism of the reformists'. 42 In response 
to Comintern censure the Daily Worker, in mid February, 
carried proposals for several amendments to the unity 
congress resolution. One of these amendments strongly 
criticised the role of the Labour Party in refusing to 
support the fight of the unemployed. 43 
At the united front congress itself, the Communist 
Party delegation insisted on moving its amendment (drawn 
up by Gallacher) which criticised the Labour leaders. The 
Central Committee members present clashed over whether or 
not the Communist Party should press ahead with their 
amendment or go for the ILP amendment which was far less 
critical of the Labour leaders. Gallagher wavered in the 
discussion with the ILP, unsure whether to make the Party 
amendment a condition of its participation in the 
congress. 44 Other Central Committee members, such as 
Kerrigan, dismissed fears that the Party amendment might 
alienate some labour and trade union branches. In the end 
a composite amendment of the CPGB and ILP amendments was 
agreed to. This 'capitulation' of the Communist Party 
delegation to reformism was severely criticised by 
Pollitt after the congress on the Political Bureau. 45 The 
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resolution eventually passed by the united front congress 
called for a mass campaign against the government's 
unemployment bill, which was portrayed as another step in 
the direction of fascism in Britain. The congress also 
elected a committee to carry on the campaign, which by 
early April had largely faltered having held one badly 
attended meeting. 46 
The CPGB's latest attempt at drawing the organised 
Labour movement into its united front campaign had 
fizzled out ignominiously due to the failure of large 
sections of its membership and parts of the leadership to 
try and involve the organised Labour movement in the 
campaign. This was compelling evidence of the fact that 
the CPGB was crippled by a deep-rooted sectarianism, 
which reflected the contradictory nature of the united 
front line as handed down by Comintern at the Thirteenth 
ECCI Plenum. Further evidence for such a conclusion, if 
further evidence were needed, comes in an article in the 
April issue of the Communist Review in 1934. In this 
Robson, who was a member of the Central Committee, draws 
attention to the organisational anarchy prevalent in the 
lower levels of the Communist Party and the bad 
organisational methods used by so many of its branches, 
which were incapable of implementing the new united front 
methods of work due to their sectarian outlook. 47 However 
the Communist Party found a partial way out' of its 
isolation and lack of influence through its participation 
in the anti-Mosley struggle during the spring and summer 
of 1934. 
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The struggle against the BUF 
It was to be through its participation in the anti-Mosley 
movement, which rapidly escalated in size and tempo 
during 1934 in response to the upsurge in BUF activity 
and membership, that the Communist Party was to partially 
overcome its isolation within the Labour movement. Yet 
during the first few months of 1934 the Communist Party 
leadership refrained from involvement in the anti-Mosley 
movement as it had done in 1933, while sections of the 
membership played a leading role in this struggle in many 
areas. By late spring 1934 the CPGB leadership decided to 
throw the full weight of the Party behind the anti-BUF 
struggle, influenced as it was by the failures of the 
united front campaigns to date, mass pressure `from 
below' of the anti-Mosley movement, and the realisation 
of the great mobilising potential of this campaign. 
Encouraged by the success of the fascist movements on 
the continent, and with the backing of an increasing 
number of business and military figures in Britain 
organised through the January Club, the BUF launched a 
mass recruitment campaign in the spring of 1934.48 
Imitating the tactics of the Nazis in Germany the BUF 
held provocative marches and rallies, under police 
protection, in dozens of towns and cities across the 
country. These well-attended activities were given the 
active support of Lord Rothermere's newspapers, and 
produced a rapid increase in the membership of the BUF. 
The BUF grew from 17,000 members in February 1934 to over 
50,000 by July 1934.49 As the BUF tried to establish 
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itself as a mass party, so popular opposition to the 
growth of fascism increased. The backbone of this 
resistance being the organised working class. 50 As one 
anti-fascist of the period commented: 
The British working class gave the Blackshirts their 
answer. Every demonstration called by the fascists 
was answered by a great counter-demonstration of 
workers and anti-fascists. 51 
During the spring of 1934, the Daily Worker carried 
numerous reports of BUF meetings which were broken up or 
disrupted by anti-fascists. At Dumfries and Plymouth in 
April the anger of the workers was such, that the BUF 
meetings had to be abandoned with the speakers retreating 
under a police escort. In early May, over 2,000 workers 
in Greenwich turned out to oppose the fascists. During 
the meeting itself the workers drowned out the fascist 
speaker, chanting slogans such as `No blackshirts in 
Greenwich'. After the fascists had left the meeting place 
having not spoken, Kath Duncan of the Communist Party got 
up and addressed the crowd. 52 Meanwhile during a speaking 
tour on Tyneside in mid May, John Beckett of the BUF, 
found himself opposed by over 10,000 chanting anti- 
fascists in Gateshead and by over 5,000 in Newcastle. At 
the Newcastle meeting Beckett managed to speak for five 
minutes before he was pushed off the platform as the 
meeting broke up in pandemonium. Mounted police were used 
to clear a path for Beckett's retreat from the meeting-53 
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While this rank and file movement of opposition to the 
BUF was unfolding before its eyes and rising in scale and 
tempo, the CPGB leadership maintained its long held 
attitude that the main threat of fascism in this country 
came from the National Government, and that the BUF was 
something of an irrelevance. An example of this attitude 
is shown by the following quote from a Daily Worker 
editorial in late April 1934: 
The fight against this [Sedition] Bill is the most 
vital phase in our fight against fascism in this 
country. It is the acid test of all organisations who 
claim to be opposed to fascism. They will be judged 
by their attitude to the organisation of action 
against this bill.... It is not a question of vowing 
our intention to fight Fascism in the future. It is a 
question of organising our forces to fight the 
important step to Fascism embodied in this bill. 54 
Nevertheless, sections of the Communist Party membership 
took the opposite view, believing the main struggle 
against fascism in Britain lay with the BUF. During 1933 
and again in 1934 this anti-fascist movement from below, 
which was covered by the Daily Worker, was actively 
supported by sections of the Communist Party membership. 
Further evidence of this division over anti-fascist 
strategy between sections of the membership and the 
leadership, is described by London communists in the 
anti-fascist classics Out of the Ghetto by Joe Jacobs and 
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Phil Piratin's book Our Flag Stays Red. Jacobs describes 
how the efforts of the rank and file communists in East 
London to combat the BUF came into increasing conflict 
with the branch and district leadership of the Communist 
Party; this included leading figures on the Central 
Committee such as Bramley and Springhall. They gave 
priority to building up the CPGB's presence in the trade 
unions. At the Political Bureau on 3 May, Pollitt stated 
that in London large sections of the membership had no 
confidence in the district leadership. 55 Jacobs comments 
that by autumn 1933 in the East End, increasing numbers 
of ex-servicemen were beginning to organise along anti- 
fascist lines independently of the Communist Party, 
while: 
Some of us who were being criticised thought that 
those mainly engaged in trade union work, were 
neglecting the other important facets of the class 
struggle. For example, German fascism, unemployment, 
rents, Mosley, etc. This kind of argument had been 
going on for a long time and came to the surface more 
and more as time went on. 56 
This division between the leadership and sections of the 
rank and file over anti-fascist strategy is graphically 
illustrated by the following example. When the Daily 
Worker noted the first big London rally of Mosley's 
spring campaign at the Albert Hall on 21 April 1934, 
there was no mention of any Communist Party counter- 
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demonstration. 57 This reflected the line of the CPGB 
leadership that fascist meetings should pass off 
unopposed. Despite the leadership's failure to sanction 
any counter-action, many Communist Party members from 
East London along with thousands of non-party workers, 
turned up to oppose Mosley's Albert Hall rally. As Jacobs 
pointed out, the failure of the Communist Party to 
mobilise for this event meant that, `The opposition to 
this meeting was not organised on anything like the scale 
it should have been', and Mosley's meeting went ahead 
smoothly. 58 
When the BUF announced another mass rally for 7 June 
at Olympia to follow its successful Albert Hall rally, 
the London district committee of the Communist Party 
initially took no action. As Pollitt revealed at the 
Political Bureau in June, it took strong pressure from 
the Political Bureau on the London district committee, 
before the London district committee made the call for a 
counter-demonstration against the BUF rally at Olympia. 
At the same meeting Pollitt commented that the Communist 
Party, with its call for action against Mosley's Olympia 
rally, was increasingly seen as the leading force in the 
struggle against the BUF. He added that a large portion 
of the London membership had been involved in this 
activity. 59 This comment in itself is further evidence to 
the popularity of the anti-Mosley struggle with the rank 
and file of the Communist Party, and how large sections 
of the membership saw the main threat of fascism in 
Britain coming from the BUF and not from the National 
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Government. It was not until 18 May that the London 
Communist Party made the call for a counter-demonstration 
against Mosley's Olympia rally, inviting all Labour 
movement organisations to participate in this activity. 60 
The Political Bureau's decision to call for a counter- 
demonstration to oppose the Olympia rally raises the 
question of what brought about the sudden change in its 
attitude to the struggle against the BUF? The minutes of 
the Political Bureau meeting on 4 May 1934 make no 
mention of the BUF rally at Olympia. Some time between 
this meeting on 4 May and the 18 May declaration in the 
Daily Worker, the national leadership made a sharp change 
of direction in its attitude to the struggle against the 
BUF. There is nothing to indicate that intervention from 
Comintern brought about this change of attitude, for the 
Comintern leadership was preoccupied with the French 
situation and its own debates about united-front 
strategy. It would appear much more likely that this 
sudden change of attitude to the struggle against the 
BUF, which was going on independently of the Communist 
Party up and down the country, was brought about by the 
sudden realisation of the great mobilising potential of 
the anti-Mosley struggle. The Political Bureau's decision 
must also have been influenced by the successive failures 
of the united front campaigns to date. It would also have 
been influenced by the mass pressure `from below' of 
those sections of the Communist Party membership who 
along with thousands of workers up and down the country, 
118 
were demonstrating their opposition to the BUF during its 
spring campaign. 
It is interesting to note that nearly all of the 
previous accounts of the CPGB and its struggle against 
fascism give the impression that the Communist Party was 
always primarily concerned with the growth of the BUF. 
From this flows the misconception that the CPGB always 
played a leading role in the struggle against the BUF. 
With one exception, they make no mention of the CPGB's 
abrupt change in tactics; from opposing the struggle 
against the BUF to suddenly giving it unqualified 
support. The one exception is Branson's history of the 
Communist Party. In her chapter on fascism and the 
united-front 1933-1935, Branson gives a cursory and 
incomplete account, which is limited to two lines, of the 
CPGB's change of attitude with regard to the struggle 
against the BUF. 61 
The CPGB's sudden change of attitude towards the anti- 
Mosley struggle highlights the essential differences 
between the `traditionalist' and `revisionist' approaches 
to the history of the CPGB. In her history of the CPGB's 
involvement in the trade unions 1933-1945, Fishman has 
divided the various approaches to CPGB history into 
`traditionalist' (made up of communist and non- 
communists) and a newly emerging `revisionist' school. 62 
This tries to see beyond the accepted mythologies that 
have obscured our understanding of Communist Party 
history and prevented accurate historical vision. All of 
the `traditionalist' approaches to CPGB history, both 
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communist and non-communist, take it for granted that the 
CPGB was always the leading force in the struggle against 
the BUF, and fail to bring out the different conceptions 
of fascism in Britain within the Communist Party. In 
contrast to this, Kevin Morgan (who might be termed a 
`revisionist') in his book, Against Fascism And War, 
notes that most historians have failed to see that the 
Communist Party leadership saw the National Government as 
the main fascist threat in Britain. 63 
The Communist Party's sudden about-turn in its 
attitude to the anti-Mosley struggle was to pay 
considerable dividends. The failure of the Labour and 
trade union leaders to organise any activity against the 
BUF meant the field was clear for the Communist Party to 
assume the leadership of this rank and file movement. 
With the weight of its whole apparatus now behind the 
campaign against the BUF, the Communist Party was 
perfectly poised to tap into the rich seam of support 
which existed among workers for this campaign. Against a 
background of the virtually unimpeded advance of fascism 
across Europe, tens of thousands of workers who normally 
would have remained loyal to the advice of the Labour 
leaders, decided to get involved in the fight against the 
BUF now led by the Communist Party. The leading role 
which the Communist Party began to play in the campaign 
against the BUF brought it considerable prestige and 
enhanced its standing within the Labour movement. 
However, it did not bring the Communist Party any great 
increase in its membership. For the first time since the 
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united front campaign started in March 1933, the CPGB 
nationally began to actively involve sections of the 
Labour movement in its activities, which was a major 
breakthrough. 
Despite the late start in the Communist Party's 
campaign against Mosley's Olympia rally, it soon began to 
gain momentum and develop important points of support 
within the Labour movement. By 2 June 1934, the national 
committee of the engineers union and the London 
management committee of the furnishing trade union, had 
come out in support of the counter-demonstration to 
Olympia. 64 Meanwhile in the run-up to Olympia the 
campaign against the BUF in the provinces carried on 
unabated in its determination to sweep the fascists off 
the streets. 
On 1 June BUF meetings in Bristol and Edinburgh were 
met with counter-demonstrations of thousands of workers. 
At the Bristol meeting the fascist speaker was hurled 
from the platform and the meeting was broken up. In 
Edinburgh the anti-fascists were unable to get into the 
heavily guarded meeting so they waited patiently for it 
to end. Despite the presence of a large contingent of 
mounted police, the anti-fascist demonstrators broke 
through police lines to the buses waiting to take the 
fascists away. They repeatedly attacked members of the 
BUF in the buses, causing great damage to the vehicles 
and hospitalising many fascists in the process. The Daily 
Worker commented that, 'The organised thugs, rushing 
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around the country in armoured cars and buses, received 
another good thrashing at Edinburgh on Friday night'. 65 
The events which took place at the BUF's Olympia rally 
have been well recorded elsewhere, suffice to say that 
the actions of the anti-fascists who disrupted Mosley's 
rally, played an invaluable role in exposing the fascist 
movement. 66 British workers were given a graphic example 
of what to expect if fascism triumphed in this country. 
Undoubtedly the revulsion felt amongst all sections of 
the population at the brutal disposal of all those 
disrupting the Olympia rally, played a part in stemming 
the advance of the BUF. 67 On the day after Olympia the 
Daily Worker paid tribute to all those workers involved 
in the struggle against the BUF: 
In the great industrial centres of this country 
thousands of workers have rallied (in most cases 
spontaneously and without leadership) against 
Mosley's travelling circuses. 68 
After Olympia the BUF started to go into a slow decline, 
which was largely due to the enormous opposition it 
encountered wherever it organised meetings. Nigel Todd 
has observed this rank and file opposition movement 
during the summer of 1934, 'seems to have marked a 
turning point in the advance of the BUF', with its 
membership plummeting from 50,000 in June to 5,000 in 
October. 69 As a Daily Worker editorial in June pointed 
out, if police protection had been withdrawn from the 
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fascists they would have been unable to hold meetings in 
most areas; and that the anti-fascist struggle would be 
immeasurably stronger if the Labour and trade union 
leaders came out in support of it. 70 
During the summer of 1934 Mosley began to cancel 
meetings for fear of violent opposition from the anti- 
fascist movement; he noted this in a letter to the Home 
Secretary in late June. 71 Even with a high level of 
police protection the counter-offensive of the anti- 
fascist movement, under Communist Party leadership, was 
powerful enough to seriously knock the confidence of the 
BUF and began to erode its base of support. Throughout 
the summer of 1934 the BUF were routed and prevented from 
holding meetings by thousands of anti-fascists all over 
the country. 72 The struggle against the fascists was most 
intense in East London, which remained the BUF's main 
bastion of support throughout the 1930s. The intensity of 
the struggle against the BUF can be attested to by the 
following comment of the Daily Worker on 13 June 1934: 
the brutalities of the Mosley thugs at Olympia have 
roused the workers of Britain to action. Not a single 
fascist meeting is being held which does not meet the 
violent opposition of the workers. 73 
In response to events in France and the new thinking in 
the Comintern leadership, the Communist Party began to 
develop its own conception of the popular front in 
Britain. At an anti-fascist rally on 16 June 1934, 
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J. R. Campbell called for the anti-fascist movement to be 
organised on the widest possible basis of all individuals 
and organisations prepared to fight against fascism, as 
expressed by the BUF and the National Government. 74 This 
new conception of the anti-fascist struggle rapidly came 
to involve the Communist Party with Liberal MP's which 
hitherto would have been anathema to it. 
The negotiations (over the united front pact) between 
the PCF and the SFIO in July 1934, spurred the British 
Communist Party to write to the Labour Party, calling for 
a meeting of representatives of both parties to discuss 
joint anti-fascist activity. In his call to the 
membership to support this new united front approach to 
the Labour Party, Pollitt stated that they should take 
encouragement from events in France, where mass pressure 
from below had forced the SFIO leaders into united front 
negotiations with the Communist Party. In Britain, if the 
CPGB campaigned vigourously enough amongst the rank and 
file of the Labour movement for the united front, then 
the Labour Party leadership would be forced against their 
will into united front negotiations with the Communist 
Party. 75 
Despite the growth in the influence and prestige of 
the Communist Party as a result of its leading role in 
the struggle against the BUF, it still failed to grow to 
any significant extent, much to the consternation of the 
King Street leadership. In a long and arduous discussion 
at the August Central Committee on why the Party had 
failed to grow, a plethora of organisational defects were 
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identified. Besides these, the major reason put forward 
for the Communist Party's failure to grow was that most 
of its members when carrying out their daily work did not 
have the idea of recruitment on their minds. 76 
The notion that the political line of the Party was 
responsible for this state of affairs was never brought 
up. Although the Communist Party's anti-fascist work was 
starting to break down its isolation within the Labour 
movement, it was still seriously hindered by the 
sectarian hostility which it displayed towards the 
leaders of the Labour movement. Undoubtedly, the 
Communist Party's sectarian attacks upon the Labour and 
trade union leaders reinforced the suspicion and 
hostility which many activists held from the CPGB's 
'class-against-class' period. 
In opening the discussion on the united front at the 
August Central Committee, Pollitt quoted from a Central 
Committee resolution of June 1933, pointing out how the 
Party had failed to put this resolution into effect. He 
lambasted the membership for its sectarian refusal to 
actively campaign for the united front within the Labour 
movement: 
The reason is that the Party comrades do not want the 
United Front and are very glad to receive the refusal 
[of the Labour Party to communist overtures]. We are 
still so cut off from the workers in the localities 
that we do not know who are the active members of the 
Labour Party. We have a local in London of 80 members 
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and the united front proposal is suggested to them 
and they are asked to get in touch with Labour Party 
members and they do not know the name of the local 
ward secretary... if the united front can be attained 
in France it can be done here... We must convince the 
Party that for the working class it is a life and 
death matter. 77 
It was at this meeting that the CPGB leadership agreed 
upon a popular front style campaign to attempt to defeat 
fascism in Britain. The Communist Party would now call 
for the formation of a mass anti-fascist front embracing 
not only working-class organisations but also the anti- 
fascist elements of the middle and upper classes. 78 This 
was a response to the recent united front pact signed 
between the socialists and communists in France, the 
rapid growth of the anti-Mosley movement during the 
summer, and the Communist Party's continuing isolation 
within the Labour movement. According to Pollitt, `our 
Party shall see in the organisation of this anti-fascist 
front the main line through which it is going to build up 
the working class united front'. 79 In other words this 
mass multi-class anti-fascist front would assist the CPGB 
in its task of forming a united front with the Labour 
Party. The road to this mass anti-fascist front would 
take three stages. The first stage would be to fill Hyde 
Park on 9 September with a counter-demonstration against 
Mosley's planned rally on that day. At this mass anti- 
fascist demonstration the call would then be made for an 
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anti-fascist rally in the autumn at the Albert Hall, 
drawing in as wide a spectrum of anti-fascist 
organisations as possible. The Albert Hall rally would 
then convene a national anti-fascist conference for 
November, which would form an elected organisation 
representative of all anti-fascist forces, to take the 
struggle against fascism forward. Pollitt commented 
optimistically: 
if we tackle this thing now we can make it the 
biggest thing in the history of the Party, such as 
will give a tremendous impression on the rank and 
file of the Labour Party and the Trades Union 
movement. 80 
The Communist Party succeeded in spectacular fashion in 
attaining the first stage of its anti-fascist strategy. 
On 9 September 1934 between 100,000 and 150,000 responded 
to the vigourous campaign of the anti-fascist movement 
led by the Communist Party. 81 The build up to this had 
seen the distribution of over half a million leaflets and 
the active support of over fifty union branches. 82 More 
than any other event of that summer this enormous show of 
strength by the anti-fascist movement decisively dented 
the confidence of the BUF and helped push the fascist 
movement into a rapid decline which would not be halted 
until 1936. 
The great success of the 9 September demonstration led 
the Communist Party to write to the Labour Party once 
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again, with a request for informal discussions on the 
formation of a working-class united front. With the 
Labour Party turning down its latest request for a 
united front, it would appear that the Communist Party 
leadership abruptly dropped the idea of a mass anti- 
fascist front. It never attempted to put into practice 
the other elements to the anti-fascist strategy outlined 
in August. While the rank and file communists continued 
to play a leading role in the battles against the BUF, 
which carried on into the autumn, the CPGB leadership 
clearly felt a change of tactics was needed if it was to 
obtain a united front with the Labour Party. 83 The change 
in tactics would require the Communist Party finally 
dispensing with the sectarian principles of the `Third 
Period' enabling it to approach the Labour Party as a 
common ally and not as an opponent. 
The new turn in communist Policy 
The Communist Party leadership saw the formation of a 
united front with the Labour Party as the key to the 
defeat of the main fascist threat in Britain, that is the 
National Government. They saw the municipal elections in 
November as an opportunity to extend the Party's united 
front tactics on the question of electoral strategy, 
believing that this would boost its campaign for a united 
front with the Labour Party. This extension of the 
Communist Party's united front tactics entailed the 
abandonment of the united front from below and the 
attendant sectarianism which went with it, and for this 
128 
move the leadership had to seek Moscow's permission. Up 
until that permission was given the CPGB carried on as 
usual, with its sectarian attacks upon the Labour Party 
and the idea of a united front from below. This reflected 
the fact that Comintern had not yet officially abandoned 
its sectarian attitudes towards social democracy. The 
following passage from a Daily Worker editorial in early 
October is a typical example of this, 'In all basic 
essentials Labour Party policy stands for the upholding 
of capitalism. Its municipal record is one of defence of 
capitalist interests'. The editorial concluded that the 
choice facing workers was between the capitalist 
candidates of the three major parties and the 
revolutionary candidates of the Communist Party. 84 It was 
this sectarianism which continued to alienate most 
workers away from the Communist Party and produced such a 
hostile reaction from the Labour Party to its united 
front campaign. 
At the meeting of the ECCI Presidium in October 1934, 
Pollitt gave a report on the CPGB's lack of progress in 
its campaign for a united front with the Labour Party. He 
put this lack of progress in the main down to the 
failings of the Communist Party. Pollitt noted how the 
reformist workers deeply resented the Communist Party 
splitting the working class vote in elections, and the 
continuing opposition of sections of the CPGB membership 
to the campaign for a united front with the Labour Party. 
Pollitt asked for, 'a clear line on united front tactics 
in elections'. He indicated the need for a re-evaluation 
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of the Communist Party's electoral strategy and the need 
to avoid being seen as letting in capitalist candidates 
at elections. Pollitt finished by stating that the CPGB's 
anti-fascist work had brought it closer to the workers 
than at any time in its history. 85 
The ECCI's sanction for this extension of the CPGB's 
united front tactics flowed from the fact that it fitted 
in perfectly with the needs of Soviet foreign policy, and 
Dimitrov's views on the role of communism in the era of 
the anti-fascist struggle. Following Moscow's sanction 
for this extension of its united front tactics the 
Communist Party was to execute a rapid change of 
direction which moved it from left to right. This rapid 
about-turn, was to create alarm among some sections of 
the CPGB. 
With less than two weeks to go before polling day in 
the municipal elections, the CPGB made a startling change 
in its electoral tactics, which was designed to further 
its campaign for a united front with the Labour Party. 
Unfortunately for the Communist Party the TUC was about 
to launch yet another crack down upon its united front 
campaigns in the trade union movement. The TUC General 
Council on 26 October 1934 issued the infamous `Black 
Circulars', officially known as Circulars 16 and 17. 
Circular 16 informed trades councils that the TUC would 
withdraw its recognition from them if they persisted in 
accepting delegates who were known communists and 
fascists. In a similar vein Circular 17 called on all 
unions affiliated to the TUC to enforce similar bans on 
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communists, in effect debarring communists from holding 
any union office. 86 As will revealed later, when looking 
at the activities of communists in Leeds and Bradford, 
Circular 16 was to have a mixed impact on communist 
activities on the trades councils. Where the communists 
had become accepted as a legitimate part of the local 
Labour movement such as in Bradford, Circular 16 was to 
have a nominal effect on their activities; however in 
Leeds it had a greater impact. 
The new electoral proposals which were announced in 
the Daily Worker on 20 October 1934 saw a complete 
transformation in communist attitudes to the Labour 
Party. From outright opposition to the Labour Party as 
being another capitalist party, the Communist Party 
became"a firm advocate of the need for working class 
unity to defeat the capitalist candidates of the National 
Government. These proposals were accompanied by the 
Communist Party renewing its united front offer to the 
Labour Party. 87 
The CPGB's election proposals involved it pledging 
active support for all those Labour Party candidates 
prepared to support minimum united front demands such as 
lower rents and increased scales of relief for the 
unemployed. It declared that it would not put forward 
candidates against those Labour candidates who supported 
such united front demands. In the interests of class 
unity against the capitalist enemy the Communist Party 
was prepared to go even further in its concessions to 
Labour. Only in those areas where the Communist Party had 
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a serious chance of either winning or gaining a 
significant vote would it put forward candidates against 
Labour, elsewhere it would withdraw its candidates. In 
those areas where the Communist Party had no candidate, 
its members were called upon to consider support for 
Labour candidates, even though they might not agree to 
support any minimum united front demands. 88 
The CPGB leadership portrayed these new electoral 
tactics, to its membership, as an extension of the united 
front. An internal secretariat circular sent to all 
branches stressed how the Party's anti-fascist activities 
had won large numbers of militants in the Labour movement 
for practical united front action. If the Communist Party 
was to be successful in its campaign for a united front 
with the Labour Party then it had to break down the many 
barriers and objections that at present existed among the 
reformist workers to the united front. 89 
The new electoral tactics came as a shock to the 
Communist Party membership, which was halfway through an 
election campaign which they had fought on a strongly 
anti-Labour programme. Not surprisingly, they created 
great confusion amongst the membership which responded in 
a variety of ways to this abrupt change. As will be shown 
when looking at the Bradford district, the new electoral 
tactics were subject to a variety of different 
interpretations by the membership. 
In some areas the membership completely ignored the 
new electoral tactics, pressing ahead with their own 
campaigns and standing against Labour. At the political 
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Bureau in November 1934, Bramley gave the example of one 
London constituency where local communists were 
contesting three wards. He stated that the attitude of 
Party members in these three wards was that the new 
electoral tactics did not apply to them, and they went 
ahead in standing against Labour. 90 
In other areas the membership used the new electoral 
tactics as an excuse to drop out of badly organised 
electoral campaigns. However there were areas where the 
branches tried to use the new tactics as a bridge to 
break down barriers with the local Labour movement. At 
the same Political Bureau meeting in November Pollitt 
praised the example of communists in Bolton who had been 
planning to contest three Labour marginals. Once the new 
electoral tactics had been declared the Communist Party 
in Bolton withdrew its candidates from the elections. 
This brought a complete change of attitude to the Bolton 
Communist Party from many in the local Labour movement. 
Even the most anti-communist elements had begun to adopt 
a more positive attitude to the united front. 91 
Despite the poor showing of the Communist Party 
candidates in most areas, squeezed as they were by the 
swing to Labour, the CPGB leadership expressed 
satisfaction with the election results on several counts. 
Firstly, the new tactics had brought branches in many 
areas into closer contact with the officials and leading 
figures in the local Labour parties. Secondly, the new 
tactics were beginning to break down the objections of 
many reformist workers to the united front campaign of 
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the Communist Party. Finally and most important of all 
were the defeats which the National Government had 
suffered at the hands of Labour. 92 
When the Political Bureau came to assess the local 
election results Pollitt observed how, `Any weakening of 
the capitalist forces are now of tremendous importance 
for our Party and has tremendous effect and importance 
abroad'. 93 He stated that without the united front in 
France fascism would probably have triumphed there, which 
would have placed Europe on the verge of war and put the 
Soviet Union in grave danger of imperialist attack. The 
election of a popular front government in France or the 
defeat of the National Government in Britain would 
transform the international situation and help stem the 
advance to fascism and war in Europe. Most crucially of 
all, `It would mean we hold off war in Europe against the 
Soviet Union, a gain for the international working 
class'. 94 Pollitt maintained that whilst the criticisms 
of the Labour Party programme for government would 
remain, the Communist Party's attitude to the election of 
a Labour Government would have to change from the 
negative to the positive. 95 
In discussing strategy for the forthcoming general 
election, the CPGB leadership agreed to stand in a 
handful of seats and elsewhere to actively campaign for a 
Labour victory. The new objective set for the Communist 
Party was to get a small fraction of MPs elected along 
with a majority Labour government. 96 This essentially was 
the electoral policy adopted by the Communist Party at 
134 
its Thirteenth Congress in February 1935 and around which 
it campaigned in the 1935 general election. 97 
While Pollitt and his supporters on the CPGB's leading 
bodies got their own way over this extension of united 
front tactics, there still remained within the membership 
a deep rooted adherence to old sectarian attitudes. 98 
Along with this there was alarm amongst the membership 
about the Communist Party moving to the right as a result 
of the new united front tactics. 99 Joss and Dutt were 
both criticised at the Political Bureau in November 1934 
for their opposition to the new united front line, which 
allegedly, sowed confusion amongst sections of the 
membership as to what they should do in the elections. In 
many areas it appears the membership completely ignored 
the new united front guidelines. Bramley commented at the 
Political Bureau in November 1934 that: 
The sectarianism of the Party is more widespread than 
I believed possible. [He recounted the behaviour of 
CPGB members towards Labour supporters at the count 
in West Ham] ... you could hear the murmuring of `rats, 
rats, rats, we must get rid of the rats'. This was 
terrible. 100 
The dichotomy between the national leadership and the 
rank and file over anti-fascist strategy will be explored 
further by reference to the activities of communists in 
West Yorkshire. This reveals that the continuities and 
ruptures in practice between local communists and the 
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Communist Party on a national scale were quite 
substantial when it came to attitudes towards social 
democracy and the BUF. 
The Communist Party in West Yorkshire - 1934 
During 1934 the CPGB branches in Bradford and Leeds 
enjoyed rather mixed fortunes, with the struggle against 
fascism emerging as their main priority. While their 
anti-fascist activities brought them closer to sections 
of the local Labour movement, the credit accrued from 
such activities was undermined by occasional fits of 
sectarian activity. On balance it would appear that the 
Communist Party in Bradford emerged from 1934 with a 
stronger position in the local Labour movement than its 
counterpart in Leeds. The disparate fortunes of the two 
branches can be partly attributed to the differing effect 
in the two areas of the 'Black Circular'. This is in 
marked contrast to the experience of the CPGB in the 
East Midlands where the 'Black Circular' appeared to have 
less impact upon the activities of local communists. 
Richard Stevens has commented that while the 'Black 
Circular' made things more difficult for local 
communists, they escaped the worst effects of the 
circular due to, 'the fundamental tolerance that existed 
within most sections of the local Labour movement'. 101 
Leeds Communist Party 
By the spring of 1934, the Leeds branch had become the 
biggest and most vibrant section of the Bradford 
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district. It had a 
. 
flourishing YCL which had its own 
premises in the city centre. It even had its own football 
team which played in the local junior leagues. The Leeds 
branch, through its turn to trade union work, had more 
employed members than ever before. Through the medium of 
the Red Leader, which was a factory paper produced for 
the workforce at Montagu-Burtons, and the hard work of 
its members at other clothing factories, the Leeds 
Communist Party had built a position of considerable 
influence within the local clothing industry. The success 
of the Red Leader, (out of a workforce of 10,000 at 
Burtons its circulation peaked at 1,000 a week), brought 
requests from workers in other clothing factories for the 
local Communist Party to produce something similar for 
them. This led to the publication of the Garment Worker 
which covered the five factories where Leeds Communist 
Party had members and contacts. 102 
The success of the local Communist Party's work in the 
clothing industry sparked off a ferocious witch-hunt 
against its members in the National Union of Tailors and 
Garment Workers (NUTGW). They spent the best part of 1933 
fighting their expulsion from the union by local right 
wing union officials. The local communists in the NUTGW 
were readmitted to the union in the spring of 1934 under 
certain conditions. First of all, they had to cease 
publication of the Red Leader. They were also barred from 
holding any union office for three years. 103 
The growth of the Leeds branch was such that it agreed 
in the spring of 1934 to take Ernie Benson (the branch 
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secretary) on as a part-time organiser. He was to be paid 
one pound fifty for a three day week. 104 However the 
greatest success for the local Communist Party in 1934 
came from its work on Leeds Trades Council, where it 
increased its representation from two to five. Of these 
five, Marion Jessop and Peter Mahoney were elected on to 
the Trades Council executive, with Jessop being elected 
to the post of second vice-president. 105 
In the spring of 1934, the communist fraction on Leeds 
Trades Council successfully moved a variety of 
resolutions, which included one calling for the release 
of imprisoned German communists and another calling for 
the withdrawal of the charges against Harry Pollitt and 
Tom Mann, for their activity against the government's 
unemployment bill. 106 Meanwhile the Leeds Communist Party 
maintained the close relations which its members had 
established in 1933 with sections of the local Leagues of 
Youth. At the Central League of Youth branch in early 
February 1934, they managed to get W. Spence (a national 
YCL organiser) in to speak. 107 
In response to the BUF announcing its intention to 
hold a meeting in the city centre, Leeds Communist Party 
moved into action. At the BUF rally on 26 April 1934, the 
local communists organised a counter-demonstration 
outside several hundred strong. They were even able to 
smuggle anti-fascists into the meeting where they 
unfurled banners carrying slogans such as `BRITAIN IS 
GOING FASCIST'. Despite this intervention there are no 
reports of any attempt to disrupt the fascist meeting. 108 
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On the 1934 May Day activities, the local communists 
clashed with the Leeds Labour Party, and committed a 
major tactical mistake in their united front activities. 
This sectarian blunder only served to undermine the 
political capital accrued from its anti-fascist 
activities. On the May Day demonstration itself, attempts 
were made to prevent the communist contingent from 
joining the march, despite the fact that Marian Jessop 
was President of the May Day committee. David Beevers, 
the chief marshal for the demonstration, who was a Labour 
councillor and a worker at the Burtons factory, 
instructed the police to keep the communist contingent 
from the rest of the demonstration. This attempt to split 
the demonstration failed, as the communist contingent 
evaded the police by immersing itself in the heart of the 
demonstration. 109 
At the May Day rally there was the official Labour 
movement platform and a united front platform. Marian 
Jessop made a major tactical mistake when she spoke from 
the united front platform organised by the local 
Communist Party. This act greatly angered many of those 
present and was to draw much criticism from the local 
labour movement. At the meeting of Leeds Trades Council 
on 30 May 1934, a letter was read from number two branch 
of the Boot and Shoe Operatives, which strongly protested 
at Marian Jessop's action in supporting the united front 
activities of the local Communist Party on May Day. After 
a short discussion the Trades Council passed a motion of 
censure by a large majority against Marrion Jessop. 110 
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Members of the League of Youth who were involved with the 
united front activities on May Day, were also subjected 
to disciplinary action. 111 
At the meeting of Leeds Trades Council Executive 
Committee in May, the delegates agreed to cooperate with 
the local Jewish Council in the setting up of a 
committee to organise a boycott of German goods and 
services. In what appears to have been another example of 
sectarianism, the Leeds Communist Party, following the 
national Party line on this issue, made no attempt to get 
involved in this campaign, losing another opportunity to 
get closer to the local Labour movement. 112 Instead it 
engaged in popular front style activities in support of 
the Relief Committee for the Victims of German Fascism. 
The local communists organised a meeting on 27 May 1934 
at Leeds Town Hall. The chair was taken by a local 
vicar, W. Thompson, while the platform brought together 
the likes of J. R. Campbell with Vyvyan Adams, who was a 
Conservative MP. At this meeting the largely Jewish 
audience raised over seventy pounds for humanitarian aid 
to German refugees. 113 
The struggle against the BUF, however, was to offer 
local communists an opportunity to raise their profile 
and influence within the Labour movement in Leeds. Alarm 
at the successes of fascism on the continent and the 
rapid growth of the BUF led several trade union branches 
to send resolutions to the Trades Council, calling for it 
to organise effective action against the menace of 
fascism. 114 
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At the June meeting of Leeds Trades Council, a 
resolution from the local branch of the NUTGW was the 
subject of considerable debate. The resolution referred 
to the `drive towards Fascism in this country' and called 
for a local, `labour movement conference to discuss the 
dangers of fascism in this country and decide on the best 
means of combatting it'. Despite calls for no action to 
be taken, the above resolution was passed with a large 
majority. The resolution was seconded by Nat Kline, a 
local communist, who withdrew his branch resolution which 
was along similar lines. 115 
It was not until July that the Trades Council 
Executive Committee took the decision, in the face of 
calls for no action to be taken on this issue, to put the 
garment workers' resolution into practice. The executive 
decided to organise a weekend of anti-fascist activity in 
the autumn, which was to take place on the 17 and 18 of 
November 1934. On Saturday 17 November there was to be an 
anti-fascist conference addressed by Aneurin Bevan, while 
on the Sunday there was to be an anti-fascist 
demonstration protesting against the government's 
sedition bill and the menace of the BUF. 116 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1934, the Leeds 
Communist Party held a series of anti-fascist meetings 
all over the city. 117 During this period the communist 
bookshop in Hunslet was repeatedly attacked by fascists. 
After the windows were smashed for the fourth time, the 
insurance companies refused cover to the bookshop any 
longer. 118 
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When the local BUF announced that it was going to have 
an open-air rally outside Leeds Town Hall on 28 July 
1934, local communists immediately began preparations for 
a counter-demonstration. On the Friday night before the 
fascist rally, the local police-no doubt alarmed by the 
events at Olympia-visited the home of a leading figure in 
the Leeds Communist Party. The police allegedly said that 
they would arrest him and two other local Communist Party 
members if the anti-fascist counter-demonstration caused 
any `trouble' the next day. 119 This action of the police 
was seen by many in the local Labour movement as yet 
another example of state bias towards the BUF in its 
struggle with the anti-fascist movement. Ignoring this 
act of intimidation, the Leeds Communist Party proceeded 
with its plans to oppose the BUF public rally. 
On 28 July the communist-led counter-demonstration 
started off over 400 strong but had swelled to over 1,000 
people by the time it reached the Town Hall, where the 
BUF was supposed to be holding its open-air rally. No 
doubt fearful of what kind of reception they might 
encounter, in view of the determined opposition put up 
against them at Olympia and many other places around the 
country, the fascists never turned up for their public 
rally in Leeds. The failure of the fascists to turn up 
for their meeting was portrayed as yet another victory 
for the anti-fascist movement led by the Communist 
Party. 120 
Along with fascism the other great international issue 
of the day was the threat of world war. It was on this 
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question that the communist fraction on the Leeds Trades 
Council, attempted to steer the Trades Council into 
adopting a Leninist position. At the Trades Council in 
July a letter from the National Joint Council was read 
out, outlining its attitude to the threat of war. The 
discussion on this letter was followed by a resolution 
from the communist fraction on the Trades Council. This 
protested at the position adopted by the National Joint 
Council, with regard to its attitude to war. The 
resolution advocated that in the event of war breaking 
out, the working class should unite and fight against the 
capitalist class, seeking to utilise the upheavals 
brought about by war to overthrow the National 
Government, and replace it with a workers government. In 
a hard fought debate, in which all five communist 
delegates spoke, the resolution was lost 17 to 25.121 
Besides the anti-fascist and anti-war campaigns the 
local communists attempted to apply the Communist Party's 
electoral policy as part of their united front campaign; 
and found that this area of activity only served to 
alienate sections of the local Labour movement. In mid- 
June 1934, the CPGB announced its panel of candidates for 
the next general election. Included in this panel was the 
Leeds communist Jim Roche, who had played a key role in 
building up the communist cell at the Burtons factory. 122 
At the start of October 1934 Roche was put forward as one 
of the local Communist Party's two candidates for the 
municipal elections, the intention being to stand in the 
Central and Middleton wards. 
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In a leaflet on the elections, which included a long 
diatribe against the Labour Party, the Leeds Communist 
Party invited workers to its nomination meetings on the 9 
and 12 of October. When the abrupt change of electoral 
tactics was announced on 20 October 1934, the Leeds 
Communist Party responded positively to these proposals, 
and immediately set about implementing them. It produced 
another open letter to workers, which invited them to a 
series of meetings where they could hear Maurice Ferguson 
speak on the Communist Party's new united front 
proposals. This new open letter to workers declared that 
the Leeds Communist Party was prepared to withdraw its 
candidates in the Central and Middleton wards if the 
Labour candidates would pledge their support for the 
united front against fascism and war. In support of its 
case the letter from Leeds Communist Party also cited the 
activity of the local fascists, who it claimed had 
repeatedly attacked communist paper sellers, and the 
police, who had also victimised communist paper sellers 
and hindered their anti-fascist activities. 123 
Although these overtures to the local Labour Party 
were rejected, the Leeds Communist Party, in line with 
the directives contained in the secretariat letter of 20 
October, withdrew its two candidates from the elections. 
Despite this withdrawal of its candidates from the 
elections, there were still complaints made against the 
Leeds Communist Party to the Trades Council Executive 
Committee, about the communist electoral campaign. 124 
Such complaints could not have come at a worse time for 
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they tied in with an offensive against communist 
influence within the Leeds Labour movement led by local 
Labour loyalists alarmed at communist influence within 
the Leagues of Youth. This local anti-communist offensive 
was to be greatly reinforced by the effect of the `Black 
Circular'. 
Throughout 1934 communist speakers were a fairly 
regular feature of the various League of Youth branch 
meetings. The growing sympathy expressed within the local 
Leagues of Youth for the united front prompted the chair 
of the Leeds Labour Party Youth Advisory Committee, in 
October, to launch an unprecedented attack upon communist 
sympathisers within the Leagues of Youth. They were 
criticised for being `drawing room revolutionaries' who 
'are complete failures in constructive work'. The chair 
of the Youth Advisory Committee observed that, 'One of 
the most disturbing influences to which the League of 
Youth is subjected is due to members who hover round the 
Young Communist League'. 125 
The issuing of the TUC's 'Black Circular' (Circular 
16) in October 1934, which barred communists from being 
delegates to a trades council, prompted yet another 
attack upon the local Communist Party by the right wing 
within the Leeds Labour movement. The 'Black Circular' 
gave local Labour loyalists the means to launch their 
most successful campaign yet against communist influence 
in the Leeds Labour movement. At the Trades Council 
meeting in November 1934 the 'Black Circular' was read 
out, immediately after which a Communist Party member who 
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was part of the NUTGW delegation stood up and moved a 
resolution that, 'No action be taken by this council on 
this circular'. After a very bitter and divisive debate 
the resolution was lost by 43 votes to 24.126 
Following this decision, reaction against the 
Communist Party in Leeds came in swiftly from various 
quarters of the local Labour movement. At the Trades 
Council in November 1934 further discussion on the 'Black 
Circular' was ruled out of order. Besides this letters 
were read out from NUR Branch 5 and the local NUTGW, 
informing the Trades Council that they were withdrawing 
two delegates on the grounds that they were members of 
the Communist Party. 127 By February 1935, after the 
Trades Council annual meeting, the Leeds Communist Party 
was down to one delegate on the Trades Council, 
illustrating its failure to move beyond the fringes of 
the local Labour movement. 
This failure can be put down to the combined effect of 
the 'Black Circular' and the sectarian lapses of local 
communists which only aided their political opponents 
within the Leeds Labour movement. These factors were 
given added potency by the atmosphere of political 
intolerance which pervaded the local Labour movement. It 
could also be argued that the local Communist Party's 
concentration on the anti-fascist campaign cut it off 
from many workers more interested with so-called 'bread 
and butter' issues such as wages and conditions. This 
situation is in sharp contrast to the experience of the 
Bradford Communist Party, where local communists had 
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succeeded in establishing a position where they were seen 
by a large number of activists as a legitimate part of 
the Labour movement, and consequently were better able to 
fend off attacks upon them such as the `Black Circular'. 
Bradford Communist Party 
The Communist Party in Bradford made an impressive start 
to its united front activities at the beginning of 1934. 
It campaigned vigorously within the Bradford Labour 
movement for support of the national hunger march and 
united front congress. The local Communist Party met with 
a very favourable response when it took this united front 
campaign out into the local Labour movement. The campaign 
got off to a flying start in January, with the Trades 
Council coming out in favour of actively supporting the 
hunger march and united front congress. It elected Fred 
Ratcliffe, the Trades Council President, as delegate to 
the Bermondsey united front congress and sent six 
delegates to a local conference of the NUWM, which was 
convened to organise the Bradford leg of the national 
hunger march. The Trades Council also granted three 
pounds to the local NUWM to help with its preparations 
for the Bradford leg of the hunger march. 128 
Other delegates from Bradford to the Bermondsey united 
front congress included Maurice Ferguson from the TGWU, 
the President of number 2 branch of the textile workers, 
the branch secretary of the Furnishing Trades Union and 
the assistant secretary of the local ILP. The local NUWM 
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received donations in support of the hunger march from a 
large number of local trade unions. 
When the hunger march passed through Bradford in early 
February 1934, the building workers' trade union let the 
marchers stay overnight at their union hall. The local 
Cooperative Society fed the marchers in the evening free 
of charge at its cafe, while two Labour councillors 
arranged for blankets for the marchers. 129 Here was 
concrete evidence of the united front activities of the 
local Communist Party, successfully involving sections of 
the Labour movement in its activities. 
On this occasion the united front was not confined to 
mere propaganda, but organising practical aid in support 
of the unemployed. The success of the Bradford Communist 
Party's united front campaign is shown by the fact that 
it organised the biggest trade union delegation from the 
provinces to the Bermondsey united front congress. 130 
Further confirmation of this success came in the remarks 
of Fred Ratcliffe, President of the Trades Council, at 
the May Day Committee on 9 February 1934: 
The Labour Party has just had its annual meeting and 
bemoaned the apathy of the workers and the difficulty 
in getting a meeting. Yet we who welcomed the 
marchers at the Building Trades Hall had to turn away 
2,000 people for there was no room. 
I am for the United Front and propose that we 
invite the Communist Party, the ILP and the National 
Unemployed Workers Movement, to send a representative 
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to this body so that we can have a united May Day 
demonstration this year. 131 
Ratcliffe's proposal which was approved by the May Day 
Committee, was the first time since 1925 that the Trades 
Council had officially invited the local Communist Party 
to participate in May Day. It is interesting to note that 
at the Hyde Park reception for the hunger marchers, Fred 
Ratcliffe seconded the resolution in support of the 
marchers, which had been moved by Pollitt's opening 
speech. 132 This was further evidence of the local 
Communist Party's success in gaining the confidence and 
support of leading figures in the local Labour movement. 
In response to the fascist activity in France and the 
crushing of the uprising of the Austrian workers, the 
Bradford Trades Council organised an anti-fascist rally. 
The anti-fascist rally was also in support of victims of 
fascism on the continent, such as Dimitrov and his co- 
defendants in the Reichstag Fire Trial. Over 8,000 
handbills were circulated to advertise the rally on 27 
February 1934 at the Building Trades Hall. The platform 
of speakers represented a wide cross section of the local 
Labour movement. There was Fred Ratcliffe, W. Hirst J. P., 
Foster Sunderland from Bradford Labour Party, and Maurice 
Ferguson of the local Communist Party, who had recently 
been elected as Trades Council delegate to the Yorkshire 
Federation of Trades Councils. 133 
As the influence of the communist fraction grew on the 
Trade Council during the spring of 1934, for which it was 
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commended at the Central Committee, it slipped back into 
sectarian attacks on the leadership of the Labour 
movement. 134 At the April meeting of the Trades Council, 
it raised criticism of the disbursement of the TUC's 
Austrian worker's fund, reflecting the criticisms made of 
this in the Daily Worker. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
Trades Council responded to the criticisms made by the 
communists by writing to the TUC for an assurance that 
the fund was being distributed among the real victims of 
fascism. 135 
At the May Day rally the Bradford Communist Party 
scored its greatest united front success to date. It had 
three speakers on the May Day platform, one each from the 
Bradford Communist Party, the YCL and the NUWM. Alongside 
these were speakers from every section of the local 
Labour movement, including Fred Jowett of the ILP. The 
record financial collection taken at the May Day rally 
reflected the fact this was the biggest local Labour 
movement event for some years. 136 The success of the 1934 
May Day event was powerful ammunition in favour of the 
local Communist Party's united front campaigns. Was the 
success of May Day that year due to the united front 
platform? It is very debatable whether this was the case. 
Certainly it did nothing to diminish support for May Day 
that year as shown by the record attendance. It would 
appear more likely that the record attendance at May Day 
in 1934 reflected growing concern at the successes of 
fascism, particularly on the continent. For the local 
Communist Party to have gained acceptance into what was 
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symbolically the most important date in the calendar of 
the Labour movement was a considerable achievement. It 
was further evidence of how the communists had overcome 
much of the hostility and suspicion generated by their 
sectarian activities in the past. 
The Bradford Communist Party's united front work in 
the first half of 1934, had won its members a wide 
measure of acceptance within the local Labour movement. 
The united front successes of the local Communist Party 
concealed a deep malaise within the branch. The main 
problem facing the Bradford Communist Party was its 
inability to recruit on any significant scale from the 
various united front campaigns in which it was involved. 
The surviving papers of local communist D. A. Wilson seem 
to indicate that the membership of the Bradford Communist 
Party fell to 37 in 1934.137 What emerges from careful 
study of the Bradford Communist Party is of a small, 
highly motivated branch which was heavily overworked. 
This was due to its failure to recruit enough new people, 
to help shoulder the burden of the large number of 
campaigns it was involved in. 138 The reasons for this 
failure to recruit were partially subjective, and lay in 
some of the bad organisational methods used by the local 
Communist Party. Of far greater importance was the legacy 
of past sectarianism, during the days of the 'class 
against-class' period. At the Central Committee in April 
1934, Maurice Ferguson admitted that while many workers 
were now willing to engage in united front work with 
local communists, they were not prepared to join the 
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Bradford branch due to lingering suspicions about its 
sectarian past: 
We have had a feeling in Bradford where the workers 
have thought to be associated with the Party was 
dangerous and would involve them in artificial calls 
for strike action, open them to victimisation, etc. 
This is a heritage of the past [in particular the 
local Party's mishandling of a major textile strike 
in 1930] and is very difficult to break down. To a 
certain extent we have succeeded in breaking this 
down. There is a better relationship all round and 
yet this does not seem to lead further than a certain 
point. 139 
In the summer of 1934, Bradford Trades Council organised 
a campaign against the proposed rent increases for 
council tenants. The conference that launched this 
campaign, involved representatives of the Tenants League, 
the city Labour Party and various district and ward 
parties, along with the ILP and the local Communist 
Party. 140 The local Communist Party's involvement in such 
a campaign, which had as one of its central objectives 
the discrediting of the Conservative council to further 
the electoral prospects of Labour, is testimony to their 
further integration into the mainstream of the local 
Labour movement. 
This growing acceptance of the local Communist Party 
as a legitimate part of the Bradford Labour movement was 
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to be instrumental in defeating the threat posed by the 
TUC's `Black Circular'. Over the following year, right 
wing elements within the local Labour movement tried to 
use the TUC's witch-hunting measures, as an instrument 
with which to drive communists out of the mainstream of 
the Labour movement. 
In response to the battles against the BUF waged on a 
national scale and the attempts of the BUF to establish a 
branch in Bradford, the Trades Council took steps to 
counter this menace at its July meeting. It passed a 
resolution which was sent to the next half-yearly meeting 
of the Yorkshire Federation of Trades Councils (YFTC), 
that called on the TUC to organise a Labour movement 
defence force to protect its activities from the 
fascists. 141 The communist fraction, in giving support to 
this resolution, broke the Party line on this question. 
As noted in chapter one the national line of the CPGB was 
against the idea of a workers defence force to combat the 
threat of attacks on Labour movement events by BUF 
members. 
In breaking the national line on this issue, the 
Bradford Communist Party revealed how it was far more in 
tune with the mood and concerns of local Labour movement 
activists than the Communist Party leadership in King 
Street. It also reveals a difference in opinion between 
the local communists and the Party's national leadership 
over the priorities of the anti-fascist struggle. The 
CPGB leadership saw the main threat of fascism in Britain 
coming from the National Government even when it was 
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giving support to the struggle against the BUF. However, 
local communists reflecting the concerns of local Labour 
movement activists, saw the main threat of fascism in 
Britain coming from the BUF. 
In the second half of 1934, the battle against the BUF 
and the threat of war was to dominate the activities of 
the Bradford Communist Party. During the latter part of 
the summer, it was able to get the Trades Council to 
support a variety of anti-fascist activities. 142 
As the battle against the BUF reached a climax in the 
second half of the year, the Trades Council became 
increasingly concerned by the blackshirts' activities. It 
organised a conference to discuss methods of combatting 
fascism for Saturday 10 November 1934, with John Strachey 
as the main speaker. Working in tandem with the local 
anti-war council this was to be followed by an anti-war 
conference on armistice day, Sunday 11 November. 143 
Whilst the Trades Council and Bradford Anti-War Council 
were engaged in making preparations for these activities, 
the BUF announced that Mosley would be coming to Bradford 
in mid-November, to open the new office of the local 
blackshirts and address a public rally. 
On Saturday 10 November 1934,131 delegates from 35 
different organisations met at the Milton Rooms under the 
auspices of the Bradford Trades Council. Over 28 local 
union branches were represented, along with the local ILP 
and various ward Labour parties, and the Bradford Anti- 
War Council. In his speech, John Strachey aroused 
controversy when he attacked Labour's passive attitude 
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towards fascism. At the end of the conference Maurice 
Ferguson successfully moved an addendum to the Trades 
Council resolution. This called for the conference to 
elect a committee to organise opposition to Mosley's 
rally. From the conference a steering committee of 26 was 
elected, to oversee preparations for the counter- 
demonstration to the BUF rally. 144 
On the next day, over 300 people turned up to the 
anti-war conference organised by the Bradford Anti-War 
Council. The intensity of the discussion was shown by 
the large number of questions asked and the late 
finishing time of the meeting. At the end of the meeting, 
all those present expressed their support for a 
resolution dealing with the twin dangers of fascism and 
war. It ended: 
I therefore pledge myself, wholeheartedly to resist 
war and Fascism... and to undertake to win the support 
of my colleagues, workmates, neighbours and 
acquaintances, and any organisation to which I 
belong. 145 
The large numbers attending both of these events revealed 
the depth of concern within the local Labour movement at 
the growing danger of war and the threat posed by 
fascism. At both of these events the Bradford communists 
played a key role in organising action against fascism 
and war. The prominent role which local communists were 
able to play in these events reflects how they were in 
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tune with the concerns of local Labour movement 
activists. 
Inside the BUF rally on Sunday 18 November 1934, 
Mosley addressed a half-empty hall; meanwhile outside 
over a thousand people had turned out for the anti- 
fascist counter-demonstration. Under the chairmanship of 
Luther Horner, the crowd heard speeches from Fred 
Ratcliffe and Maurice Ferguson. At the end of the rally 
Fred Ratcliffe led an attempt to march on Mosley's 
meeting, but was prevented from doing so by the police. 
He then led a noisy demonstration through the city 
centre. As the one commentator in the Bradford Pioneer 
noted, the anti-fascist counter-demonstration was a 
considerable success in view of the many obstacles the 
organisers had to overcome, `That was not bad at all in 
view of the apparently official ban that had been put on 
the demonstration by the Labour Party'. 146 
The Trades Council followed this up with the formation 
of an anti-fascist committee. 147 Over 16 union branches 
regularly sent delegates to this anti-fascist committee. 
This issued a monthly circular and quarterly newsletter 
to all affiliates, with news of fascist activity both in 
Britain and abroad. 148 
During this flurry of anti-fascist activity in the 
autumn of 1934, the Bradford Communist Party faced 
challenges on other fronts. In line with the new united 
front directives issued by the Party secretariat on 20 
October, the Bradford Communist Party approached the 
local Labour Party for an electoral bloc of all working 
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class parties to fight the coming municipal elections. At 
a special meeting of the Bradford Labour Party executive 
in late October, a delegation from the local Communist 
Party put the case for an electoral united front between 
all working class parties. The meeting rejected these 
proposals 11 to 1.149 
It is interesting to note how differently the Bradford 
and Leeds branches interpreted the secretariat's 
directives. These stated, that where the local branch had 
no chance of winning or obtaining a `significant' vote, 
it should withdraw its candidates. Rebuffed by the local 
Labour Party, the Bradford Communist Party instead of 
withdrawing its candidate as the branch in Leeds had 
done, interpreted the new electoral directives in what 
appeared to be a sectarian manner. After a long and 
divisive debate which spanned two evenings (22-23 
October) the Bradford Communist Party decided to stand 
Tom Tynan, a well known local communist who was on the 
Trades Council and President of the Bradford ETU, in the 
Manningham ward. 150 The bitter debate within the Bradford 
branch over whether to stand in the local elections 
revealed considerable confusion over the new united front 
line. This confusion was not cleared up until after the 
elections when the Central Committee sent a 
representative (Robson) up to Bradford to resolve the 
dispute within the branch over the new united front 
policy. At a meeting of the West Yorkshire district 
committee on 11 November Robson criticized the Bradford 
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branch for its sectarianism in standing a candidate 
against Labour during the local elections. 151 
The results for Manningham ward were as follows: 
Independent-2,530, Labour-2,408, Communist-107.152 This 
close result would only have given ammunition to those in 
the local Labour movement who argued that communist 
sectarianism was a destructive influence, helping 
Labour's enemies. On the basis of the result it gained in 
1933 the Bradford Communist Party was not in a position 
to attain a significant vote. Having said this, the local 
communists may not have acted out of sectarianism. Their 
standing against Labour did nothing to diminish their 
influence on the Trades Council, as we shall see with the 
struggle against the `Black Circular'. They may have felt 
that on the basis of all their successes with united 
front work, they actually had a serious chance of gaining 
a significant vote. However, sectarian motives for 
standing against Labour are revealed by Maurice Ferguson, 
in a letter to D. A. Wilson, when he rejects the latter's 
call for the Bradford branch to withdraw from the local 
elections: 
To withdraw effaces our Party, we have no platform, 
destroys the hopes of the workers... leaves them 
without a lead. Destroys the political face of the 
Party for the 12 months ahead. If we do this we are 
not even a mild ginger group even so much as the 
Socialist League. 153 
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The different interpretations put upon the Communist 
Party's new electoral tactics by the Leeds and Bradford 
branches illustrates the difficulties in analysing the 
actions of the local membership. This, along with several 
other episodes from the united-front activities of the 
Communist Party in West Yorkshire, shows the membership 
were far from being a monolithic bloc which obediently 
carried out orders from King Street. The CPGB membership 
were subject to the often conflicting requirements of 
maintaining Party discipline and carrying out the Party 
line, and the difficulties of establishing or maintaining 
their hard-won position within the local Labour movement. 
Soon after this the Bradford Communist Party was to 
face a far greater challenge in the form of Circular 16, 
one of the so called `Black Circulars' issued by the TUC 
on 16 October 1934. At this TUC meeting the Bradford 
Trades Council was cited as a prime example of the 
disruptive nature of communist united front tactics. 154 
The November meeting of the Trades Council overwhelmingly 
rejected the `Black Circular', with only four votes in 
favour its acceptance. The Trades Council President, Fred 
Ratcliffe led the opposition to the `Black Circular'. The 
Daily Worker noted that he: 
paid tribute to the sterling work of the communist 
trade unionists in Bradford. In the union recruitment 
campaign in Bradford, the majority of the hardest 
workers were those the General Council wanted 
excluded. [While] Comrade Ferguson reminded the 
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delegates of the thousands of pounds won in wages for 
the tramwaymen in Bradford, the campaign for which 
had been led by the Communists. New union branches 
had also been formed by them. 155 
There were two essential ingredients to the Bradford 
Communist Party's successful application of united front 
tactics. It relied upon its members being loyal 
hardworking trade union activists, and being in the 
vanguard of the struggle against fascism and war on a 
local scale. This enabled them to fend off the attacks 
made upon them as a result of the 'Black Circular'. 
Over the next eight months, until July 1935, the 
'Black Circular' was to dominate proceedings of the 
Trades Council, embittering relations between left and 
right in the local Labour movement. In practical terms 
TUC Circular 16 was effectively ignored by the Trades 
Council. Despite the enormous pressures brought to bear 
on the Trades Council from within the Labour movement, on 
a local and national level, it never excluded any 
communists from being delegates. Indeed, in recognition 
of their services to the local Labour movement, two 
communists were elected onto the Bradford Trades Council 
executive in January 1935.156 
The greater success of the Bradford branch in 
comparison to Leeds was reflected in its stronger 
position within the local Labour movement. The Bradford 
Communist Party unlike its counterpart in Leeds had 
become accepted into the mainstream of the local Labour 
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movement. Whereas in Leeds the `Black Circular' proved to 
be highly damaging to the local Communist Party, in 
Bradford the branch was able to successfully fend off 
this threat to its position. The atmosphere of political 
tolerance which prevailed in the Bradford Trades Council 
and its left-wing stance on most political issues of the 
day provided the local communists with a more favourable 
environment in which to work. The absence of such 
conditions in Leeds was to be instrumental in holding 
back their united front work. 
Conclusion 
In drawing up a balance sheet of the Communist Party's 
anti-fascist activity during the period in question, what 
stands out is its inability to expand its membership and 
influence within the Labour movement on any significant 
scale. The CPGB's membership had inched forward from 
5,000 in January 1934 to 5,800 by December 1934.157 At 
the Central Committee in December 1934 Pollitt was very 
frank in his assessment of the united front campaigns 
over the previous two years: 
With regard to the united front in Britain instead of 
the united front leading to the increasing influence 
of the Party and to increasing mass work and 
increases of sales of the Daily Worker, on all of the 
vital tests Comrade Ferguson has had to admit that we 
have failed.... the decisive section of the workers 
without whom we will never bring down the National 
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Government are still outside the influence of our 
Party... 158 
What small gains the Communist Party did make in 
membership from its united front activities were usually 
lost very quickly due to a high turnover in membership. 
Throughout 1933 and 1934 the CPGB had been handicapped by 
its sectarianism towards the Labour Party. This was a 
central factor behind its continuing isolation within the 
Labour movement. At the Central Committee in December 
1934 several members remarked that in every united front 
campaign since 1933, these activities had been confined 
to the same circle of sympathetic workers and the same 
layers of the Party-159 
This position contrasts with the experiences of the 
Communist Party in West Yorkshire, where in Bradford the 
local branch managed to involve significant sections of 
the Labour movement in its united front activities. While 
this may well have been a product of local conditions to 
a degree, the local Party's lack of sectarianism towards 
the Labour movement (despite the occasional lapse) 
together with its positive attitude towards the struggle 
against the BUF helps account for this dichotomy. 
It was only once the Communist Party nationally had 
thrown its weight behind the anti-Mosley movement and 
abandoned its sectarianism towards the Labour Party that 
it began to break down its isolation within the Labour 
movement. The failure of the 1934 hunger march to gain 
widespread support within the Labour movement reflects 
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this continuing isolation during the first half of 1934. 
The campaign against the BUF gave the Communist Party 
considerable prestige; despite this, the majority of 
workers on the anti-fascist demonstrations would have 
voted Labour in elections during this period, for they 
regarded the Communist Party as more of a ginger group 
than as a political party with serious pretensions of 
power. In being faithful to the political requirements of 
the leadership of Comintern and the CPSU, the CPGB lost 
an opportunity, presented by the emergence of German 
fascism, to emerge as a significant force in the British 
Labour movement during 1933 and 1934. By the time of the 
Comintern's Seventh World Congress in July 1935, the CPGB 
had made the necessary changes to its anti-fascist 
strategy for it to be in the vanguard of those supporting 
the new popular front line proclaimed there. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RISE OF POPULAR FRONTISM 1935-36 
"Howard: Does this statement of yours mean that the 
Soviet Union has to any degree abandoned its plans and 
intentions to bring about a world revolution ? 
Stalin: We never had any such plans or intentions". 1 
At its Seventh World Congress in July 1935 the Comintern 
gave its formal stamp of approval to the popular front 
strategy pioneered by the PCF. This new strategy entailed 
communists pursuing broad multi-class alliances in 
defence of the Soviet Union, and directly facilitated the 
election of Popular Front governments in France and 
Spain. These election victories were a catalyst for 
enormous social upheaval in both countries. 
In the revolutionary situations which developed the 
PCF and PCE acted as a brake on the workers' struggles 
and played a key role in ensuring capitalism withered the 
revolutionary storm. Due to the Soviet Union's pursuit of 
alliances with Western capitalist powers, the Comintern 
was required to damp down and direct into safe channels 
any revolutionary outbursts of the masses. 
In this chapter the reaction of the CPGB to the 
decisions of the Comintern's Seventh World Congress will 
be examined. How did it interpret the new popular front 
policy and what effect did it have on its anti-fascist 
activities? Taking into account the debate and 
controversy over the CPGB's popular front activities, 
this chapter will attempt to reveal how the CPGB's anti- 
fascist activities were conditioned more by the ethos of 
class collaboration inherent in the new Comintern line 
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than by indigenous anti-fascist sentiment; leading to it 
refraining from militant anti-fascist activity such as in 
the struggle against the BUF. 2 With its anti-fascist 
strategy guided in the main by the Comintern's popular 
front policy, which in turn was determined by the 
requirements of Soviet foreign policy, the CPGB was to 
engage in a year-long campaign for affiliation to the 
Labour Party. This campaign was defeated by a combination 
of the Labour Party's opposition to the popular frontism 
of the Communist Party and its defence of the first 
Moscow show trial. The needs of the new popular front 
policy for non-socialist allies to the right of the 
Labour movement led the Communist Party leadership to 
downplay the struggle against the BUF, and almost to miss 
playing a role in the famous `Battle of Cable Street'; 
which has gone down into Labour movement mythology as 
being led by the CPGB. 
In the first two chapters it was shown how the 
Comintern slowly moved towards an anti-fascist strategy 
which complemented Soviet foreign policy. In the first 
section of this chapter the decisions of the Seventh 
World Congress will be examined against the background of 
developments in Soviet foreign policy. The reaction of 
Soviet foreign policy and Comintern to the upsurge in 
fascist activity throughout the world has considerable 
bearing upon any study of the CPGB, which shaped its 
anti-fascist activity to fit in with its overriding 
objective of defending the Soviet Union. 
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After examining the policy and campaigns of the 
Communist Party nationally the activities of communists 
in West Yorkshire will be examined in an effort to 
determine the effectiveness of communist anti-fascist 
strategy. What effect did the CPGB's new popular front 
policy have on the fortunes and activities of local 
communists? Did local communists find that it served to 
strengthen their position within the local labour 
movement or did it make little or no difference to their 
fortunes and activities? By examining the Communist Party 
on a national and local level hopefully it will shed 
light on why it failed to become a mass party and a 
leading force within the British Labour movement, unlike 
its counterparts in France and Spain. The CPGB's anti- 
fascist activity was determined more by the spirit of 
class collaboration inherent in Comintern's popular front 
policy than by the anti-fascist sentiments of British 
workers; which led to it putting less emphasis upon 
militant anti-fascist activity, such as the campaign 
against the blackshirts. 
Soviet Foreign Policy 1935-36 
The signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact in May 1935 saw the 
first major triumph of Litvinov's policy of seeking an 
alliance system between the Soviet Union and other major 
powers threatened by Germany and Japan. Underpining 
Litvinov's foreign policy was the belief that German and 
Japanese aggression could be contained by the imposition 
of collective sanctions by the major powers acting 
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through the League of Nations. Only by committing the 
Soviet Union to the defence of others could it expect to 
have allies in the event of a German or Japanese attack. 
This represented a total departure from Soviet foreign 
policy which, since Lenin's day, had always been against 
any military commitment to one group of capitalist powers 
rivalled by others. In his study of Soviet foreign policy 
during the 1930s Haslam has commented: 
Traditionally the Soviet regime had sought security 
through the exploitation of frictions and antagonisms 
within the capitalist camp, a policy which 
presupposed manoeuvre vis-a-vis the other powers, and 
which certainly precluded membership of any 
entangling alliance. This undifferentiated approach 
to the capitalist world was based on established 
Marxist theory reinforced by traditional Leninist 
practice. 3 
According to Lenin wars were an inevitable by-product of 
capitalist development, believing that military alliances 
precipitated rather than forestalled conflict. The best 
form of defence for the Soviet state lay in the success 
of the world revolution. 4 The departure of Soviet foreign 
policy, away from the goal of world revolution as the 
means of defending the first workers state, towards 
rapprochement with the major western powers was to have 
profound consequences for the Comintern. 
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While Litvinov directed Soviet foreign policy, Stalin 
was preoccupied by domestic matters, particularly 
economic matters. Foremost amongst these economic matters 
was the second Five-Year Plan. Besides this Stalin was 
preoccupied with consolidating his grip on power through 
purges, a new round of which started in 1935 following 
the assassination of Kirov, the Leningrad Party leader, 
in December 1934; and culminating in the first Moscow 
show trial of old Bolsheviks such as Kamenev and 
Zinoviev. 5 
Since containing German expansionism was its foreign 
policy priority, the Soviet government was keen to 
maintain good relations with Italy. However, Mussolini's 
imperialist ambitions drove Italy into conflict with the 
League of Nations, presenting the Soviet government with 
an acute dilemma once Mussolini had made clear his 
intention to invade Abyssinia. 
With continued misgivings and considerable reluctance 
the Soviet government gave Litvinov the go-ahead for 
Soviet support for League sanctions against Italy. 
Throughout the Abyssinian war Soviet diplomacy sought to 
preserve the outward appearance of conformity to the 
League's Covenant, so as not to discredit the League of 
Nations too much and weaken its future capacity for 
taking action against Germany. Reluctant to offend its 
French ally, the Soviet government privately accepted the 
French idea of a compromise deal to settle the Abyssinian 
dispute. 6 
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By early 1936 the Soviet Union seemed as far away as 
ever from achieving an anti-German front with Britain and 
France; both of whom pursued a policy of seeking an 
understanding with Germany. Although isolationist 
sentiment temporarily held sway within the Soviet 
government during the spring of 1936, Stalin had not 
abandoned the pursuit of an anti-German alliance with 
Britain, France and the United States. In an interview 
with the American journalist Roy Howard published in 
Pravda, Stalin went out of his way to reassure those 
powers that the Soviet Union had never had any plans to 
bring about world revolution and would make a reliable 
ally.? In effect, Stalin openly admitted that the Soviet 
government had abandoned its previous raison d'etre and 
now sought a relationship of peaceful coexistence with 
the capitalist West. Trotsky commented at the time that 
the pacifism of Soviet foreign policy revealed the 
military and economic weakness of the first workers 
state. 8 
Soviet impotence and sense of frustration on the 
diplomatic scene was finally lifted with the election of 
the Popular Front government in France on 3 May 1936; 
which raised hopes that the Franco-Soviet Pact might yet 
be made to work. While the Soviet government welcomed the 
election of the Popular Front government in France, it 
also held many misgivings about it as well. It viewed the 
election successes of the PCF with alarm, out of fear 
that they might frighten the Radical party away from 
continued support for the Popular Front, and thus place 
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the Franco-Soviet Pact in jeopardy. 9 In order to reassure 
its French allies Moscow vetoed calls for the PCF to 
participate in the Popular Front government. 
The PCF, taking its cue from Moscow's reaction to 
events, viewed the revolutionary upsurge in May and June 
1936 as a threat to French national security and not as 
an opportunity to overthrow capitalism. 10 By mid July 
1936, much to the relief of the Soviet government, the 
crisis in France was largely over and the Popular Front 
government had stabilised its position. Just as with 
events in France, the Soviet government was taken by 
surprise by Franco's insurrection on 17 July 1936 which 
plunged yet another country into revolutionary turmoil. 11 
Once again the Soviet government was faced with a major 
foreign policy dilemma, between supplying arms to the 
Republican government and not wanting to threaten its 
relations with Britain and France. 
During the summer of 1936 Stalin faced a groundswell 
of criticism within the CPSU over the Soviet government's 
failure to aid the workers' struggles in Spain and 
France. In the face of this, together with the 
oppositions' criticism of his personal abuse of power and 
discontent over social reforms, Stalin appeared to be 
losing his grip in Moscow and therefore launched the 
Trotskty-Zinoviev-Kamenev show trial in mid-August 1936 
as a means of securing his position. 12 The purges of the 
CPSU and Soviet government which followed the trial, also 
referred to as the Terror, convulsed not only Soviet 
society but spread to the Comintern apparatus in Moscow 
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and were exported to Spain. 13 In their recent history of 
the Comintern, McDermott and Agnew have argued that the 
purges within Soviet society, and their export to the 
Comintern and the Spanish conflict, alienated potential 
allies throughout Europe away from support of Popular 
Front movements. 14 
After signing the Franco-Soviet Pact in May 1935 the 
Soviet government developed high hopes of establishing an 
international front with the major western powers 
designed to contain German aggression. Yet by October 
1936 it found this objective as far away as ever. Indeed, 
its diplomatic position in many respects was even weaker 
than in 1935. On the one hand it found itself embroiled 
in a foreign civil war against its will; while the states 
to which it sought an alliance with against Germany 
remained aloof from its overtures and appeared intent on 
appeasing German aggression. The foreign policy dilemmas 
of the Soviet government raise the question of how did 
the Comintern react to the security concerns of the 
Soviet government? The answer to this is provided by the 
decisions of the Comintern's Seventh World Congress whose 
edicts laid down a new policy for the popular front 
period 1935-39; that the communist parties' activities 
should be determined above all else by the need to defend 
the Soviet Union. In order to carry out this objective 
communist parties were required to form popular front 
alliances with socialists and non-socialists with the 
objective ultimately of forming popular front governments 
favourable to a military pact with the USSR. 
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The Seventh World Congress of Comintern July-August 1935 
The seventh and last Comintern congress has aroused great 
controversy amongst historians leading to radically 
different interpretations of its decisions. There are two 
main schools of thought on the significance of the 
decisions reached at the congress. Many have portrayed 
its decisions as proof of the Comintern's subordination 
to the foreign policy requirements of the Soviet state. 
The world revolution was effectively abandoned as a means 
of defending the first workers' state and in its place 
came the popular front. This entailed the communist 
parties campaigning for multi-party anti-fascist unity 
`with declared enemies of the revolution'; a policy which 
neatly dovetailed with the Soviet Union's quest for 
military alliances with Western powers against Germany. 
This viewpoint brings together a diverse range of 
historical opinion ranging from E. H. Carr and P. Broue to 
dissident Marxist historians such as F. Claudin, L. Trotsky 
and C. L. R. James. 15 
Yet orthodox communist historians ranging from 
A. I. Sobolev and M. Myant to N. Branson and E. Hobsbawm have 
taken a more positive view of the congress. They portray 
the congress decisions as elaborating a new strategic 
line which addressed the anti-fascist and general 
democratic tasks of the day, while enhancing the long- 
term prospects for world revolution. 16 Non-communist 
historians such as McDermott and Agnew share this more 
positive interpretation yet refer to the congress 
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decisions as only a partial break with the past which set 
in motion, `a highly contradictory period in Comintern 
history'. 17 
The key event of the congress was the report given by 
Dimitrov on the struggle against fascism. Dimitrov 
pointed out that fascism was becoming an increasing 
menace to the international Labour movement and to 
bourgeois democracy. Communists therefore should modify 
their rigid view of the capitalist camp, and draw a line 
of distinction between fascism and bourgeois democratic 
parties, and direct their fire against the chief enemy 
fascism. Fascism it was argued represented a tremendous 
step backward in comparison with bourgeois democracy. 
Dimitrov observed: 
Now the fascist counter-revolution is attacking 
bourgeois democracy in an effort to establish the 
most barbaric regime of exploitation and suppression 
of the toiling masses. Now the toiling masses in a 
number of capitalist countries are faced with the 
necessity of making a definite choice, and of making 
it today, not between proletarian dictatorship and 
bourgeois democracy, but between bourgeois democracy 
and fascism. 18 
At that stage of the class struggle the most important 
things were the anti-fascist general democratic 
objectives i. e. the defence of bourgeois democracy. 
Dimitrov argued that the task of achieving the unity of 
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all working-class forces was inseparable from the task of 
uniting all anti-fascist forces. The efforts of even a 
united working class were not sufficient to secure 
victory over fascism. Therefore, after having achieved 
unity of all working-class forces, it was stated that the 
communist parties should strive to build national cross- 
class alliances comprising all those groups which, though 
not natural adherents to socialism, were concerned in 
defending democratic freedoms against fascist 
enslavement. In working for the union of all anti-fascist 
forces, the communist parties had to put forward a 
popular front platform based on demands for resistance to 
fascism, defence of the democratic rights and the living 
standards of the working and middle classes. 
United in a popular front movement the anti-fascist 
masses had the potential to get reactionary governments 
removed. Dimitrov put the formation of anti-fascist 
popular front governments on the order of the day. The 
defence of the Soviet Union was proclaimed in all the 
speeches and resolutions of the congress as the primary 
duty of all communists. Implicit within Dimitrov's call 
for the formation of popular front governments, was the 
belief that these would link up with the Soviet Union 
against fascist aggression. 19 
The popular front strategy put forward by Dimitrov had 
no precedent in the history of the Comintern. Dimitrov 
attempted to justify the new popular front strategy by 
reference to the Fourth World Congress resolution on the 
united front. Yet in no way did this conceive of 
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collaboration with capitalist parties for the defence of 
bourgeois democracy. Claudin has commented that: 
It is usually assumed, in studies of the Seventh 
Congress of the Comintern, that the basic purpose of 
its work was the formulation of tactics for the 
struggle against Fascism and against Capitalism. 20 
Yet in reality as Claudin points out, the congress 
defined as the central slogan for its supporters, `The 
fight for peace and for the defence of the USSR'. In his 
report Togliatti, 'located the slogan of the united 
front"in the struggle for peace and for the defence of 
the Soviet Union"'. 21 He declared that defence of the 
Soviet Union was the prime objective of all communist 
parties. This meant that all the activity of the 
communist parties had to be subordinated to this 
objective. In the speeches of the delegates arguments for 
the defence of bourgeois democracy invariably took second 
place to the argument for the defence of the Soviet 
Union. 
In their speeches the delegates unanimously repeated 
that the chief threat of war came from Germany, 
presenting the imperialist antagonisms of Europe as a 
clash between the principles of democracy and fascism. At 
a stroke, this view dispensed with Lenin's doctrine of 
imperialism, which believed that the real cause of wars 
were imperialist antagonisms. Lenin considered it absurd 
to look for a 'guilty party' in the conflicts between 
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capitalist states. The new policies put forward were not 
based on a critical analysis of the problems of the class 
struggle, but represented a pragmatic response to the 
urgent needs of Soviet foreign policy. 
The contradiction at the heart of the new policy lay 
in the fact that it instructed all sections to adapt 
their anti-fascist strategy to suit their own national 
conditions; yet at the same time it declared that all 
countries of the world were equally in need of the 
popular front and popular front government. Far from 
allowing its sections the autonomy to develop their anti- 
fascist strategy in response to national conditions, the 
Comintern imposed a new orthodoxy on its sections from 
which deviations were not tolerated. 
Several historians have noted that the Popular Front 
policy was based on an unstable contradiction which, `lay 
in the incompatibility of the economic aspirations of its 
component class elements'. 22 Events in France and Spain 
during 1936 were to reveal that the aspirations of the 
working class for social and economic reform, went far 
beyond the threshold of change considered as acceptable 
by both the liberal bourgeoisie and the political 
representatives of the traditional workers parties. 
Unlike any previous Comintern congress, this one 
deliberately avoided the theme of world revolution. 23 
Dimitrov later admitted that, `We deliberately excluded 
from the reports as well as from the decisions of the 
congress high-sounding phrases on the revolutionary 
perspective'. 24 E. H. Carr has noted: 
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the silent relegation of proletarian revolution to as 
inconspicuous a place as was decently possible in the 
proceedings and resolutions of the seventh congress. 
Lenin's united front had been designed to hasten the 
advent of the proletarian revolution. Dimitrov's 
"popular front" was designed to keep the proletarian 
revolution in abeyance in order to deal with the 
pressing emergence of fascism. 25 
In assessing the historical importance of the Comintern's 
Seventh World Congress it is difficult to avoid 
supporting Trotsky's verdict on its proceedings; a 
verdict which is subscribed to by Comintern historians 
such as E. H. Carr. 26 The Seventh World Congress 
effectively abandoned the revolutionary tenets of 
Leninism and its goal of world revolution and put in its 
place the defence of bourgeois democracy. This was to 
find practical confirmation in the counter-revolutionary 
role of the Comintern and the PCF and PCE during the 
revolutionary upheavals in France and Spain during 1936 
serve to confirm Trotsky's prognosis of the Comintern 
having abandoned the Leninist goal of world revolution. 
On 23 August 1935 Trotsky commented: 
The Seventh Congress of the Comintern... will sooner 
or later go down in history as the liquidation 
congress. Even if all its participants do not today 
recognize the fact, they are all - with that 
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obligatory unanimity which in general has 
characterised the Third International over recent 
years - busy in practice with the liquidation of the 
program, principles, and tactical methods 
established by Lenin, and are preparing the complete 
abolition of the Comintern as an independent 
organization. 27 
In both France and Spain, the communist parties tailored 
their anti-fascist strategy to meet the requirements of 
Soviet foreign policy. In both countries the communist 
parties abandoned revolutionary class struggle in 
circumstances uniquely favourable, to pursue class 
collaboration alliances which betrayed the interests of 
the workers. Both the PCF and the PCE saw a growth in 
their influence and membership due to the enormous social 
upheavals gripping their respective countries. Yet in 
passing over the unique revolutionary opportunities which 
were presented to them both, the communist parties lost 
their one chance of replacing the socialists' as the 
dominant influence within the French and Spanish working 
class. In both countries, the Popular Front proved to be 
a force which betrayed the workers' interests, in the 
name of anti-fascism, rather than a force which defended 
them. 
Despite the negative role of the popular front in 
France and Spain the communist parties in both countries 
saw an increase in their membership and influence which 
is in sharp contrast to the situation in Britain where 
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the CPGB saw only a marginal improvement in its position 
as a result of its popular front activities. The attempts 
of the CPGB to put the new popular front line into 
practice are examined in the following section. 
The CPGB and the new popular front line 
In turning to Britain, the experience of the Seventh 
World Congress and the popular front in France and Spain 
raises several questions. Was the CPGB's anti-fascist 
strategy primarily determined by the requirements of 
Soviet foreign policy or was it shaped more by domestic 
political conditions? Did its Popular Front campaign 
entail the pursuit of cross-class alliances? What effect 
did pursuit of the new popular front policy have upon the 
fortunes of the CPGB in terms of membership and 
influence? Finally, bearing in mind the debate over the 
popular front, we need to assess what truth there is in 
allegations that the CPGB, from its adoption of popular 
frontism, began to 'soft pedal' the class struggle and 
refrained from militant anti-fascist activity. 28 An 
examination of communist anti-fascist activity at both a 
national and local scale will be helpful in answering 
such questions. 
In assessing the CPGB's anti-fascist policy and 
activity it will be necessary to establish the nature of 
its Popular Front campaign. The first task is to 
establish how the CPGB interpreted the Seventh Congress 
decisions and what it saw as its objectives flowing on 
from these. Essentially the CPGB saw its main role being 
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to help bring about the downfall of the `pro-fascist' 
National Government and replace it with a Labour 
Government favourable to a military pact with the Soviet 
Union. The first major step towards realising these 
objectives was to obtain the working-class united front 
i. e. Communist Party affiliation to the Labour Party. In 
its efforts to attain these objectives the Communist 
Party leadership saw the struggle against the BUF as 
politically irrelevant. 
Speaking in the debate on Dimitrov's report to the 
Seventh World Congress, Pollitt declared that within the 
Comintern special responsibility fell on the CPGB. This 
was because the British Government, far from opposing, 
fascism, was trying to direct Germany and Italy towards 
confrontation with the USSR; and that the Labour Party 
was the main obstacle to the establishment of a working- 
class united front in Britain and to united action 
between the LSI and the Comintern. 29 
Taking his cue from Dimitrov's comment that, `At the 
present stage, fighting the fascist danger in Britain 
means primarily fighting the "National Government" and 
its reactionary measures... ', Pollitt noted that the 
British ruling class held the BUF in reserve, taking 
advantage of mass hatred of the BUF to push through the 
anti-democratic agenda of the National Government. 30 He 
complained that: 
The great weakness of the fight against Fascism in 
Britain is that it is seen primarily as a fight 
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against Mosley. The tendencies towards Fascism, 
developed in the policy of the National Government, 
are not seen as a vital danger that makes it 
imperative to defeat this government. 31 
From this it followed that the main task facing the CPGB 
was to play a leading role in organising the defeat of 
the National Government. As will be shown later, this 
meant in practice that the CPGB leadership effectively 
downplayed the struggle against the BUF as politically 
irrelevant. This contradicts the established historical 
view which portrays the CPGB as the leading force in the 
fight against the BUF. 32 It also contradicts the view of 
Kevin Morgan who argues that it was not until the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War that Pollitt became 
preoccupied by international questions and effectively 
gave up on the struggle against the BUF as politically 
irrelevant. 33 
In chapters one and two of this study the divisions of 
opinion within the CPGB over anti-fascist strategy were 
revealed. On the one hand there was the leadership, which 
saw the anti-fascist struggle in Britain as constituting 
the fight against the 'pro-fascist' National Government; 
while large sections of the rank and file saw the fight 
against the BUF as the main focus of the anti-fascist 
struggle in Britain. In the period after the Seventh 
World Congress this division of opinion within the CPGB 
continued. 
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In his speech to the Seventh World Congress Pollitt 
repeatedly emphasised that the CPGB should work towards 
the election of a Labour Government. To facilitate this 
it would propose to the Labour Party a joint election 
campaign and withdraw most of its candidates from the 
general election. He declared that in keeping with the 
congress resolution, which called for unity between the 
Comintern and the LSI, the CPGB would renew its 
application for affiliation to the Labour Party. Pollitt 
stated that the united front tactics of the CPGB: 
can become the first step towards a mass political 
party of the working class in Britain, and make a 
substantial strengthening of all those forces in the 
world fighting against fascism and war. 34 
Pollitt stressed the importance of fighting for the 
defeat of the National Government and the election of a 
Labour Government, but not from the perspective of how 
this would open up opportunities for the struggle for 
socialism in Britain. Rather, the election of a Labour 
Government would help to check the advance of fascism and 
war in Europe, and replace Britain's pro-Hitler foreign 
policy with, `closer relations with the Soviet Union and 
full identification with its peace policy'. 35 Looked at 
in this light it would appear that the CPGB General 
Secretary saw the struggle against fascism in Britain as 
primarily determined by the requirements of Soviet 
I 
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foreign policy and not by the concerns of British 
workers. 
In concluding his speech Pollitt called on the CPGB to 
widen its united front tactics and pursue a broad 
amorphous cross-class alliance of all anti-fascist forces 
regardless of their political colour. The clear 
implication being that the British Labour movement on its 
own was not strong enough to bring about the defeat of 
the National Government: 
The Communist Party of Great Britain now has the duty 
of bringing together in a people's front every 
section of the working class movement, the 
agricultural workers and all sections of the 
intelligentsia and professional classes, in fact all 
people who hate Fascism and War.... and draw them into 
the political struggle against the whole policy of 
the National Government, a policy which leads towards 
German Fascism and War. 36 
Unfortunately for the CPGB the obstacles to an effective 
anti-government combination were quite formidable. 
Undoubtedly, the biggest obstacle was the legacy of 
bitterness left by the Labour Party split in 1931. The 
role played by MacDonald and Snowden in the formation of 
the National Government was widely regarded within the 
Labour movement as an act of treachery. For the rest of 
the 1930s there existed very strong feeling within the 
Labour movement against any kind of involvement with 
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`capitalist' politicians; the split of 1931 created a 
deep suspicion of anybody who favoured political deals 
with them. The strong mood for unity in the face of the 
capitalist enemy was reinforced by the steady recovery of 
the Labour Party's electoral fortunes from 1932 onwards. 
It was played upon to great effect by the Labour Party 
leadership in their campaign of opposition to the CPGB's 
affiliation bid. This factor, together with the 
bitterness still felt from the communists sectarian 
`class-against-class' phase, played an important role in 
undermining support for the CPGB's campaign for a united 
front with the Labour Party. The united front with the 
Labour Party was seen as the foundation stone of any 
popular front movement in Britain. 
In the post-Seventh Congress discussion within the 
CPGB, the leadership interpreted the new Comintern policy 
and the subsequent tasks flowing from this, in line with 
the formulations laid down by Pollitt's speech in 
Moscow. 37 The Seventh Congress decisions were portrayed 
to the CPGB membership as a historic turning point for 
the world communist movement. They represented more than 
just a change in communist tactics as Dutt stressed at 
the Political Bureau on 6 October 1935: 
We want to beware of a narrow approach that shows the 
Seventh Congress as a change in our tactics... it is 
that, but that is not all.... It means we have a new 
approach to all political questions. 38 
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Dutt emphasised that the Seventh Congress decisions were 
aimed not just at the communist parties but also aimed at 
giving practical leadership to the whole working class 
and to the anti-fascist majority in all countries. 39 The 
struggle against fascism and war was inextricably linked 
with the defence of the Soviet Union; for in any future 
world war the Soviet Union would come under attack from 
the fascist powers with the active collusion of 
imperialist states such as Britain. Dutt noted that the 
fascist powers of Central Europe were looking to a war of 
conquest against the Soviet Union to solve their economic 
problems. For such a military adventure to be successful, 
the fascist states needed the acquiescence of Western 
powers such as Britain and France. Hence the fascist and 
potential fascist groups within the ruling classes in the 
West were trying to give their fascist allies this 
support. However, they were held back from this by the 
weight of anti-fascist feeling. France was cited as an 
example to be followed, where the united front movement 
had been able to transform anti-fascist feeling into such 
a force that not only prevented any French alliance with 
the fascist powers against the Soviet Union; but had 
forced the ruling class to conclude the Franco-Soviet 
Pact. 40 
The views of Dutt were reflected in an article for 
Labour Monthly on the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, with 
John Mahon making public the strategic thinking behind 
the Communist Party's anti-fascist work. Mahon concluded 
that: 
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In this situation the supreme interest of the 
international working class is the defence of the 
USSR. At all costs the stronghold of socialism must 
be protected from the destruction which the Fascist 
powers with the support of the extreme reactionaries 
in all countries are planning. Only the successful 
defence of the USSR can guarantee the victory of 
socialism in all countries. 41 
If further proof were needed to show that the CPGB's 
anti-fascist strategy was worked out in accordance with 
the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, then the 
following admission by Dutt to the Political Bureau in 
October 1935 should suffice: 
Our danger is the united front of imperialism and 
fascism against the workers, the Soviet Union, and 
the colonial peoples.... the force of armaments at 
present are ten to one against the Soviet Union if 
imperialism were united and therefore if we are 
serious about victory for socialism it means we have 
got to find the way to change that proportion and see 
that the proportion out of this ten on the 
imperialist side shall be turned against each other 
and that becomes our policy. 42 
He concluded with the following comment: 
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We have to find those elements in the imperialist 
camp who for whatever reason and the reasons do not 
matter to us a bit, who are prepared to oppose the 
fascist warmaking powers,... and so we get the 
position of the Franco-Soviet Pact. 43 
Dutt went on to argue that only mass public pressure 
could prevent pro-fascist elements in the British and 
French governments from making agreements with Hitler. 
The CPGB's ultimate objective was the replacement of 
reactionary governments in these countries, with popular 
front governments committed to collective security and 
support for the Soviet Union's peace policy. However, in 
the short term the Communist Party's task was to try to 
force the National Government to actively support 
collective security so as to restrain fascist aggression, 
and for it to enter the Franco-Soviet Pact. 44 
At the CPGB's national conference on 5-6 October 1935, 
88 delegates heard Pollitt give a report from the Seventh 
World Congress and outline the tasks facing the Party. 
The Daily Worker report of the conference noted that the 
introspective nature of the Party over the previous two 
months was due to its intense study of the decisions of 
the Seventh World Congress. The conference approved the 
proposal to withdraw all candidates from the next general 
election with the exception of Pollitt and Gallacher, 
despite the fact that Labour had already rejected the 
Communist Party's united front proposals for the 
election. In all areas the branches were to approach 
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local Labour parties for a joint campaign during the 
municipal and parliamentary elections. Pollitt concluded 
with the following call to the delegates: 
Organise the defeat of the National Government and to 
secure as a step towards this one united working 
class party in Britain, that not one working class 
vote from Cornwall to Aberdeen shall be split in the 
parliamentary elections. 45 
While the national leadership geared the Communist Party 
up for the approaching elections, the struggle against 
the BUF took off once again. Divisions over anti-fascist 
strategy once again came to the fore between the 
leadership, which saw the main task as the organisation 
of a popular front to change British foreign policy, and 
sections of the membership which saw the struggle against 
fascism in Britain lying with the campaign against the 
BUF. 
The anti-Mosley movement - Autumn 1935 
During the late summer and early autumn of 1935, as the 
Abyssinian crisis escalated towards war, the BUF held a 
series of `Hands Off Italy' meetings up and down the 
country. As in the 1933-34 period a largely spontaneous 
mass movement from below developed to counter Mosley's 
blackshirts. 46 
In town after town, local Labour movement activists 
came together with local communists to organise counter- 
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demonstrations to BUF meetings; attempting in most cases 
to try and close the fascist meetings down. In the 
majority of cases the BUF had to abandon its meetings and 
retreat under a police escort. More often than not a 
provocative act by a fascist steward would lead to the 
anti-fascists charging the platform. 47 Over the weekend 
of 1-2 September 1935, BUF meetings across London ended 
in failure as thousands of anti-fascists forced them to 
close prematurely. 48 
Throughout September and October 1935, fascist 
meetings, advertised as `peace rallies' in support of 
Italy's aggressive stance towards Abyssinia, were 
invariably broken up or severely disrupted. 49 The 
highlights of the anti-fascist campaign in this period 
include the 10,000 strong counter-demonstration in 
Aberdeen on 26 September which closed down the fascist 
meeting and on 6 October in Sheffield where over 3,000 
people disrupted the BUF rally. 50 The intensity of the 
anti-Mosley movement led the Daily Worker to comment: 
In all parts of Britain Mussolini's blackshirted 
agents are being driven off the streets by the 
terrific anger of the workers.... everywhere the 
Fascists are recognized as the supporters of war. 51 
Nigel Todd in his study of rank and file Labour movement 
opposition to the BUF in Tyneside, has noted how this 
movement from below helped bring to an abrupt end 
Mosley's campaigning in 1935. He has observed how, 
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`Nationally, the BUF had been reduced, by a combination 
of hard opposition and a self-acquired disreputable 
image, to a largely London based movement after 1934- 
35'. 52 
There is no indication from the Political Bureau or 
Central Committee minutes that the national leadership 
paid any attention to the anti-Mosley movement during 
this period. While not opposing this movement as they had 
done in 1933 and early 1934, the King Street leadership 
failed to actively participate within it and throw the 
resources of the Communist Party behind it. 53 In the 
absence of a lead from King Street, local communists 
linked up with their Labour movement counterparts to 
organise a campaign of opposition to Mosley. 
This episode reveals once again how the CPGB's anti- 
fascist strategy was out of touch with indigenous anti- 
fascist sentiment. The requirements of Soviet foreign 
policy, which desired the National Government to be 
replaced by a government partial to an alliance with the 
USSR, led the CPGB leadership to overlook this rank and 
file movement of opposition to Mosley. Knowing full well 
of the Labour leaders' opposition to extra parliamentary 
action, the Communist Party leadership, obsessed with 
defeating the National Government, missed out on an 
opportunity to extend the CPGB's influence amongst a 
layer of militant Labour movement activists. This episode 
in the anti-Mosley struggle which has largely been 
ignored by historians, is yet another dent in the popular 
198 
image of the Communist Party as being the vanguard of the 
anti-fascist movement. 54 
While the rank and file movement against Mosley during 
the Autumn of 1935 was going from one success to another, 
the Communist Party leadership was immersed in 
preparations for the general election. The general 
election was seen as an opportunity to bring about the 
desired changes in British foreign policy. 
The 1935 general election campaign 
At the Political Bureau discussion of the general 
election campaign, the re-election of the National 
Government was blamed on the passive campaign of the 
Labour Party leaders, who had allowed themselves to be 
politically outmanoeuvred. The Labour leaders' opposition 
to the united front was cited as a major reason why the 
National Government had been re-elected. It was noted 
that the biggest gains for Labour came in areas where 
local Labour parties worked together with local 
communists. The National Government's re-election was 
viewed as especially serious from the standpoint of the 
worsening international situation, with regard to the 
strengthening of the international anti-Soviet front and 
increased fears of an understanding between Britain, 
France and Germany. 55 
On the whole, most of the contributions to the 
discussion argued that the Communist Party's electoral 
campaign had been a success. It was reported that in 
most areas the branches had made a favourable impression 
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through their hard work in support of local Labour Party 
campaigns. The Secretariat circular on the lessons of the 
general election campaign, which summed up the Political 
Bureau discussion, stated: 
The contacts which the Party made, the good relations 
they established, the favourable impression which our 
work encouraged, the unity in action which developed 
in some cases - these are our gains which must be 
consolidated, strengthened and further developed. 56 
The Secretariat circular also noted the serious 
weaknesses in the Communist Party's election campaign 
which reflected its opportunistic adaptation to the 
Labour Party campaign: 
We can say that generally speaking, it was the 
individual Party members who operated not the Party 
as an organisation.... Very few Party meetings were 
organised, very few local Party leaflets were issued, 
and most significant of all, very little was done in 
the way of recruiting members to our Party. 57 
The CPGB's failure to carry out the basic tasks of a 
revolutionary party in an election campaign, such as 
holding propaganda meetings, together with the absence of 
any criticism of Labour during the campaign, show how it 
hid its face from the electorate in an unprincipled bid 
to further its campaign for a united front with the 
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Labour Party. At the Central committee in January 1936 
Pollitt criticised the Communist Party's general election 
campaign along similar lines: 
In general our Party submerged the whole of its 
independent line. The general propaganda of the 
Communist Party in the election campaign became 
indistinguishable from the propaganda of the Labour 
Party. 58 
In his speech which opened the discussion on the 
Political Bureau over the General Election campaign, 
Pollitt outlined future perspectives and tasks for the 
CPGB: 
It is clear on the basis of this election... there 
will have to be many changes in policy on the part of 
the Labour Party and our policy. We are moving into a 
situation like France. The National Government is 
strongly consolidating its forces. It would be fatal 
to wait to the next General Election to defeat the 
National Government. On the basis of our experiences 
we have to apply not only for affiliation to the 
Labour Party but for comrade Gallacher to apply for 
the whip of the Labour Party. 59 
The main objective of the Communist Party's new united 
front campaign, central to which was its application for 
affiliation to the Labour Party, was to develop the 
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Labour movement and its allies, `into a fighting 
opposition to the National Government inside and outside 
of Parliament', capable of bringing about the 
government's downfall. Pollitt called upon CPGB branches 
to extend and develop the friendly relations which they 
had established during the election with local Labour 
parties. Communist Party branches were expected to get 
resolutions of support for the affiliation bid passed by 
all local working-class organisations. The campaign for 
affiliation was portrayed not as an end in itself but as 
a means to recruit to the Communist Party and build its 
influence throughout the Labour movement. 60 Affiliation 
to Labour was also seen as a vital stepping stone towards 
a popular front movement in Britain. 
Towards the popular front 
Over the next year, up to Labour Party conference in 
October 1936, the CPGB was to pursue a two-fold strategy 
in its campaign against the National Government. On the 
one hand, the Communist Party was to launch a major 
campaign for affiliation to the Labour Party, believing 
the united front with Labour to be an essential component 
in the building of a popular front movement strong enough 
to bring down the National Government. Complementing 
this, the CPGB was to cast its net out for political 
allies to the right of the Labour movement. This largely 
took the form of its intervention in the peace movement, 
which was composed of various middle-class organisations 
representing different shades of pacifism. 
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One example of the Communist Party's attempt to build 
support amongst the middle classes for its anti-fascist 
strategy was the national Congress of Peace and 
Friendship with the USSR held on 7 December 1935. It 
received messages of support from Air-Commodore Charlton 
and the leader of the Liberal Party. Delegations to the 
congress included represent4ttives of 18 professional 
societies, 60 peace societies, dozens of religious 
bodies, 168 social, educational and cultural 
organisations and 37 local Labour parties. The congress 
passed a motion which declared that, 
'the interests of 
international peace and the welfare of mankind require 
the closest possible cooperation in international affairs 
between the government of Britain and the USSR'. 61 In an 
attempt to boost the appeal of its popular front 
propaganda and the campaign for affiliation 
to the Labour 
Party the Communist Party began to change its 
organisational structure to bring 
it into harmony with 
British forms and to gradually abandon the lexicon of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
A turning point? 
At the Central Committee meeting on 4-5 January 
at the political Bureau on 
7 February, a 
strategy was elaborated, 
about a mass popular front movement in 
which was designed 
1936, and 
two-fold 
to bring 
Britain. The 
decisions taken, instituted far reaching changes in the 
Communist Party's structure and campaigning priorities, 
have been portrayed by some 
historians as a turning point 
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in its history. Noreen Branson claims that the changes 
approved by the January meeting, `led to an enormous 
improvement in the Party's work', making recruitment to 
the ranks much easier. 62 It could be reasonably argued 
that Branson exaggerates the impact of these changes. 
There is evidence to suggest that the new changes were 
not warmly received by sections of the rank and file who 
were very confused by it all and may have seen the 
changes as an attempt to abandon the practices of 
Marxism-Leninism. 63 However, the CPGB's membership was 
fairly stagnant up until the early summer of 1936. It was 
largely developments in the international arena such as 
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War which turned the 
Communist Party's fortunes around, and gave it a popular 
issue around which to campaign and led to a rapid flow of 
new recruits into the ranks. The anti-Mosley activities 
of sections of the rank and file during the summer of 
1936 also appear to have aided recruitment to the 
Communist Party. 
At the Central Committee meeting on 4-5 January 1936, 
Pollitt declared that central to the preservation of 
world peace was the defence of the USSR. He praised the 
national Congress for Peace and Friendship with the USSR, 
held in December 1935, as a model example of popular 
front activity designed to build support for the defence 
of the USSR: 
Never before have such different men and women got 
together all united in a common friendship with the 
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Soviet Union. The fact such a congress could be held 
is an indication of how strong is the feeling of 
friendship with the USSR. 64 
Pollitt believed that the Communist Party should 
capitalise upon the momentum developed in the campaign 
building up to the peace congress, and called for all 
those groups supporting the congress to organise a peace 
ballot which asked the question, `Are you in favour of a 
peace pact of friendship with the Soviet union or 
continuance of the present friendship policy with Hitler 
?' He believed that such a peace ballot could mobilise 
public opinion decisively in favour of an Anglo-Soviet 
pact with the object of pressurising the government to 
abandon the pro-German line of its foreign policy; `No 
government and no foreign minister can help but be 
compelled to pay attention to such a ballot'. 65 
Alongside activities such as the above, which were 
designed primarily to appeal to non-socialist allies of 
the popular front, went the campaign for affiliation to 
Labour. At this early stage of the campaign for the 
popular front the Party gave most emphasis to achieving 
affiliation to Labour. 
In his report on the early stages of the campaign for 
affiliation to the Labour Party, Pollitt noted the poor 
response of the Communist Party membership in taking up 
the issue. Beside calling for the membership to step up a 
gear in support of the affiliation campaign, he also 
proposed that it launch a pro-affiliation petition with 
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the target of a million signatures, which would be handed 
in at Labour Party conference. This petition would later 
be abandoned due to a lack of signatures far below the 
million mark. 
The same Central Committee meeting approved a far- 
reaching package of changes which Pollitt put forward to 
boost the campaign for affiliation to Labour and broaden 
the appeal of the Communist Party's popular front 
propaganda. Pollitt claimed that the new proposals on 
organisational structure and political strategy: 
go much further than anything we have yet done in the 
building of the Communist Party. From the point of 
importance, I can only think of the central committee 
after the ninth plenum [of the ECCI which introduced 
the sectarian 'class-against-class' line-DLM) which 
took such important decisions in regard to the future 
work of the party. 66 
The Communist Party on a local basis was reorganised to 
fit in more with British conditions. The old division of 
the membership into factory and street cells was 
abolished, and the local membership was reorganised into 
branches on a residential basis similar to the ward 
Labour Party system. This eliminated the old structure 
with its alien sounding terminology. In an article 
outlining the new organisational structure in the journal 
Discussion, R. W. Robson wrote, `We must be able to 
approach Labour Party organisations on an equal level and 
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discuss questions in organisational terms common to both 
parties'. 67 
The new popular front strategy was also applied to the 
trade union front, with the Communist Party campaigning 
for closer relations between the Soviet and British 
unions; for the British unions were seen as the strongest 
opponents of merger between the IFTU and the RILU. The 
merger of the two main trade union blocs was set down as 
a campaigning priority by the Seventh World Congress. 
Besides this, communist trade unionists were expected to 
campaign for all union branches to affiliate to the 
Labour Party, with a view to bolstering support for the 
affiliation campaign. There was to be a new emphasis on 
Party members becoming, 'the champions for trade union 
recruitment', particularly in the new industries of the 
Midlands and Greater London which were trade union 
blackspots. Again this was seen as a measure which would 
boost support for the campaign for affiliation to 
Labour. 68 
More controversial was the proposal for the NUWM to 
merge with the unemployed associations organised by the 
TUC. Pollitt admitted that this proposal had led to 'very 
heated discussions' on the Political Bureau and in the 
Secretariat, and went on to criticise Wal Hannington and 
Harry McShane for their opposition to this proposal. 
Arguing in favour of this proposal, Pollitt said that 
unity amongst the unemployed would, 'help the fight for 
unity in the whole of the country'. He deliberately 
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downplayed the importance of the NUWM to justify the 
changes in the Communist Party's orientation: 
We state that the NUWM is now in a complete rut. You 
are faced with the fact that there has never been a 
time in the history of the NUWM when the mass fight 
against unemployment was at such a low ebb. We can 
make all the excuses we like as to why this is so. I 
make the point that the basic reason is because of 
the split in the ranks of the unemployed.... What we 
are doing now is to come forward with a line for the 
NUWM which corresponds to the line in the trade 
unions etc. 69 
The logic of the campaign for the popular front which 
sought political allies to the right of the Labour 
movement, was leading the Communist Party to downplay 
aspects of its militant past such as the NUWM. Pollitt's 
comments about the NUWM being a defunct organisation were 
a gross exaggeration as is shown by the success of the 
hunger march organised by the NUWM in the autumn of 1936, 
which was greeted by 250,000 people in Hyde Park. 70 
Beside approving the above set of proposals the 
January Central Committee launched a national recruitment 
drive, to offset the alarming decline in membership which 
had affected every district for the previous six months. 
In the first six months after the Seventh World Congress 
the CPGB's popular front campaigning had brought it few 
rewards. The blame for the fall in membership was put on 
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the conception, apparently widespread amongst the 
membership, that recruiting for, and building up, the 
Communist Party was a secondary issue to the question of 
affiliation with the Labour Party. 71 No one saw fit to 
question the new popular front approach as being 
responsible for this declining membership. 
Central to this new popular front approach was the 
objective of gaining affiliation to the Labour Party. 
After building up considerable momentum during the first 
half of 1936, the affiliation campaign experienced a 
substantial haemorrhage of support in the late summer due 
to two things. Firstly, there was the effect of the 
Labour leaders campaign of opposition which portrayed the 
affiliation campaign as part of the CPGB's wider popular 
front strategy which sought to compromise the Labour 
movement's political independence by allying it with non- 
socialists. The affiliation campaign was also undermined 
by the CPGB's support for the first Moscow show trial 
which unleashed the Great Terror in the USSR. 
The campaign for affiliation to Labour 
On 26 November 1935, the Labour Party received the CPGB's 
application for affiliation. At the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party in January 1936 this was 
turned down on the grounds that the rise of fascism in 
Europe did not necessitate unity between the two parties. 
It was alleged that communist campaigns in other 
countries had split the Labour movement facilitating the 
victory of fascism. The Communist Party's latest 
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affiliation application was portrayed as yet another 
manoeuvre designed to overthrow the democratic and 
socialist character of Labour's programme. If anything, 
communist affiliation to Labour would weaken its defence 
of political democracy, assist the forces of reaction 
and, `would retard the achievement of socialism in this 
country'. 72 
There was a grain of truth in the Labour leaders' 
criticisms of the Communist Party. Yet this was the first 
of many occasions when they would don the mantle of 
defending the Labour movement's socialist programme and 
heritage, in order to ward off the popular front. 
The Labour Party's rejection of the affiliation 
application, together with the call made at the January 
Central committee for greater effort, served to spur the 
Communist Party membership into campaigning more 
vigorously for -affiliation. At the Political Bureau in 
early February 1936 it was reported that 160 
organisations had passed resolutions in support of the 
Communist Party's affiliation to Labour. 
The same meeting decided to step up popular front 
propaganda in the peace movement, concentrating in 
particular on the Peace Councils and the League of 
Nations Union. It was presented with a long and detailed 
report which assessed the strengths and weaknesses of 
both organisations and concluded: 
Both organisations,... provide possibilities for 
effective work along the Party's main line of 
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collective security against aggression, maintaining 
and strengthening of the League of Nations, for an 
Anglo-Soviet Peace Pact,.. and for the defence of the 
Soviet Union. 73 
The Peace Councils were seen as the best forum for 
coordinating the activities of all the peace 
organisations in conjunction with local trade unions and 
Labour parties. Communist Party branches were recommended 
to focus on getting trade councils affiliated to local 
Peace Councils. Experience had shown where this occurred, 
the trades councils' intervention had led to the Peace 
Councils developing mass anti-war activity. 74 
Throughout the spring of 1936 the Communist Party's 
affiliation campaign went from strength to strength, 
which is revealed in the rapid increase in the number of 
organisations passing resolutions of support for this 
issue. This reflected growing concern within the Labour 
movement at the expansionary activities of the fascist 
powers, as shown by Germany's military occupation of the 
Rhineland and Italy's conquest of Abyssinia. Besides 
this, the municipal and parliamentary triumphs of the 
Popular Front movements in France and Spain were most 
influential in swinging Labour opinion in Britain in the 
same direction. 
On 29 February 1936 the Daily Worker reported that 280 
Labour movement organisations had passed resolutions 
supporting the Communist Party's affiliation to the 
Labour Party. 75 By 20 April this had grown to over 400 
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organisations supporting communist affiliation to 
Labour. 76 This included important sections of the Labour 
movement such as the South Wales Miners' Federation and 
ASLEF. 
On 16 June the Daily Worker reported that 906 
organisations now supported affiliation. This included 
the most important socialist societies affiliated to 
Labour such as the Fabians and the Socialist League. Of 
more concern to the Labour Party leadership was the fact 
that over 577 union bodies had come out in support of 
affiliation, including the AEU national committee. 77 
By August 1936 the Daily Worker was claiming the 
support of over 1,326 Labour movement bodies, including 
the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. 78 Several 
national newspapers such as the Morning Post and the 
Daily Telegraph in late July were predicting a very close 
vote over the issue at Labour Party conference in 
October. The Daily Telegraph estimated that both pro- 
affiliation and anti-affiliation factions in the Labour 
movement could count on over a million votes and believed 
communist success a possibility. 79 
Having noted the successes of the affiliation campaign 
it must be acknowledged that its support was very patchy. 
It was concentrated in the Communist Party's four 
strongest districts - Scotland, London, South Wales, and 
Lancashire. Over 72 per cent of the pro-affiliation 
resolutions were from these areas. 80 
The affiliation campaign, with the support of several 
union executives, appeared to have a strong foundations, 
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but its rank and file base of support was rather slender, 
concentrated as it was in two or three unions. This lack 
of grass-roots support throughout the Labour movement on 
a national basis was to undermine the affiliation vote at 
Labour Party conference. 81 
The June Political Bureau meeting acknowledged another 
major obstacle to the affiliation campaign; this being 
the implacable hostility of leading trade union figures 
such as Bevin. It was reported that Bevin had privately 
admitted receiving over 200 resolutions supporting 
affiliation from TGWU branches yet the Daily Worker only 
had public knowledge of 60 of these. Bevin was reported 
as saying that, he doesn't give a damn if he gets two 
million resolutions', the TGWU would still be voting 
against CPGB affiliation at the Labour Party conference 
in October. 82 
Before looking at the Labour Party's response to the 
growing threat of communist affiliation, it is worth 
asking why did the CPGB feel that its affiliation 
campaign would be successful? The worsening international 
situation, together with the election of popular front 
governments in France and Spain, appeared to confirm 
communist claims that only unity of all anti-fascist 
forces could change the direction of British foreign 
policy to help reduce the threat of war internationally. 
The fascist uprising in Spain during July 1936 and the 
ensuing support for Franco's war effort from fascist 
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Germany and Italy served to strengthen pro-affiliation 
sentiment. Meanwhile the struggles against the BUF during 
the spring and summer also served to give momentum to the 
affiliation campaign. The resolutions and letters of 
support for affiliation from trade union and Labour Party 
branches, which were published in the Daily Worker, 
reveal how the above developments were central to many 
workers' support for the CPGB's affiliation campaign. 83 
The growing momentum of the Communist Party's 
affiliation campaign during the spring and summer of 1936 
made it obvious to Labour and trade union leaders that 
their anti-communist measures, most notably the so called 
`Black Circulars', had far from succeeded in retarding 
the growth of communist influence within the Labour 
movement. In July the National Council of Labour 
responded with a pamphlet entitled British Labour and 
Communism. 
This pamphlet reiterated many of the familiar 
objections to the Communist Party. The document played 
upon memories of the CPGB's disruptive influence within 
the Labour movement during the `class-against-class' 
period; detailing the many slanders which it had heaped 
upon the Labour Party. It rejected as totally unfounded 
the claim that by granting affiliation to the tiny 
Communist Party, resistance to war in Britain would be 
increased. The Comintern and its sections were portrayed 
as an agency of the Soviet state; their united front 
overtures were, `inspired by the change in Russian 
foreign policy'. It also noted that, `the Communist Party 
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represents no substantial part of British public 
opinion', and that its united front overture to Labour 
was dictated by its abject failure, `to secure a 
substantial membership'. The French popular front was 
portrayed as an electoral manoeuvre whereby the 
communists had managed to gain electoral strength at the 
expense of the socialists. 84 The pamphlet's conclusion 
argued that communist affiliation was a distraction from 
the real struggle for socialism: 
The advance of British Labour and the success of 
British socialists will not be gained by such means. 
Only by convinced socialists will Socialism be won. 
Communist association with Labour will only serve to 
distract the movement, mislead the electorate 
generally, and store up difficulties against the day 
of socialist victory. 85 
While the above document undoubtedly played a role in 
slowing down the momentum of the Communist Party's 
affiliation campaign, it was events in the Soviet Union 
which arguably played a more decisive role in undermining 
the campaign and sending wavering sympathisers back into 
support for the Labour Party's stance. 86 The first of the 
Moscow show trials which took place in mid-August 1936 
severely undermined support for the CPGB's affiliation 
campaign. 
215 
The first Moscow show trial - August 1936 
At this first trial the world was presented with the 
spectacle of Zinoviev, Kamenev and fourteen other old 
Bolsheviks confessing, `to an implausible range of 
crimes. '87 The CPGB leadership in attempting to justify 
the trial portrayed it, `as vitally connected with the 
international struggle against fascism', and gave the 
trial their whole hearted support. 88 In their vigourous 
support for Stalin's Terror the CPGB gravely compromised 
itself in the eyes of many workers, who previously had 
given the affiliation campaign their support. McDermott 
and Agnew have described the effect of the Terror on the 
Comintern in great detail, noting how valuable this 
support from foreign communists was and how the Terror 
undermined support for Comintern's popular front 
campaigns all over Europe: 
Such staunch international support was invaluable for 
Stalin, not least as a propaganda tool for domestic 
consumption. More important from a wider perspective, 
the Terror posed a grave threat to the anti-fascist 
struggle in Europe. 89 
McDermott and Agnew put forward new evidence to show the 
direct complicity of many Comintern leaders in the purges 
of the international. 90 In light of this new evidence, it 
makes one wonder how much knowledge Pollitt and other 
CPGB leaders had of the mass purges within the Comintern. 
Apologists for the CPGB leadership such as Branson claim 
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that they were not aware of the enormous repression 
perpetrated by the Stalin regime and denies that they 
connived at a cover-up. 91 Such claims, generally accepted 
by historians, must now be treated with a degree of 
caution, and will be re-examined in chapter four. 
Documents recently released from the Comintern 
archives in Moscow suggest that the CPGB leadership 
collaborated to some degree in the purges. On 12 April 
1937 Pollitt responded to Dimitrov's request for a 
statement on his relations with the recently arrested 
Petrovsky, who in the 1920s was the Comintern agent in 
Britain and worked under the name of Bennett. 92 At the 
Political Bureau two days later Pollitt, in response to 
Dimitrov's request, asked all its members to make written 
statements of what they knew about Petrovsky. 93 As Kevin 
Morgan has commented, 'Who knows what dossier of 
murderous fabrications might have been drawn from this 
particular source? '94 
In its coverage of the first show trial the Daily 
Worker repeated the calumnies of Pravda that Trotsky, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev had organised terrorist groups 
against the leadership of the Soviet government in close 
collaboration with the Gestapo. The Daily Worker's 
coverage of the trial culminated in the infamous 
headline, 'Shoot The Reptiles'. 95 
When the Daily Herald and the TUC General Secretary 
Citrine supported a request from the LSI and IFTU for 
the defendants to be given a proper legal defence and be 
spared the death penalty, the Daily Worker and the rest 
217 
of the CPGB press reacted with a series of attacks upon 
Citrine and the LSI, accusing them of siding with the 
fascist enemies of the Soviet state. 96 The Daily Worker 
accused the Daily Herald of using its coverage of the 
trial to undermine the Communist Party's campaign for 
affiliation to the Labour Party. 97 
Knowing full well the damage which the Daily Herald's 
opposition to the trial was inflicting on the Communist 
Party's affiliation campaign, Pollitt took the 
unprecedented step of writing to J. S. Middleton, national 
secretary of the Labour Party, asking him to stifle the 
Daily Herald's coverage of the trial. 98 Hand in hand with 
this denunciation of anyone who dare to oppose or even 
question the validity of the trial proceedings, went a 
systematic rewriting of Comintern and Bolshevik history. 
Articles in the CPGB press denied that Trotsky, Zinoviev 
and the other defendants had ever played a meaningful 
role in the world communist movement. 99 
At the TUC conference in September 1936 Citrine, who 
had made a six-week journey to the Soviet Union and 
written an account of his experiences; used the Moscow 
show trial to great effect in discrediting the Communist 
Party's affiliation campaign. 100 Harold Laski, who at the 
time expressed grave doubts about the Moscow trial in a 
letter to Pollitt, later admitted that the CPGB's 
affiliation campaign had been severely damaged by its 
association with the juridical murder of the sixteen old 
Bolsheviks. 101 Pollitt himself, in a letter to Arnot who 
was in Moscow to cover the trials for the Daily Worker, 
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admitted that the show trial had been politically 
damaging to the Communist Party. 102 
In its defence of the Stalinist Terror the CPGB gave 
substance to the charge made by the Labour Party 
leadership that it was merely a mouthpiece for the Soviet 
government; such charges helping to undermine support for 
the affiliation campaign. 103 Before looking at how the 
affiliation campaign fared at the Labour Party conference 
in October 1936, it is necessary to briefly examine other 
elements in the Communist Party's anti-fascist activity. 
The Communist Party's role in the struggle against the 
BUF gives substance to the charge that it was downplaying 
militant anti-fascist activity so as not to alienate 
potential allies for the popular front. The same 
divisions between the leadership and sections of the rank 
and file over anti-fascist strategy which had been in 
evidence during 1934-35 were to re-emerge during 1936, 
most notably over the Communist Party's attitude to the 
BUF's attempt at marching through the East End of London 
on 4 October 1936. 
The struggle against the BUF during 1936 
In the spring of 1936 Mosley launched a new national 
recruitment campaign which held public rallies in dozens 
of towns up and down the country. In the majority of 
cases these rallies were vigorously opposed by counter- 
demonstrations organised by local communist and Labour 
movement activists. 104 
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When Mosley announced that he was going to have a 
national rally at the Albert Hall on 22 March 1936, the 
Daily Worker, unable to ignore such an event without 
losing face, appealed for a counter-demonstration to this 
event. In the run-up to the counter-demonstration the 
emphasis of the Daily Worker's campaign was on getting 
the support of famous personalities and using their names 
as a means of building support amongst the trade unions 
and wider working class. On the 17 March 1936 the Daily 
Worker declared, 'With a clear lead from all from all 
progressive figures, London workers will rally on Sunday 
evening to answer Mosley' while noting also that, 'The 
biggest and broadest People's Front ever known in this 
country is being built up in London against Mosley's 
meeting'. 
There was no call for mass working-class action to 
stop the BUF and drown it out in a sea of anti-fascist 
activity as in September 1934. Neither were there any 
appeals for the Albert Hall staff to go on strike on the 
day of the fascist rally, just appeals to the Albert Hall 
manager for 'fair play'. This rejection of militant anti- 
fascist activity reflected the Communist Party's attempt 
to appear respectable to potential middle class 
supporters of its popular front campaign; and to reassure 
the Labour Party leaders that the Communist Party would 
be a safe and reliable ally if it became an affiliate. 
On the day of the Mosley rally, on 22 March 1936, a 
mere 8,000 people turned out on the counter- 
demonstration. This relatively small number was 
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outmanoeuvred by a large police presence, and failed to 
prevent Mosley speaking. The Daily Worker failed to 
acknowledge this victory for the BUF for only a day 
earlier it had described the counter-demonstration as the 
broadest movement against fascism ever seen before in 
London. 105 
The failure of this anti-fascist activity, together 
with the relatively high level of police violence meted 
out to the anti-fascists on the counter-demonstration, 
led to calls within the London Labour movement for a 
workers' defence force to protect demonstrations and 
meetings from attack from either the police or the 
fascists. Within the Communist Party this demand found 
support particularly from sections of the Young Communist 
League. 106 The Communist Party leadership, in keeping 
with its desire to appear politically respectable to the 
Labour Party leaders and to court political allies to the 
right of the Labour movement, rejected such a demand as 
politically immature and stated that the best way of 
combatting fascism was to build a mass movement to defeat 
the National Government. 107 
Throughout the summer of 1936 tens of thousands of 
anti-fascists turned out on counter-demonstrations to 
oppose BUF rallies. 108 Meanwhile, the Communist Party 
leadership was preoccupied by the Labour affiliation 
campaign and by preparations for the World Peace Congress 
in early September in Brussels, which the Comintern had 
made a priority for its sections to work towards. It was 
hoped that the World Peace Congress would give a major 
I 
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boost to the Soviet government's campaign for an 
international peace front to enforce collective security 
measures designed to restrain Germany. 109 
The East End of London was at the centre of the battle 
against the fascists with the confrontations becoming 
bigger and increasingly violent. On 21 June 1936 at 
Finsbury Park over 20,000 anti-fascists shouted down 
Mosley's speech, which led to repeated charges by mounted 
police to clear the counter-demonstration. 110 
At the London Communist Party congress in late June 
1936, Springhall, the district secretary, who was also a 
leading member of the Central Committee, presented the 
main report. In this he made no mention of the struggle 
against the BUF. Instead he emphasised the decisive 
contribution London communists could make to the struggle 
for affiliation to the Labour Party. He declared that the 
London Communist Party should concentrate on building up 
its position in the unions and on helping the Labour 
Party to win two upcoming municipal by-elections. In the 
longer term the London Communist Party should set its 
sights on helping Labour retain control of the London 
County Council; for in doing so it would, `deliver a 
powerful blow against the National Government.... a Labour 
victory would shake the government to its 
foundations'. 111 
When the BUF announced a rally in the East End to 
coincide with a YCL youth rally on 7 June in Trafalgar 
Square, the Communist Party leadership called on workers 
not to confront Mosley but to support the YCL youth 
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rally. Only after the YCL Trafalgar Square rally was over 
should they march back to the East End for an anti- 
fascist rally. 112 In his autobiography Joe Jacobs, then 
secretary of the Stepney Communist Party, states that he 
and many other CPGB members were unhappy with this 
decision. 113 
Both Jacobs and Piratin, who were members of the 
Stepney Communist Party, note that as the BUF attempted 
to expand its geographical base of support within East 
London there was a growing conflict inside the East 
London Communist Party as to how it should respond to 
this. 114 Jacobs recalls that, `the majority view, 
certainly among the youth, was that Mosley should be met 
everywhere with the maximum force available'. 115 While 
opposed to the strategy of confronting the BUF on the 
streets at the time, Piratin later acknowledged that a 
majority of the Stepney Communist Party favoured such 
action in 1936.116 
Yet powerful figures within the London Communist Party 
opposed such tactics as inappropriate. This reflected the 
line of the national leadership that the struggle against 
the BUF was politically irrelevant when compared to the 
need to organise a mass movement to defeat the National 
Government. As the summer progressed other organisations 
in the East End, such as the ex-servicemen's anti-fascist 
movement, became as important as the Communist Party in 
deciding what should be done to oppose Mosley. 117 
On 26 September 1936 the BUF announced that it 
intended to march through the East End of London on 4 
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October. This clashed with a YCL Aid-for-Spain rally in 
Trafalgar Square on the same day. The Daily Worker was 
slow to respond to this announcement by the fascists. It 
was not until the 30 September that the Daily Worker 
finally responded. On that day the Daily Worker called on 
workers to go to the YCL Aid-for-Spain rally in Trafalgar 
Square during the day. In the evening they would go to an 
anti-fascist rally in the East End to protest about the 
fascist march in the afternoon, thus avoiding a 
confrontation with Mosley's demonstration. 118 
This decision not to confront the BUF in defiance of 
local sentiment clearly reveals how the Communist Party 
leadership had moved rightward in its opportunistic 
pursuit of political allies to the right of the Labour 
movement. The CPGB leadership clearly saw the popular 
front campaign around the Aid-for-Spain issue as 
politically more important than confronting Mosley's 
march through the East End. 
On 20 September 1936 the London Communist Party held a 
parade attended by 4,000-5,000 people, hundreds of 
banners were carried which illustrated famous chapters 
and celebrated influential figures from English history. 
As Lewis Day commented at the time, what did this 
heterogeneous collection of Englishmen from Thomas More 
to Cobden have in common with the spirit and traditions 
of communism? The answer is very little. Rather it was 
crude attempt to court political allies to the right of 
the Labour movement in the pursuit of an anti-fascist 
policy determined not by domestic concerns, like the 
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fight against Mosley, but by the requirements of Soviet 
foreign policy. Communist Party members such as Lewis Day 
drew similar conclusions at the time. He commented that 
the 20 September march gave: 
the impression that the Party was not seeking on this 
march to win the proletariat, but to impress more 
influential allies. It seems to be no longer a 
question of appearing as comrades of the most 
indigent, most oppressed strata of the workers, but 
as the bowler-hatted, Sunday-best allies of Liberals 
and petty-bourgeois Labourites. 119 
This attempt to try and appeal to middle-class patriotic 
sentiment proved successful and brought in over 800 
recruits for the Communist Party. 120 Meanwhile large 
sections of the CPGB membership were preoccupied by the 
fight against the BUF. In the Stepney Communist Party 
there was great anger at the decision of the national 
leadership not to confront Mosley and try and stop his 
march through the East End. Joe Jacobs recalls how this 
decision was completely out of touch with the sentiment, 
widespread within the East End, that the BUF should be 
confronted and prevented from marching: 
The pressure from the people of Stepney who went 
ahead with their own efforts to oppose Mosley left no 
doubt in our minds that the Communist Party would be 
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finished in Stepney if this was allowed to go through 
as planned by our London leaders. 121 
Jacobs describes how it was only the threat of open 
revolt by a large section of the East End membership 
which forced the Communist Party leadership to change its 
position and call on workers to oppose Mosley's march on 
4 October. 122 Apparently, leading figures on the Central 
Committee such as John Mahon, D. F. Springhall and Bob 
McLennan, had told Jacobs and others in the Stepney 
Party, who wanted to confront Mosley, that the Aid Spain 
march of the YCL was more important than Mosley's march 
through the East End. 123 
This viewpoint is given credibility by the lateness of 
the Communist Party's decision to oppose Mosley. It was 
not until 2 October that the Communist Party cancelled 
the YCL rally scheduled for 4 October and came out 
publicly with a call for mass opposition to prevent 
Mosley marching. 124 Jacobs claim is also supported by the 
remarks of Pollitt in a discussion on the `Battle of 
Cable Street' with Herbert Morrison on 14 October 1936. 
In this Pollitt remarked that he, `was no enthusiast for 
such clashes but he insisted that his supporters would 
not be persuaded to surrender the streets to fascism'. 125 
It is obvious that, even without the Communist Party's 
support, Mosley would have been opposed by tens of 
thousands of anti-fascists. By its sudden change of heart 
at the eleventh hour the Communist Party was able to 
avoid a humiliating loss of face and a potentially 
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serious loss of support and influence. The generally 
accepted view amongst most historians, that gives the 
Communist Party sole credit for organising the defeat of 
the fascists at the `Battle of Cable Street' where 
250,000 anti-fascists prevented Mosley's men from 
marching, is open to question and in need of revision. 126 
The struggle waged against the BUF throughout the 
spring and summer of 1936 by thousands of activists from 
the Labour movement and the Communist Party, was largely 
responsible for the BUF's failure to emerge as a 
political force with a significant base of support. As 
Nigel Todd has commented, such anti-fascist activity was, 
`far more effective than government bans on wearing 
uniforms and holding marches imposed under the 1937 
Public Order Act'. 127 It was on the whole, a movement 
from below, `a response of the common people' which 
lacked the conscious support not only of the Labour and 
trade union leaders, who rejected extra-parliamentary 
activity as a viable political strategy, but more 
surprisingly the Communist Party leadership. 128 
The CPGB leadership throughout 1935-1936 was 
preoccupied by the need to build a multi-class alliance 
to defeat the National Government in order to help 
safeguard the Soviet Union, which led it to effectively 
abandon militant anti-fascist activity. The anti-Mosley 
struggle reveals how the Communist Party `soft pedalled' 
the class struggle and refrained from militant anti- 
fascist activity unless forced to do so, as in the case 
of the `Battle of Cable Street'. Such a statement must be 
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qualified by making a distinction between the national 
CPGB leadership preoccupied by international affairs and 
the campaign for affiliation to Labour, and large 
sections of the rank and file which held a different 
conception of the anti-fascist struggle. Undoubtedly, a 
large section of the Communist Party membership believed 
that only militant activity could effectively undermine 
the BUF, which they saw as the main focus of the anti- 
fascist struggle in this country. While large sections of 
the Communist Party rank and file were absorbed with the 
struggle against the BUF during 1936, the national 
leadership was more concerned with the campaign for 
affiliation to Labour which it believed it had a 
realistic chance of winning. 129 
Failure of the affiliation campaign 
The disastrous effect of the Moscow show trial upon the 
Communist Party's affiliation campaign has already been 
noted; the other factors which were responsible for the 
defeat of the affiliation campaign will also be examined 
now. The Labour and trade union leaders convincingly 
portrayed the CPGB's espousal of popular frontism as an 
attempt to ally the Labour movement with forces hostile 
to socialism. In the Communist Party journal Discussion 
in August 1936, Rust openly called for a political 
alliance between the Labour movement and the various 
strands of Liberal opinion in order to form a popular 
front capable of defeating the National Government. 130 
Writing in Forward after the 1936 TUC conference, Herbert 
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Morrison stated, `They went too far to the Right, for 
they were willing to make an alliance with the Liberals 
and other non-Socialist elements'. 131 
The Labour and trade union leaders successfully played 
upon the memory of the fall of the previous Labour 
Government and the subsequent mood for unity against the 
Labour movement's class enemies which produced a deep 
hostility to cross-class political alliances. Walter 
Citrine expressed this well at the 1936 TUC annual 
conference: 
The Liberal Party has ceased to be a political force 
of any consequence in this country, and the Labour 
Movement is to be asked after all these years of 
fighting Liberalism, of trying to get people to come 
to a clear Labour platform, to put Liberalism on its 
feet and to take it into our bosom. 132 
Besides this, the accusation that the CPGB was merely a 
mouthpiece for the foreign policy requirements of the 
Soviet government struck a deep chord of support within 
the Labour movement. At the 1936 TUC annual conference 
Walter Citrine put this view most forcefully: 
When the Communist Party speaks here it is expressing 
that governments point of view, certainly in all 
matters of foreign policy.... I say to you that you 
may find the time will come along when that sort of 
thing [following a policy dictated by a foreign 
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government-DLM] will lead you up against the greatest 
principles of your life. The Trade Union Movement has 
been built up in independence of all governments. I 
would remind you of 1931 when this Movement, this 
Congress saved the soul of the Labour Movement. 133 
By the time of the Labour Party conference in October 
1936 between 850,000 and a million votes seemed committed 
to Communist Party affiliation. Yet when a card vote was 
taken only 592,000 votes were cast in favour, with 
1,728,000 votes against. 134 The Communist Party may have 
consoled itself with the fact that it had gained a third 
of the conference vote, yet this ignored the question of 
what had happened to the missing pro-affiliation vote. 
Both the AEU and the MFGB had split their votes. Only 
325,000 of the miners' 400,000 votes were cast for 
affiliation, and a section of the 145,000 AEU votes went 
against affiliation. Support from the Divisional Labour 
Parties was lower than expected; one estimate putting 
this at 150,000 votes. Meanwhile the CPGB's hopes of 
obtaining the support of NUDAW were not realised. ASLEF 
was the only major union to vote solidly in favour of 
affiliation. 135 
The poor showing of the pro-affiliation vote at the 
Labour Party conference came as something of a shock to 
the Communist Party, which had developed high hopes that 
it could actually win affiliation to Labour. 136 The 
failure of the affiliation campaign testified to the 
CPGB's failure to build sufficient grass-roots support 
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within the Labour and trade union movement. This was 
largely the result of its pursuit of an anti-fascist 
strategy that was determined primarily by the 
requirements of Soviet foreign policy. The Communist 
Party's courting of middle-class Liberal opinion through 
its intervention in the peace movement, and its failure 
to throw its weight fully behind the anti-Mosley 
movement, along with its unconditional support for the 
Moscow show trial, are all examples of this. 
The last section of this chapter will examine the 
anti-fascist activities of the Communist Party in West 
Yorkshire. This will illustrate the dichotomy between the 
national Party line and the activities of local 
communists who were more responsive to the anti-fascist 
sentiments of British workers, and who gave a higher 
priority to combatting the BUF than the campaign for 
communist affiliation to the Labour Party. 
The West Yorkshire Communist Party 1935 - 1936 
Before describing the activities of the local Communist 
Party during the period in question it is first necessary 
to point out that local source materials for 1935-39 are 
not as rich as the materials for the earlier 1933-35 
period. Having said this, what does emerge from the 
limited source material which is available is that the 
campaigning priorities of local branches did not always 
follow the major concerns of the King Street leadership. 
In Leeds the local branch largely concentrated its 
activities in the struggle against the BUF and did not 
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really take up the campaign for affiliation to the Labour 
Party. This reflected the enduring presence of anti- 
semitism and the BUF in Leeds which had the biggest 
Jewish population in Britain outside London. 137 It was 
also due to the effect of the `Black Circulars' which 
weakened the local Communist Party's position on both the 
Trades Council and in certain local unions such as the 
NUR; the latter having removed Ernie Benson as its 
delegate to the Trades Council. 138 The Leeds branch used 
its anti-war committee as a vehicle for its popular front 
propaganda. 
The situation in Leeds contrasted with the activities 
of the communist branch in Bradford. The activities of 
the Bradford branch reflected the concerns of the 
national leadership and the Comintern to 'a greater 
degree; with international developments in Abyssinia, 
France and Spain becoming the focus of local communist 
activity. In Leeds the Communist Party branch appeared 
less preoccupied with international issues when it had a 
pressing domestic issue on which to campaign in the form 
of anti-semitism and the BUF. The Communist Party in 
Bradford, in contrast to Leeds, took up the campaign for 
affiliation to Labour much more vigorously. 
In the spring of 1935 the national leadership 
intervened in the affairs of the West Yorkshire Communist 
Party and had Maurice Ferguson removed from his position 
as district secretary. This reflected the frustration of 
the King Street leadership at the failure of the West 
Riding district to grow significantly at a time when the 
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CPGB nationally had recruited over 2,000 from the NUWM's 
struggles against Part Two of the Unemployment Act. 139 
Maurice Ferguson's replacement was Ernie Benson, the 
secretary of the Leeds Communist Party. In his 
autobiography, Benson later claimed that Ferguson was 
removed due to the poor state of his health. Yet after 
his removal Ferguson continued to play a full and active 
role in the Bradford Communist Party as is shown by his 
activities on the local Trades Council. Benson states 
that he took up the post of district secretary on the 
recommendation of Pollitt, who had come up to Bradford to 
address the West Riding district committee, specifically 
on the question of a new district secretary. 140 
Behind the official reason of `ill-health' for 
Ferguson's departure other more sinister influences may 
have been at work. There was a history of animosity 
between Pollitt and Ferguson which can be traced back to 
the Dawdon mining dispute of 1929 during the `class- 
against-class' period. 141 During the years 1933-1935 
Pollitt and Ferguson had clashed on more than one 
occasion on the Central Committee. 
The sharpest exchange between them came at the Central 
Committee in December 1934, when Pollitt accused Ferguson 
of political opportunism in his. support for a Labour 
government at any price. The same charge of political 
opportunism was levelled at the work of the Bradford 
district under Ferguson's leadership. In his defence, 
Ferguson pointed out that the Bradford district had 
achieved many successes in its united front work under 
233 
his leadership. He also rejected the charges of political 
opportunism levelled against himself and the work of the 
Bradford district. Ferguson went to the extraordinary 
lengths of having a written protest from himself attached 
to the Central Committee minutes addressing the charges 
made by Pollitt. 142 In February 1935 the Central 
Committee was reduced from 32 to 22 members with Maurice 
Ferguson being dropped, signalling his fall from favour 
with the leadership. 143 
Soon after his appointment as the new district 
secretary Benson moved to Bradford where the district 
office was based. He lodged with Tom and Harriet Tynan 
who were members of the Bradford branch, and returned to 
Leeds at weekends. His decision to move to Bradford was 
also motivated by his belief that the Leeds branch had a 
`good collective leadership' which had developed a larger 
membership and a stronger base of political support, 
Particularly in the trade union field, than the Bradford 
branch. In his autobiography Benson recalls: 
I thought that the situation in Bradford warranted my 
greatest attention. Leeds was in good hands and 
presented no problems, but in Bradford there was 
dissent between comrades. 144 
Benson claims that the Leeds branch had a much stronger 
industrial base of support and greater influence in the 
local trade union movement than the Bradford branch, 
where it had developed a strong position in the local 
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clothing industry. 145 Yet study of communist intervention 
on the Bradford and Leeds Trades Councils does not really 
support his claim. The Bradford Communist Party had a 
much stronger position on the local Trades Council than 
its Leeds counterpart and was able to exert a much 
greater degree of influence. Having said this, a 
multitude of factors affected the strength of each 
communist fraction on their respective Trades Council. 
The interventions of the communist fractions on the 
local Trades Councils were largely organised around the 
questions of war and peace and Labour affiliation, which 
reflected the main concerns of the national Party 
leadership. On these issues the local communists had 
rather varied success. On the Leeds Trades Council the 
communists had very little to show for their 
interventions, indeed they saw their position drastically 
weakened largely as a result of the `Black Circulars'. 
Yet on the Bradford Trades Council the communist fraction 
managed to maintain its position of relative strength and 
enjoyed considerably more success with its interventions. 
It is interesting to compare this situation with the 
fortunes of communists on Trades Councils in other parts 
of the country to see if a general pattern emerges which 
will tells us something about why the Communist Party 
never became a mass force within the Labour movement. In 
his study of communist activity within the Trades 
Councils of the East Midlands, Richard Stevens has found 
that during the second half of the 1930s there was a 
steady growth in communist influence and an annual 
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increase in the number of communist delegates. This was 
certainly the case in the largest trades councils of the 
region based in Nottingham and Leicester. However, in 
Derby the ILP was by far the dominant left influence on 
the Trades Council during this period, which is in 
contrast to the position in most British towns and cities 
where the ILP's influence steadily declined. 146 What 
emerges then is a slightly different picture in the 
fortunes of the Communist Party between the two regions. 
By looking in more depth at the Bradford and Leeds Trades 
Councils it will help to explain why this was so. 
Bradford Communist Party 
In Bradford the ILP's development reflected the fortunes 
of the party nationally, which was one of uninterrupted 
decline. By 1935 the Communist Party had become the 
strongest force on the left within the Bradford Trades 
Council. During 1935-1936 the Bradford Communist Party 
benefited from a steady flow of recruits from the local 
ILP. 147 The local Communist Party's emergence as a 
stronger force than the ILP was shown by the election of 
two of its members onto the Trades Council executive 
which was in contrast to the ILP's one delegate. 148 
The Bradford Communist Party's intervention on the 
Trades Council during 1935-1936 largely reflected the 
main concerns of the national Party; namely the questions 
of war and peace. On 1 September 1935 the Bradford 
Communist Party held a `Hands Off Abyssinia' rally which 
was over 300 strong. 149 At the Trades Council on 19 
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September the delegates agreed to participate in a local 
Peace Council conference called to discuss the Abyssinian 
crisis. The local Peace Council was controlled by the 
Bradford Communist Party. Tom Tynan, a CPGB member on the 
Trades Council executive, was elected to be one of the 
Trades Councils representatives to the Peace Council 
conference. 150 
At the same Trades Council meeting a left resolution, 
probably inspired by the ILP delegation, was passed, 
opposing the TUC's support for sanctions against any 
Italian invasion of Abyssinia, `reaffirming our 
resistance to all imperialist wars'. 151 It would appear 
that on this occasion the local communists found 
themselves in the unprecedented position of being on the 
same side as the right-wing delegates, in support of 
sanctions against Italy. 
Confirmation of the fact that the Communist Party's 
swing to the right over the question of war had served to 
isolate it from the left-pacifist wing of the local 
Labour movement is revealed by an article in the Bradford 
Pioneer on 20 September 1935. This lambasted the 
Communist Party for its support of League of Nations 
sanctions against Italy as a betrayal of socialist 
principles carried out in order to comply with the 
foreign policy requirements of the Soviet state. 152 
At the Trades Council, in November 1935, the communist 
fraction suffered another reverse when the council voted 
27 to 15 not to discuss a circular from the `Peace and 
Friendship with the USSR' campaign. The same meeting also 
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rejected an ILP request for the Trades Council to hear 
one of its representatives outline its policy on the 
Abyssinian crisis. Instead, the November Trades Council 
passed an executive committee motion opposing the 
National Government's rearmament programme. This also 
called upon the government to pursue collective security 
through the League of Nations. 153 This meeting revealed 
that the left on the Trades Council although nominally in 
the majority, could not always count on getting its own 
way. It confirms another finding of the study by Richard 
Stevens, that the left and right always had to win over 
the politically uncommitted majority if they were to get 
one of their measures passed. 154 
The Bradford Trades Council's long-standing opposition 
to the TUC Circular 16 finally came to an end in October 
1935. At its meeting in October the Trades Council voted 
41 to 30 to accept the `Black Circular' which prevented 
communists from being union delegates to a trades 
council. This was in response to a threat from the TUC, 
which had informed the Bradford Trades Council that 
recognition would definitely be withdrawn if it failed to 
comply with national policy. It would appear that 
previously staunch allies of the local Communist Party 
such as the Trades Council President, Fred Ratcliffe, 
finally caved in under this pressure. 155 
While committed to enforcing the `Black Circulars' on 
paper, in practice Bradford Trades Council quite 
consciously failed to implement them. This reflected the 
recognition, from both right and left, of the local 
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communists' role as hard-working trades unionists who 
participated energetically in all the campaigns of the 
Trade Council. This situation corresponds with what 
Richard Stevens has described as one of the outstanding 
features of left-right relations within the East Midlands 
Trades Councils, which, 'was the fundamental tolerance 
that existed within most sections of the local labour 
movement'. Stevens shows that most trades councils in the 
East Midlands while eventually accepting the 'Black 
Circular' on paper, never enforced it and no communist 
delegates were disbared. 156 
Although committed to its formal acceptance Bradford 
Trades Council continued to campaign against the 'Black 
Circulars'. In December 1936 it wrote to the TUC General 
Council urging it, 'to give further consideration to 
circulars 16 and 17 with a view to their abolition'. The 
same meeting rejected 43 to 4 the General Councils 
questioning of its acceptance of communist delegates from 
the TGWU and the ETU; the delegates in question being 
leading figures in the Bradford Communist Party. They 
were Maurice Ferguson from the transport workers union 
and Tom Tynan from the electricians union. 157 
With the retirement of Fred Ratcliffe from the post of 
Trades Council President at the annual meeting in January 
1936, the local Communist Party lost a long-standing left 
ally. However, his replacement, Roland Hill, while not as 
close politically to the CPGB as Fred Ratcliffe, was a 
long-standing advocate of the working-class united front 
and opposed to the 'Black Circulars'. The annual meeting 
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in January 1936 elected another executive with a left 
majority. It also retained the two communists, Ferguson 
and Tynan; this was a sign of the high regard with which 
the local Communist Party were held. 158 
In early 1936 the Bradford branch tried to implement 
the first stage of the Communist Party's popular front 
strategy which involved campaigning for affiliation to 
the Labour Party. When Ferguson and Tynan put forward a 
motion to the Trades Council in February 1936, urging 
support for the Communist Party's affiliation to the 
Labour Party, it was rejected out of hand by an 
overwhelming majority. As the minutes do not describe the 
discussion at that meeting, one can only speculate as to 
the reasons for this surprisingly heavy defeat. One 
possible reason may have been the desire not to get into 
further trouble with the TUC or to alienate the local 
Labour Party any further. It is worthwhile recalling the 
storm of protest which had issued from the TUC and the 
local Labour Party when the Trades Council had first 
refused to accept the 'Black Circulars'. 159 
The heavy defeat of the affiliation motion on the 
Trades Council executive, which was somewhat surprising, 
did not reflect the strong support which affiliation had 
from substantial numbers of local trade unionists. Among 
local trade union branches supporting communist 
affiliation to Labour were ASLEF, the NUR and the 
Painters Society. 160 This, together with the respect for 
the communist fraction on the Trades Council as hard 
working trade unionists, may explain the decision of the 
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Trades Council to allow the Bradford Communist Party 
representation on the May Day committee. 161 
As the international situation worsened the communist 
fraction on the Trades Council found increasing support 
for its anti-war activity and popular front campaigns. In 
early June 1936 the Trades Council executive wrote to the 
TUC General Council calling upon it to invite the Soviet 
trade unions to the IFTU meeting in London in early July 
as a precursor to joint anti-war action between the two 
internationals. 162 It is worth noting that since the 
autumn of 1935 the Comintern and its various sections had 
been campaigning for joint anti-war activity between the 
two internationals and their trade union counterparts. 
In mid-June the Trades Council passed a communist 
motion which praised the French workers for putting a 
Popular front government into office. The motion also 
called for the TUC and Labour Party to launch a national 
campaign, `to demand the resignation of the National 
Government', and for its replacement by a popular front 
government committed to maintaining peace and 
democracy. 163 
In mid-July 1936 Maurice Ferguson tendered his letter 
of resignation to the Trades Council executive on the 
grounds he was leaving the area. The executive committee, 
`Placed on record their appreciation of the services 
rendered by Maurice Ferguson, and wished him success in 
his future work'. 164 Despite this considerable loss, the 
Bradford Communist Party maintained its influential 
Presence on the Trades Council due to the leading role it 
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played in the local Aid-for-Spain movement which emerged 
during late July and August. 
In mid-August 1936 the Bradford Communist Party 
organised a meeting attended by over 500 people which 
demanded the British Labour movement give its full 
support, both moral and practical, to the Spanish 
workers. Recognition of the leading role which the local 
Communist Party had been playing in the Aid-for-Spain 
movement, came in the form of an invitation from 
Bradford Labour Party and the Trades Council, for it to 
send a speaker to a Labour movement fund raising meeting. 
The West Yorkshire Communist Party rapidly escalated its 
intervention in the Aid-for-Spain movement planning 
meetings in Halifax and Dewsbury. 165 
Leeds Communist Party 
During 1935-1936 the Leeds Trades council proved to be a 
very unfruitful area of activity for the local Communist 
Party. The Trades Council during this period appears to 
have been parochial in outlook preoccupied by local 
matters such as juvenile labour investigations, resolving 
local trade disputes, like that at the large Burtons 
factory, and acquiring new premises. International 
matters figured little in its deliberations, unlike its 
Bradford counterpart, where the Trades Council delegates 
in general displayed a higher level of political 
consciousness. From its few policy declarations on 
international matters the Leeds Trades Council invariably 
followed the national Labour Party line. 166 
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The communist fraction on the Leeds Trades Council was 
reduced from at least six in 1934 to three in 1935. Most 
notable was the deselection of Marian Jessop, who was the 
communist Vice-President of the Trades Council in 1934. 
The tolerance which was the hallmark of left-right 
relations in the Bradford trade union movement and in 
other areas such as the East Midlands did not extend to 
Leeds, as noted in chapter two. In Leeds the `Black 
Circulars' together with the sectarian antics of local 
communists on occasions had served to isolate the Leeds 
Communist Party within the local Labour movement. 167 
Throughout 1935-1936 the communist fraction on the 
Leeds Trades Council was relatively ineffective and its 
interventions were rather sporadic. After the Comintern's 
Seventh World Congress, its interventions were focused 
around getting the Trades Council to support the local 
branch of the `Peace and Friendship with the USSR' 
movement. The Trades Council spent a lot of time 
deliberating whether or not to support this organisation 
and in the end came out against this. 168 
The communist fraction enjoyed more success with its 
campaign for the local Labour movement to send delegates 
to the World Peace Congress in Brussels during early 
September 1936. In July 1936 Leeds Trades Council agreed 
to send a delegate to the World Peace Congress. 169 
However, in August the Trades Council agreed to the 
executive committee's request that this delegate be 
cancelled due to a lack of financial response from 
affiliates. 170 The lack of support from affiliates is 
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shown by the fact that only 18 shillings had been sent to 
help send a delegate to the World Peace Congress; this 
money was then transferred to the Trades Councils Aid- 
for-Spain fund. 171 
During 1936 it would appear that the Leeds Communist 
Party was much more preoccupied with the threat posed by 
the local fascists than with the campaign for affiliation 
to the Labour Party-172 This probably reflected the fact 
that throughout the late 1930s Leeds remained one of the 
few areas where the BUF enjoyed any consistent 
support. 173 The blackshirts were able to draw support 
from the strength of anti-semitic feeling in certain 
parts of the city. Support for the BUF in Leeds appears 
to have been concentrated in the Armley and Burley 
areas. 174 At this time Leeds had the highest Jewish 
population in Britain outside London. 175 
When Mosley announced his intention to hold a rally in 
Leeds on 27 September 1936, which included a march 
through the Jewish section of the city, the local 
Communist Party advocated a counter-demonstration to stop 
the BUF march and rally taking place. The local fascists 
during 1936 had made regular attacks upon Jewish homes 
and shops and physically assaulted Jewish people. 176 
While the local Labour Party and Trades Council refused 
to support this call, the ILP did come out in support of 
a campaign to prevent the fascists marching. The BUF's 
plan to march through the Jewish area of Leeds, which was 
Chapeltown at that time, was dropped on the insistence of 
the Assistant Chief Constable, Frank Swaby, who, `deemed 
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it to be more trouble than it was worth in the face of 
the mounting campaign' of opposition to Mosley's 
march. 177 
The Leeds Communist Party was unanimous in its 
decision to try and stop the BUF march and rally, unlike 
the Stepney Communist Party which faced opposition from 
Party officials to its campaign of opposition to try and 
stop Mosley marching through the East End. The defeats 
inflicted upon the BUF in rapid succession at the `Battle 
of Holbeck Moor' and the `Battle of Cable Street' were to 
bring to a premature end Mosley's campaigning work in 
1936. 
On 27 September 1936 a uniformed BUF contingent, 
about 4,000 strong, set off from Calverley Street up to 
Holbeck Moor. As the blackshirts reached Holbeck Moor 
they were greeted with cries of "murderers" and "Get Back 
To Germany", from 30,000 to 50,000 anti-fascist 
activists. 178 Several hundred police both mounted and on 
foot kept the anti-fascist counter-demonstration from 
swamping the BUF contingent. 
As soon as Mosley started speaking he was greeted by 
a hail of stones and chanting which drowned out his 
speech. The police response to this was to mount baton 
charges into the huge crowd of anti-fascist 
demonstrators, injuring dozens of people. The fascists 
too began to attack the crowd knocking unconscious 
several people. Scores of people, mainly fascists, were 
injured by the barrage of stones with which Mosley's 
rally was pelted. Having abandoned attempts to address 
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his meeting, Mosley and his supporters were escorted off 
the moor by the police, who with great difficulty managed 
to clear a path for the fascists. 
On their way back to their headquarters in the city 
centre the BUF were bombarded with stones. In Domestic 
Street the fascists were confronted with a barricade 
jbuilt by local workers, from behind this barrier they 
pelted the blackshirts with stones. It was at this point 
that Mosley was hit on the temple and the police again 
charged the crowd arresting three anti-fascists. After 
the BUF had left Holbeck Moor the local Communist Party 
held a meeting which collected three pounds to pay for a 
legal defence fund for those anti-fascist demonstrators 
who had been arrested. 179 
On a local scale, the communists in Leeds and Bradford 
had limited success with their united and popular front 
activities; a situation which largely reflected the 
fortunes of the Communist Party on a national scale. 
During 1935-36 the Leeds Trades Council was largely 
concerned with local matters such as union recruitment 
drives and investigations into juvenile labour; 
international matters figured little in its deliberations 
unlike its Bradford counterpart. In this hostile, 
Parochial atmosphere, where the `Black Circular' was 
actively implemented, the interventions of local 
communists on the Trades Council received little support. 
It would appear that they put more of their energies into 
combatting the BUF which proved politically more fruitful 
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than the work on the Trades Council or the campaign for 
affiliation to the Labour Party. 
In Bradford where the Labour left and the ILP were a 
much stronger force, the local communists found the 
Trades Council to be a much more receptive environment in 
which to work. Building upon the goodwill established by 
its hard work within the trade union and anti-fascist 
movement, the Bradford Communist Party was able to 
maintain its position on the Trades Council. Yet at 
times, its anti-war campaigning, determined as it was by 
the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, occasionally 
isolated it from the rest of the left on the Trades 
Council. In the summer of 1936 Ernie Benson was replaced 
as district secretary by Sid Elias of NUWM fame, for in 
his own words, `I did not set the West Riding on fire. 
There were some improvements but not sufficient for me to 
be kept on'. 180 
Conclusion 
The Communist Party's campaign during 1935-1936 to build 
a popular front movement in Britain capable of bringing 
about the downfall of the National Government ended in 
failure. The twin pillars of the popular front strategy 
in the form of the Party's interventions in the peace 
movement, and the campaign for affiliation to the Labour 
Party, had failed to build up sufficient mass support for 
them to bring about the desired national front of anti- 
government forces. At that time the central plank of the 
popular front campaign was the campaign for affiliation 
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to the Labour Party. The failure of the affiliation 
campaign can be put down to the effect of the first 
Moscow show trial and the impression widespread 
throughout the Labour movement that the Communist Party 
was seeking to align it with political forces hostile to 
Labour's socialist aspirations. 
This was a clear example of how the CPGB's anti- 
fascist strategy was not determined by the concerns of 
the British working class but by the requirements of 
Soviet foreign policy. The Communist Party's 
preoccupation with building a multi-party alliance of 
forces capable of bringing down the government, led to a 
weakening of its commitment to militant anti-fascist 
struggle, as is revealed by the Cable Street episode. 
Concomitant with this, sections of the Communist Party 
rank and file saw the campaign against the BUF as the 
main focus of the anti-fascist struggle in Britain; and 
not the defeat of a seemingly impregnable National 
Government. 
The failure of the Communist Party's popular front 
campaign during 1935-36 is further illustrated by the 
membership figures for this period. At the Seventh World 
Congress CPGB membership was put at 7,500. In the six 
months following this the membership, `dropped to about 
7,000 or less'; which the leadership ascribed to `the 
false policy in carrying out the line of the Seventh 
Congress'. 181 The leadership never paused to consider 
whether the declining membership might be due to its 
popular front policies and defence of the Terror in the 
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Soviet Union. The Communist Party's membership was 
relatively stagnant up until the outbreak of the Spanish 
Civil War in July 1936. It was the influx of recruits, 
aroused into political activity by the march of fascism 
on the continent and in particular the Spanish conflict, 
that pushed the CPGB's membership to 11,500 by the time 
of Labour Party conference in October 1936.182 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The CPGB, the Unity Campaign and the second Moscow show 
trial - 1937 
"The forthcoming trial is a part of that international 
struggle against Fascism which the masses of the people 
are conducting in all the countries of capitalism. Every 
anti-Fascist and every supporter of peace, is interested 
that the counter-revolutionary essence of Trotskyism 
should be fully revealed, and that the agents of Fascism 
should be destroyed". Daily Worker, 23 January, 1937.1 
"Foreigners little realise how vital it was for Stalin in 
1936,1937, and 1938 to be able to declare that the 
British, American, French, German, Polish, Bulgarian and 
Chinese Communists unanimously supported the liquidation 
of the "Trotskyite, Fascist mad-dogs and wreckers"-among 
them even Zinoviev and Bukharin, the first two chiefs of 
the Comintern". W. G. Krivitsky, I Was Stalin's Agent, 
1939.2 
Following the juridical murder of the sixteen old 
Bolsheviks at the first Moscow show trial in August 1936, 
Stalin moved against his real and imagined enemies in the 
Soviet Union. Soviet society and the Comintern apparatus 
based in Moscow, were convulsed by a tidal wave of 
arrests and executions, commonly referred to as the 
Terror. 3 Not satisfied with the elimination of his 
`critics' within the Soviet Union, Stalin exported the 
Terror to Spain where critics of the Moscow show trials, 
most notably the POUM, were the subject of repression by 
Soviet security organs such as the NKVD. 4 Throughout this 
period the Comintern and its sections devoted an 
increasing amount of time and energy to the defence of 
the Terror otherwise known as the struggle against 
`Trotskyism'. Indeed the struggle against `Trotskyism' 
was to play a major role in undermining the popular front 
campaigns of the Comintern all over Europe. 5 
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The first section of the chapter sets out briefly to 
establish the interrelationship between events in the 
Soviet Union and the activities of the Comintern. In 
other words it aims to reveal how the main preoccupation 
of the CPSU (i. e. the Terror), became in turn a paramount 
concern of the Comintern. The second section examines the 
next stage in the attempt of the CPGB to establish a 
popular front in this country. Drawing upon evidence from 
the recently-opened archives of the Communist Party, it 
aims to take a fresh perspective on the Unity Campaign of 
1937. It seeks to show how the CPGB's ardent defence of 
the Terror in the Soviet Union and Spain was to fatally 
undermine its popular front activities; principal among 
which in 1937 was the Unity Campaign. The results of the 
votes on the Unity Campaign at the conferences of the TUC 
and Labour Party in 1937 reveal that the Communist 
Party's standing in the Labour movement had slipped 
backwards, especially when compared with the votes for 
its united front campaign in 1936.6 Study of this period 
reveals that the dichotomy between the activities of the 
Communist Party nationally and local communists in West 
Yorkshire is less marked especially when compared to 
1933-36. On both a national and local level the 
predominant issues appeared to be the Unity Campaign, 
defence of the Stalinist Terror and aid to Republican 
Spain. 
The Great Terror 1936-7 
As the Terror within the Soviet Union took on ever 
greater dimensions, Soviet diplomacy was effectively 
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paralysed as the Stalinist leadership retreated into a 
state of isolationism.? During the autumn of 1936 and 
throughout 1937 Stalin was preoccupied by the struggle 
against `Trotskyism' within the Soviet Union and Spain. 
Beside the defence of the Terror, the other major 
concerns of the international communist movement were the 
pursuit of popular front governments favourable to an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, and the defence of 
Republican Spain. Both of the latter two were determined 
by the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, with its 
pursuit of allies to help guarantee Soviet security. 
By the autumn of 1937 the requirements of collective 
security and the struggle against `Trotskyism' were 
placing severe strains on the various popular front 
alliances in Europe. It was the latter, above all, which 
undermined the campaigns of the Comintern for a popular 
front against fascism. 
The show trials and executions of those old Bolsheviks 
who, along with Lenin, were the leading figures of the 
October Revolution, served a variety of purposes. 
Stalin's primary objective was the destruction of all 
potential opponents to his personal dictatorship. 
Foremost in Stalin's mind was his long standing enemy 
Trotsky and the other old Bolsheviks who remained a 
potential focal point for any future opposition to his 
rule. 8 The trials and the Terror were also an act of 
intimidation designed to quell oppositional moods in the 
CPSU and the country at large; which reflected discontent 
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at the growing social and economic inequalities in Soviet 
society. 9 
Finally, the executions of the old Bolsheviks drew a 
line between the revolutionary ideals of the October 
Revolution and the conservative aspirations of the young 
bureaucracy which ruled the country. By severing the 
regime's last link with its revolutionary past Stalin 
sought to convince his would-be allies in the West of his 
suitability as a potential partner. As the Russian 
historian Vadim Rogovin has observed: 
By shooting people who had gone down in history as 
the leaders of revolutionary Bolshevism, Stalin 
wanted to present the world bourgeoisie with a 
"symbol of the new times", evidence of his break with 
the idea of world revolution. 10 
At the same time as Yezhov, the new head of the NKVD, 
rapidly escalated the Terror during the autumn of 1936, 
the Soviet government sent aid to Republican Spain. 
Beside a strictly rationed supply of arms, just enough to 
enable the Republican armies to hold their own against 
Franco, Soviet aid included the despatch of hundreds of 
NKVD agents as advisers on internal security to the 
Republican government. In practice this meant 
orchestrating a campaign of repression against the so- 
called `Trotskyists'. This included the POUM and left 
elements of the anarchists who had criticized the first 
Moscow show trial and whose advocacy of the `revolution 
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from below' jeopardised Soviet attempts at presenting a 
respectable face for Republican Spain to its would be 
allies Britain and France. 11 
On 28 December 1936, the ECCI sent instructions to 
the PCE calling for the physical destruction of the 
Spanish 'Trotskyists' who were portrayed as agents of 
Franco trying to destabilise the popular front 
government. 12 The campaign against the 'Trotskyists'i. e. 
POUM and the left anarchists, culminated during May 1937 
in Barcelona. The PCE provoked an armed clash between its 
own military forces and those of the POUM and the 
anarchist CNT. After convincing the popular front 
government that the POUM was a subversive ally of Franco, 
Comintern and Soviet military advisers led the 
repression of the POUM and its allies. This led to the 
infamous murder of Andres Nin, the POUM leader, and the 
death in communist custody of Bob Smillie of the ILP. 13 
On 23 January 1937 came the second Moscow show trial 
of seventeen old Bolsheviks headed by Radek and Piatakov. 
Trotsky, who was the chief defendant at all three Moscow 
show trials, noted how Stalin was taken aback by the 
hostile reaction of the world's media to the trial; 
forcing him 'to come out into the open' in defence of the 
trial. 14 
At the fortnight-long Central Committee of the CPSU in 
March 1937, Stalin defended the Radek-Piatakov trial and 
called for the struggle against 'Trotskyism' to be 
stepped up. 15 The Comintern responded by convening an 
emergency ECCI plenum for 21 April 1937 in Paris. 
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Representatives of seventeen communist parties 
participated in the secret sessions of this meeting. It 
issued only a brief statement declaring that its 
deliberations were devoted to the struggle against 
`Trotskyism', and that its decisions would not be 
published. 16 Trotsky later recalled the significance of 
this meeting: 
As is evident from the information at our disposal, 
and from all the ensuing events, this mysterious 
plenum was in reality a conference of the most 
important international agents of the GPU for the 
purpose of preparing a campaign of framed 
accusations, denunciations, kidnappings and 
assassinations against the adversaries of Stalinism 
in the labour movement the world over. 17 
This assessment of the Comintern's secret plenum is 
substantiated by the violent campaign waged by the 
Comintern in Spain against the POUM. All over Europe, the 
NKVD, with Comintern backing, engaged in a series of 
assassinations and kidnappings of prominent critics of 
the Terror. One of the most notorious examples being the 
murder of Ignace Reiss in Switzerland during September 
1937. Reiss was an NKVD agent who had broken with Stalin 
in disgust at the Terror and had pledged to join Trotsky 
in exposing the Moscow trials. 18 
Following the spectacle of communists attacking 
socialists and anarchists in Barcelona during May 1937, 
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which had a divisive effect on the international labour 
movement, came the execution of the Red Army general 
staff in June. 19 The NKVD fabricated evidence of a, 
`Fascist organisation within the Red Army', in order to 
make these executions more palatable to Soviet and 
Western public opinion. The execution of Marshal 
Tukhachevsky and thousands of other officers greatly 
weakened the fighting capacity of the Red Army, and 
undermined the efforts of the popular front movement in 
Europe to present the Soviet Union as a potential partner 
against fascist Germany. 
Throughout 1936 and 1937 the Terror in the Soviet 
Union revealed Soviet state power as an arbitrary 
despotism to large sections of opinion within the 
international Labour movement. The energetic campaign of 
the Comintern and its sections in defence of the Terror 
in the Soviet Union and their active collusion in the 
repression of the POUM in Spain were to be instrumental 
in undermining the popular front movements in Europe and 
support for the various communist parties. Vadim Rogovin 
has commented, `Such policies were driving the working 
class of the capitalist countries away from the official 
communist parties'. 20 Haslam in his study of Soviet and 
Comintern policy in the 1930s tells us that: 
Across the board, association with Stalin's rule of 
terror made the position of all European Communist 
Parties that much more difficult; it weakened the 
case for the popular front, since it exacerbated 
} 
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suspicions on the left and in the centre, that, 
should the communists attain power, a blood-bath 
might well engulf them. The terror gave those who 
opposed closer association with the communists (as in 
the British Labour Party) on other grounds a 
plausible argument against those pressing for unity 
with Comintern sections. 21 
It would appear that during 1936-37 the CPSU and in turn 
Comintern became preoccupied by the campaign against 
`Trotskyism' to the detriment of the anti-fascist 
struggle throughout Europe. In Britain too, the popular 
front campaigns of the Communist Party were to suffer 
from its association with the Soviet Union. The following 
sections will show that the CPGB's defence of the Terror 
not only undermined support for the Unity Campaign but 
also came to play a part in defining the Party's 
objectives in relation to this campaign. The Communist 
Party sought to use the Unity Campaign as a means for 
gaining affiliation to the Labour Party, thus bringing it 
a step closer to the goal of a popular front movement in 
Britain. 
The CPGB and the Unity campaign 
In the year following Labour's Edinburgh conference in 
October 1936, the Communist Party's campaign for a 
working class united front, as part of its wider popular 
front strategy, took a new form with its participation in 
the Unity Campaign. In looking at the Unity Campaign 
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afresh it is necessary to re-examine the motives and 
objectives of the Communist Party with regard to this 
movement. Previous accounts of the Unity Campaign have 
not delved very deeply into the reasons why the Communist 
Party agreed to participate in the Unity Campaign; nor 
have they fully answered the question of what the 
Communist Party hoped to gain out of participation in the 
Unity Campaign. 22 The answers to such questions will help 
Provide a greater understanding of the course of the 
campaign and what brought about its demise. 
Did the Communist Party enter the Unity Campaign out 
of a feeling of political isolation? Alternatively, did 
it see the Unity Campaign as a vehicle for its popular 
front designs? Or was there a more sinister motive at 
work in its decision to participate in the Unity 
Campaign? Was there a conflict of interest between the 
Communist Party's publicly stated objectives with regard 
to the campaign and its own privately held agenda? 
Close examination of the Central Committee and 
Political Bureau minutes and other material recently 
released from the Comintern archive in Moscow reveals 
that Dutt and Pollitt entered the unity negotiations 
despite serious misgivings about the whole enterprise, 
suggesting that a sense of political isolation played a 
Part in its participation in the Unity Campaign. What 
also emerges is a fundamental contradiction between the 
Publicly stated objectives of the Communist Party and the 
hidden agenda it held with regard to the Unity Campaign. 
The Communist Party's public declarations committed it to 
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a working-class united front to fight fascism, yet 
privately, the leadership saw the Unity Campaign as a 
means of advancing towards a popular front in Britain 
through gaining affiliation to the Labour Party. It also 
regarded the unity agreement as a means of stifling left 
criticism of the Soviet Union. The archives also reveal 
the role of the Comintern in framing CPGB policy towards 
the Unity Campaign and the Labour movement. 
Opponents of the Unity Campaign at the time such as 
Reg Groves, who was chair of the London Socialist League, 
believed that the Communist Party had a dual purpose in 
entering the Unity Campaign. Firstly, the aim was to use 
the unity agreement, subscribed to by all three parties 
in the campaign, as a means of stifling left criticism of 
the Terror in the Soviet Union from the ILP and the 
Socialist League. Groves also believed that the CPGB 
wanted the Socialist League to participate in the 
campaign in the hope of drawing it into a clash with 
Transport House leading to the League's dissolution, and 
the drawing of its members into the campaign for the 
popular front in the Labour Party at large. At the same 
time a left rival would be eliminated in whose ranks 
there was growing opposition to popular frontism and 
increasing unease at the Terror in the Soviet Union. 23 
This study of the Unity Campaign will provide evidence to 
substantiate the first charge levelled by Reg Groves. As 
for the second charge, while there is no direct proof to 
substantiate this, circumstantial evidence leaves a 
lingering suspicion on this front. 
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Unfortunately for the Communist Party its 
participation in the Unity Campaign coincided with the 
Terror in the Soviet Union whose public face were the 
Moscow show trials. The Communist Party was to be faced 
with a conflict of interest between its obligations to 
defend the Stalinist government in the Soviet Union and 
its campaign for a united and popular front in this 
country. The course of the Unity Campaign reveals that 
the Communist Party gave defence of Stalin's Terror 
priority over its publicly stated objective of workers 
unity to fight fascism. This judgement may seem a little 
harsh yet Harry Pollitt, the General Secretary, while 
privately conceding the negative impact of the Moscow 
trials, continued to make the struggle against 
`Trotskyism' a major concern of the Communist Party 
throughout the Unity Campaign. 24 This attitude contrasts 
with that of the ILP which despite its misgivings over 
the Moscow trials refrained from publicly criticising 
them during the first six months of 1937, in keeping with 
a secret clause in the unity agreement not to criticise 
the Soviet Union. This illustrates how the ILP, unlike 
the CPGB, was prepared to put the cause of workers unity 
above narrow party concerns. 
From the time of the first Moscow show trial in August 
1936 through to 1939 the struggle against `Trotskyism' 
became a major obsession of the Communist Party 
reflecting its devotion to the defence of the Stalinist 
dictatorship in the Soviet Union. The CPGB's ardent 
defence of the Terror in the Soviet Union and Spain, and 
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the vitriolic abuse which it levelled at its Labour 
movement critics were to be instrumental in undermining 
the Unity Campaign and its attempt at winning over the 
Labour Party to its popular front campaign. The Labour 
Party and TUC leadership were to use the Communist 
Party's defence of the Terror and their espousal of 
popular frontism to attack and undermine support for the 
Unity Campaign. 25 
The conflicting motives of the Communist Party in its 
decision to enter the unity negotiations will be explored 
next. The divisions within the leadership over 
participation in the Unity Campaign, which have gone 
unnoticed by most historians, will also be highlighted. 
The debate within the Political Bureau and Central 
Committee also reveals how the CPGB leadership sought to 
use the Unity Campaign to further the Communist Party's 
campaign for affiliation to the Labour Party. 
Towards the Unity Campaign 
The defeat of the united front and its affiliation bid at 
the Labour Party conference in October 1936 posed an 
acute dilemma for the Communist Party. It had waged its 
strongest campaign to date in favour of affiliation to 
Labour, as shown by the 1,500 organizations passing 
resolutions of support and the 592,000 votes for this at 
the Edinburgh conference-26 The CPGB's response to defeat 
at Edinburgh was typically defiant, with it pledging to 
carry on the campaign for affiliation to Labour. 27 Yet 
privately, the defeat suffered at Edinburgh provoked a 
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considerable degree of soul searching within the 
leadership of the Communist Party. 
At the Central Committee held on the eve of the CPGB's 
national conference at Sheffield on 10 October 1936, 
there was a heated debate over the way forward with 
conflicting strategies being put forward. Examination of 
this debate reveals that the majority of the leadership, 
including Pollitt and Dutt, were initially opposed to any 
kind of Unity Campaign with the Socialist League. Yet by 
the end of the discussion leading figures in the 
leadership, such as Pollitt, had come round to the view 
that the Communist Party needed to significantly modify 
its strategy in favour of some kind of Unity Campaign 
with the Socialist League. The discussion also reveals 
the popular front designs which lay behind the Communist 
Party's campaign for affiliation to Labour. 28 
At the Central Committee on 10 October 1936 Dutt 
delivered the main report on the tasks facing the party 
after Labour's recent conference. He declared that the 
Edinburgh decisions left the Labour movement, `facing the 
gravest crisis in its history', and pointed out the need 
for a `redoubling of the unity campaign'. In view of the 
rising international tensions which threatened war, Dutt 
stressed that they did not have time to wait for the 
possibility of a Labour Government at the next general 
election. What was needed was a multi-class popular front 
movement strong enough to change British foreign policy, 
from its `pro-fascist' orientation to one of support for 
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collective security in league with the Soviet Union and 
France. 29 
According to Dutt the problem facing the Communist 
Party was how to bring about this ambitious objective of 
a multi-class popular front to force changes in British 
foreign policy. He observed that this would have to 
proceed in several stages. Firstly, the Labour Party 
would have to be won to the policy of a united front 
which would then serve as the inner core of a popular 
front coalition of anti-government forces. Dutt stated 
that the campaign for a working-class united front was 
still the main priority for the CPGB yet he acknowledged 
that there was: 
At the present time the need for the People's Front, 
the need for concentrating the forces of the 
overwhelming majority of the population against the 
National Government.... But nationally [at this stage] 
the question of the People's Front is still a 
question of propaganda because nationally our main 
fight is still that of unity of the Labour 
movement. 30 
This raised the question of how exactly was the working 
class united front to be brought about? Dutt drew 
encouragement from the twenty five per cent vote for 
unity at the Labour Party conference; believing this to 
be a solid foundation upon which to build the fight for 
unity within the Labour movement. The way forward was to 
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build the united front from below in the localities, over 
opposition to rearmament, support for the Soviet Union's 
peace policy and aid for Spain. Eventually the pressure 
from below would compel the Labour leaders to end their 
opposition to the united front, as happened in France, 
and accept communist affiliation as the first step 
towards a popular front movement in Britain. 31 
Pollitt seconded Dutt's lead, adding that to achieve 
this the Communist Party would have to modify its tactics 
and that the new strategy would be finally confirmed by a 
Comintern commission at the year's end, 'But the biggest 
task of the Party now is this work we have of literally 
to send thousands of our members inside the Labour 
Party'. 32 
It was at this meeting that the idea of a Unity 
Campaign with the Socialist League was first raised. The 
Dutt-Pollitt line of merely continuing with the same 
failed strategy of mass pressure from below forcing 
communist affiliation upon Labour, was challenged by 
Gallacher and Rust; which may have reflected pressure 
from the Socialist League upon a section of the Communist 
Party leadership. It was the Socialist League which took 
the first formal step in initiating the unity discussions 
on 14 October 1936, yet the Communist Party leadership 
had already begun discussing the subject before this 
date. 
It would appear that Gallacher first raised the idea 
of a Unity Campaign with the Socialist League, in the 
King Street headquarters with Pollitt and Dutt on 
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Wednesday 7 October 1936.33 Then at the Political Bureau 
on Friday 9 October, Gallacher for the first time 
formally raised the issue within the CPGB leadership, 
only to be rejected out of hand. At the Central Committee 
on Saturday 10 October he complained that the questions 
he had raised the day before at the Political Bureau had 
not been treated seriously by the leadership. 34 
Gallacher declared that all the main political 
questions facing the Communist Party such as rearmament 
and the government's `pro-fascist' foreign policy, 
depended for their successful resolution upon it becoming 
an integral part of the Labour Party. Only once it was 
affiliated to Labour could the Communist Party bring 
about a change in Labour's policy that would lead to an 
effective challenge to the direction of the government's 
foreign policy. Gallacher argued that to ensure the 
success of the fight against fascism the Communist Party 
should make whatever concessions and changes were 
necessary to achieve a Unity Campaign with the Socialist 
League; which would help facilitate its affiliation to 
Labour. 35 
Gallacher's initiative was fully supported only by 
Rust and Abe Moffat at this meeting. Most of the 
participants in the discussion denounced Gallacher's 
ideas as representing an attempt to dissolve the 
Communist Party into social democracy, when it should be 
striving to gain the leadership of the working class. 
Springhall's comment typified the response of those 
opposed to Gallacher's proposal: 
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But I regard the proposal which comrade Gallacher has 
made here is a proposition which is tantamount to a 
disbandonment of the Communist Party in the interests 
of trying to make some form of hybrid revolutionary 
Socialist Party which would be another left 
independent Labour Party. 36 
In summing up this controversial debate Pollitt revealed 
that he had moved considerable ground from his earlier 
Position of outright hostility to Gallacher's proposal of 
unity talks with the Socialist League: 
One thing is perfectly clear and that is that there 
has to be a new approach made to the whole question 
of how to get working class unity in the shortest 
possible time.... We do not want to put off 
Gallacher's proposals because the Socialist League 
has only 2,000 members.... it is not the size of the 
organisation that counts, it is the fact that we can 
make any contribution towards bringing along side 
with us for our line another working class 
organisation in this country. 37 
When they received an invitation from the Socialist 
League for a unity discussion on 14 October 1937, Dutt 
and Pollitt without any clear mandate from the Central 
Committee went ahead and met Cripps, Bevan and Mellor. 
They only reported to the Political Bureau on the 
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negotiations, in mid-November, once considerable progress 
had been made towards a unity agreement. 38 While the 
Political Bureau was kept in the dark about the 
negotiations Pollitt kept the ECCI informed, via Arnot 
who was in Moscow covering the show trials, with regular 
updates. 39 In a letter to Arnot dated 6 November, Pollitt 
was eager to get Comintern approval for the proposed 
Unity Campaign, no doubt to help quell any opposition to 
the campaign from those sections of the Communist Party 
leadership which had been so hostile to Gallacher when he 
had first raised the idea in early October. 40 
In view of the hostility expressed by most of the 
Central Committee to a Unity Campaign with the Socialist 
League, the Communist Party's national conference in 
Sheffield on 11 October 1936 did not discuss Gallacher's 
proposal. It merely restated the position of the Central 
Committee resolution of the previous day that the 
Communist Party would continue to strive for affiliation 
to Labour. The real importance of the CPGB's national 
conference lay in the secret report, given by Shields, on 
the first Moscow show trial and the struggle against 
'Trotskyism'. 41 
The struggle against Trotskyism 
In his report to the national conference on 11 October 
1936, Shields put the struggle against 'Trotskyism' (in 
other words the critics of the Moscow show trials) as a 
major campaigning priority of the Communist Party. The 
Daily Worker's coverage of the conference made no mention 
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of Shields' secret report, whose purpose according to 
Pollitt was, `to prepare this Party for further events in 
the Soviet Union'. 42 This suggests that the Communist 
Party leadership had already been informed about 
preparations for the second Moscow show trial and the 
consequent need to prepare the membership for a campaign 
in defence of the trial. Let us not forget the Communist 
Party was taken by surprise by the first Moscow trial in 
August 1936 and was criticised for its slow reaction in 
coming to the defence of the trial. 43 The unfavourable 
press reaction to the first show trial led Moscow to 
inform the national sections of the Comintern of 
Preparations for the second trial to help prepare the 
ground for this event. This contradicts those apologists 
for the CPGB leadership, such as Noreen Branson, who 
makes the claim that Pollitt and company had no idea of 
what was going on in the Soviet Union. 44 
Shields noted the failure of the Communist Party to, 
`grasp the tremendous importance' of the first Moscow 
trial. This sprang from its failure to realise: 
That this trial was a mighty blow struck by the 
Soviet Union against the whole fascist movement, 
struck not only on behalf of the toilers of the 
Soviet Union, but on behalf of the international 
working class movement. 45 
Shields attacked as 'Trotskyist elements' those on the 
left in the Labour movement, such as Brockway of the ILP, 
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who had criticised the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. Right wing 
critics of the trial such as Citrine of the TUC, were 
classified as aiding the anti-Soviet campaigns of the 
fascist states. He added rather ominously : 
These people are the agents of the enemy inside the 
ranks of the working class movement.... We have got to 
raise the whole question of the importance ... Of 
clearing out from the whole working class movement 
those who are hostile to the working class 
movement. 46 
Reading between the lines this represented a call on the 
Communist Party to put the defence of the Terror in the 
Soviet Union above the interests of working-class unity 
in Britain. It made a mockery of the Communist Party's 
appeal to Labour movement activists to rebel against the 
'reactionary' Labour leaders policy of opposition to the 
united front. On both a national and local scale the 
Communist Party was to give no quarter in its attacks 
upon those in the Labour movement who criticised or cast 
doubt upon the trials. 
Shields concluded his report by informing the 
conference delegates of the preparations underway in the 
Soviet Union for a second trial of 'counter-revolutionary 
Trotskyists'. He called on the Communist Party to step up 
its defence of the Soviet Union and its struggle against 
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`Trotskyism' in Britain; a blanket term applied to those 
in the Labour movement who criticized or cast doubt upon 
the trials. 47 
Thus from the beginning of the next stage in its 
campaign for working-class unity as a prelude to a full 
blown popular front, the Communist Party was to place 
defence of the Stalinist Terror, which involved the 
imprisonment and execution of millions of Soviet 
citizens, above its search for new political allies. In 
its defence of the Terror and its attacks on those in the 
Labour movement who opposed the show trials, the 
Communist Party was to fatally undermine the forthcoming 
Unity Campaign; and lose many allies who in 1936 had 
supported its campaign for affiliation to the Labour 
Party. 48 
The turbulent unity negotiations between the Communist 
Party, ILP and Socialist League will be examined next. 
This section will also highlight the conflicting motives 
of the participants and notes the contradiction between 
the publicly stated objectives of the Communist Party and 
the hidden agenda it held with regard to the Unity 
Campaign. 
The unity negotiations 
On 14 October 1936, the Communist Party received an 
invitation from the Socialist League to attend a meeting 
with its representatives. At this meeting it was 
explained to Dutt and Pollitt that the League wanted to 
discuss the prospect of a Unity Campaign incorporating 
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itself along with the Communist Party and the ILP. The 
campaign's aim would be to offer a militant alternative 
to the `disastrous' policies of the Labour leadership; 
which failed to challenge those of the government. The 
long-term objectives of the Unity Campaign were to secure 
a united front of all working class parties, which would 
fight for the defeat of the National Government and its 
replacement by a Labour Government, committed to the 
fight for the peace. 49 
Dutt and Pollitt did not immediately agree to meet the 
Socialist League. Their initial reservations centred on 
two things, `the existence in both organisations of the 
Trotskyists, and secondly, because so many of the leading 
comrades were renegade members of the Communist Party'. 50 
They insisted on two conditions being met before entering 
any negotiations, which revealed a hidden agenda. 
Firstly, the Communist Party would not join any Unity 
Campaign that would lead to any splits or desertions from 
the Labour Party; revealing the centrality of Labour to 
the Communist Party's popular front scheme. They did not 
want any Unity Campaign to jeopardise the Communist 
Party's chances of affiliation to Labour. Secondly, there 
had to be, `complete agreement on foreign policy and no 
attacks upon the policy of the Soviet Union'. 51 
This precondition was designed to prevent any 
criticism from the Socialist League and ILP of the 
upcoming show trial of the Radek-Piatakov group. Stalin 
had been surprised by the hostile reaction of the Labour 
and Liberal press to the first Moscow show trial; hence 
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the Comintern was ordered to take preventative measures 
for the second trial. Pollitt underlined this point 
further when he declared, `that under no circumstances 
would we be identified with Brockway and the ILP', unless 
it agreed to change its `hostile' policy towards the 
Soviet Union and the Labour Party. 52 
With certain reservations, Pollitt consented to send a 
delegation to the unity talks. His aspirations centred on 
winning over the Labour Party to accept communist 
affiliation; and for Labour's participation in a popular 
front movement to change the direction of British foreign 
policy. Pollitt and Dutt believed that if the Unity 
Campaign was confined merely to the Socialist League, ILP 
and the Communist Party, there lay the danger of the 
Labour leadership portraying the campaign as a separatist 
movement designed to split the Labour Party. 53 
During the negotiations Dutt made the proposal, which 
was rejected, that the Unity Campaign should not be 
confined merely to the ILP, Socialist League and 
Communist Party. He argued that it should be based on 
representatives of all sections of the Labour movement in 
sympathy with the objectives of the campaign: 
thus preventing from the outset any impression of 
narrow separatist basis of only two or three 
organisations coming together, to the exclusion of 
the wide body of those supporting unity throughout 
the Trade Union and Labour Movement. 54 
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Once the unity negotiations began Dutt and Pollitt sensed 
a hidden agenda held by the ILP and a section of the 
Socialist League leadership around Bevan and Mellor, 
which ran contrary to the Communist Party's hopes of 
affiliation to Labour, for they: 
gave us the impression that they would not be opposed 
to creating a new Party as a result of an 
amalgamation of the ILP, the Socialist League and the 
Communist Party. We made it clear right at the start 
that the united front that we stood for was within 
the framework of the Labour movement. 55 
Why did Dutt and Pollitt consent to participation in the 
unity negotiations when they were fully aware 
that 
participation in the Unity Campaign held certain dangers 
for the Communist Party's policy of winning affiliation 
to Labour? This question has not been fully answered in 
previous accounts of the Unity Campaign; and its 
investigation should help indicate what they hoped to 
achieve from participation in the campaign. 56 
From Pollitt's reports to the ECCI during the unity 
negotiations, and his report to the Comintern commission 
held on the Unity Campaign in early January 1937, it is 
possible to identify three motives for participating in 
the Unity Campaign. Firstly, to prevent a left split away 
from the Labour Party and the formation of a new left 
party comprising the ILP and elements of the Socialist 
League. This would be a new rival to the communist Party, 
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made up of all those elements on the left most critical 
of the Soviet Union and popular frontism, and would 
undoubtedly weaken its campaign for affiliation to Labour 
and at bringing Labour into a popular front. 57 Secondly, 
to stifle left criticism of the Soviet Union at the 
height of the Terror, through the insertion of a gagging 
clause in the unity agreement. 58 Finally, to use the 
Unity Campaign to invigorate the Labour movement to such 
a degree that pressure from below would force radical 
changes in Labour policy such as accepting communist 
affiliation and participation in a popular front. 59 
Of these motives the latter two figured uppermost in 
Pollitt's strategic thinking. At the Political Bureau on 
13 November 1936, Pollitt claimed his reservations over 
participation in the unity negotiations had been overcome 
on the grounds that: 
It was the first time we would have an opportunity 
for conducting a campaign for unity within the labour 
movement with an organisation already affiliated to 
the Labour Party and that also in the person of 
Cripps we had someone who was looked up to as being 
the representative of the local Labour Party's in 
their revolt against Transport House. 60 
As Fenner Brockway has noted, Pollitt's main motive in 
the Unity Campaign was to use Cripps to further the 
Communist Party's popular front campaign: 
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I was fully aware, of course of Pollitt's motives in 
the struggle going on underneath the superficial 
unity of the [unity] committee, the struggle as to 
whether the Popular Front view of the C. P. 
or the Workers' Front view of the ILP should win the 
allegiance of the Left in the Labour Movement. 61 
Pollitt believed that the united front was lost at 
Labour's Edinburgh conference because of divisions 
between the left in the trade union delegations. He put 
the loss of the votes of the NUR and AEU down to this. 
Once the three parties started campaigning together: 
this will have a tremendous effect on all the trade 
union conferences that take place and give us 
absolutely the possibility of winning the trade union 
vote that can change the situation of the Labour 
Party at the TUC. 62 
Equally important for Pollitt was the objective of using 
the Unity Campaign to stifle left criticism of the Terror 
in the Soviet Union. At the ECCI in early January 1937 
Pollitt boasted: 
This [unity] agreement will also prevent the ILP's 
organ, the "New Leader" from being an anti-Soviet 
organ that it has been up to the present time. This 
is a very important thing, because the "New Leader" 
has still a big political influence in Scotland, and 
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therefore anything that we can do to stop it in its 
anti-Soviet campaign is exceptionally important. 63 
The unity negotiations revealed a great deal of mutual 
mistrust and a lack of common purpose, which were to 
undermine the campaign from within. What drove the 
negotiations on was the alarm shared by all three parties 
at the slide towards war in Europe. All three parties 
held the National Government partly responsible for this 
situation, with its policy which was alleged to have 
appeased fascist aggression. 64 
Not surprisingly it was over questions of foreign 
policy and attitudes to the Soviet Union that the unity 
negotiations ran into serious difficulties. There were 
bitter arguments between the Communist Party and ILP over 
the New Leader criticism of the Soviet Union and the 
popular front policy of the Comintern in Spain. 65 
The Communist Party's proposal for an immediate non- 
aggression pact between Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union, open to all capitalist states, and based on the 
League of Nations Covenant, was rejected by the ILP and 
Socialist League. The latter two believed Britain could 
only join such a non-aggression pact once the National 
Government was out of office. They also rejected the 
pursuit of peace through collective security measures 
taken by the League of Nations. The ILP went further 
demanding that a socialist government in Britain could 
only make non-aggression pacts with other working-class 
governments, excluding the Soviet Union. 
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After prolonged wrangling a compromise was reached 
where it was agreed that the defence of the Soviet Union 
and its fight for peace would be included in the Unity 
Manifesto. 66 Alongside this went the demand for a pact 
between Britain under a new government, France and the 
Soviet Union; together with `all other countries in which 
the working class has political freedom'. 67 
Together with this, the three parties disagreed over 
what form the campaign should take in order to bring 
about the required change in British foreign policy. The 
Communist Party's demand for a popular front on the 
French and Spanish models, to be included in the Unity 
Manifesto, was vetoed by the ILP and the Socialist 
League. The Unity Manifesto called only for a working- 
class united front to defeat the government. The ILP and 
Communist Party representatives on the National Unity 
Campaign Committee clashed repeatedly over the communists 
encouraging non-socialists to join the Unity Campaign. 
While the Communist Party denied that they were trying to 
move the National Unity Campaign Committee towards an 
understanding with the Liberals, prominent Liberals such 
as Sir Richard Acland were becoming associated with the 
Unity Campaign. 68 
The CPGB's demand for affiliation to Labour was also 
vetoed from inclusion in the manifesto by the ILP and 
Socialist League. Yet a clause in the agreement made 
provision for the Communist Party to publicise in its 
press the demand for a popular front and its affiliation 
to Labour. 69 
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On the surface, the disagreements between the three 
parties appear somewhat academic, yet they revealed 
fundamental differences in world outlook. The policy 
divisions, particularly over attitudes to the Soviet 
Union, which were papered over for the sake of an 
abstract artificial unity, were to re-emerge once the 
Unity Campaign was underway and played a major role in 
undermining support for it. 70 
The most significant concession which the Communist 
Party won during the unity negotiations, was the clause 
in the agreement in which, `all parties agree to abstain 
from any general criticism of the policy of the Soviet 
Union or its government'. 71 This represented a 
considerable triumph for the Communist Party, for it 
involved the ILP and Socialist League being drawn into a 
conspiracy of silence over the purges conducted by Stalin 
in the Soviet Union and behind the front lines of the 
Republican forces in Spain. 
Close examination of the New Leader from January to 
May of 1937 reveals that the ILP was rather muted in its 
comments on the show trials in the Soviet Union. It was 
not until after the POUM had been repressed by the 
Republican Government in Spain, in conjunction with the 
NKVD, that the ILP leadership began to speak out strongly 
against the Terror in the Soviet Union. It linked this up 
with the purge against the POUM in Spain as part of the 
same process of Stalin's government acting to repress all 
opposition to its reactionary policies. 72 By this time 
the likes of Brockway no longer felt constrained by the 
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terms of the Unity Campaign, which was effectively over 
by early June. 
The Communist Party's objective of using the unity 
agreement to stifle left criticism of Stalinism at the 
height of the Terror in the Soviet Union was recognised 
at the time by Reg Groves, chair of the London Socialist 
League: 
The agreement denies the right of free criticism, 
either of the parties concerned, or of their 
personnel or of the actions and policies of the 
Soviet Government. This clause does not stop the 
Daily Worker from attacking individuals in the 
Socialist League: [such as Groves who opposed the 
show trials and the League's participation in the 
Unity Campaign] neither does it prevent the CPGB from 
attempting to destroy their critics and opponents in 
the working-class movement by slander and by 
malicious falsehood, but it does hamper those so 
attacked from replying freely, for to do so is to be 
accused of seeking to disrupt the unity agreement. 73 
By 3 December 1936, a final draft of the Unity Manifesto 
had been agreed to. All that remained for the leadership 
of the three parties to the agreement was to get their 
own members to agree to what had been negotiated behind 
their backs. The undemocratic nature of the unity 
negotiations, during which the rank and file of all three 
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parties had not been consulted, was to have grave 
consequences for the Socialist League. 74 
Before moving on to look at the course of the Unity 
Campaign it is worthwhile pausing to evaluate the 
potential appeal of the Unity Campaign to activists in 
the Labour movement. It sought to win the Labour Party to 
a programme far to the right of that which it had already 
accepted, in the form of For Socialism And Peace. The 
Unity Campaign involved only working-class parties yet it 
raised demands which called for minor reforms to the 
capitalist system; when that system was in the greatest 
crisis of its history. 
The Unity Manifesto called for a limited number of 
reform measures such as higher pensions, abolition of the 
means test, along with an uncritical approach to the 
Soviet Union and its fight for peace. In practice this 
meant accepting Stalin's Terror and his diplomatic 
manoeuvres aimed at getting allies in the West. 
During the unity negotiations the Socialist League 
had put forward a series of more radical measures such as 
a minimum wage, nationalisation of the land and the 
banks, which the Communist Party had opposed. 75 
Presumably such radical demands might frighten off 
potential middle-class allies to the Communist Party's 
popular front campaign. 
Before the Communist Party could go ahead with its 
participation in the Unity Campaign it needed the 
Comintern's stamp of approval. The role of the Comintern 
in the Unity Campaign has not been commented upon before 
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by historians; it is only the recent release of archive 
material which has brought this to light. The discussion 
at the ECCI commission reveals differences in emphasis 
with regard to the objectives of the Unity Campaign 
between Pollitt and the Comintern leadership. 
Role of the Comintern in the Unity Campaign 
During the unity negotiations while the Political Bureau 
was kept in the dark, Pollitt sent regular reports to the 
ECCI in Moscow. At a commission of the ECCI on 4 January 
1937, Pollitt gave a detailed account of the unity 
negotiations. 
In its questions to Pollitt the ECCI commission 
revealed four major concerns, with regard to the CPGB's 
participation in the Unity Campaign. Moskvin asked 
whether the struggle against Trotskyism would be a major 
concern of the Unity Campaign. Lozovsky expressed concern 
at the growing hostility towards the Soviet Union amongst 
both the leaders and activists of the British Labour 
movement. Rosa questioned the value of association with 
the Socialist League. Dimitrov feared that participation 
in the Unity Campaign might lead to the Communist Party's 
isolation within the Labour movement, especially if the 
Socialist League was expelled from the Labour Party. 76 
In replying to these concerns Pollitt stated that the 
leaders of the ILP and Socialist League would not agree 
to make the struggle against `Trotskyism' an objective of 
the Unity Campaign. Yet they had agreed to a clause in 
the unity agreement which forbade any criticism of the 
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Soviet Union. Pollitt declared that anti-Soviet sentiment 
in the Labour movement was being countered by a vigorous 
propaganda campaign. The value of associating with the 
Socialist League lay in that it, `is looked upon by the 
local Labour Parties as the institution of Socialism 
within the Labour Party.... Cripps has the support of very 
big DLP's'. Pollitt's reply to Dimitrov's question 
revealed little concern at the prospect of the Socialist 
League being expelled from the Labour Party, indeed he 
fully expected it to occur. By involving as wider a layer 
of activists as possible in the campaign, Pollitt 
somewhat naively believed it would prevent the attacks of 
the Labour leaders isolating the Communist Party. 77 
At this ECCI meeting Pollitt admitted that the press 
had got hold of a copy of the Unity Manifesto through 
Special Branch interception of Socialist League mail. 
Apparently Special Branch had given this to the Times and 
Daily Herald who had published it. This admission is 
significant for later on in January 1937, in an attempt 
to politically discredit Trotskyist critics of the second 
Moscow show trial, the Daily Worker made great play of 
the unfounded charge that Reg Groves (a Trotskyist who 
was chair of the London Socialist League) had leaked a 
copy of the Unity Manifesto to the Daily Herald; and was 
collaborating with right-wing Labour leaders to sabotage 
working class unity in the face of the fascist threat. 78 
The ECCI resolution on the Unity Campaign called on 
the CPGB to engage in mass infiltration of the Labour 
Party to further its united and popular front campaigns. 
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It also instructed the CPGB to significantly increase its 
propaganda campaign in support of the Soviet Union 
against 'Trotskyism'i. e. Labour movement critics of the 
Terror. The ECCI even called for a purge of Daily Worker 
staff who may have had doubts about the trials. 79 
At the same time, the ECCI instructed the Communist 
Party to step up its propaganda calling for a popular 
front in Britain. It was directed to give its fullest 
support to the mass movement developing around the Left 
Book Club as providing, 'the wider basis for unity within 
the labour movement, and towards the formation of an 
effective basis for the popular front in Britain'. 80 
Here then was a two-fold strategy for the development 
of the popular front in Britain. The main thrust of which 
was to use the Unity Campaign as a mechanism through 
which to win the Labour Party to a united front, as a 
precursor to Labour joining up with anti-appeasement 
Liberals and Tories in a popular front movement to change 
the direction of British foreign policy. Alongside the 
Unity Campaign the Communist Party was to engage in mass 
propaganda for the popular front through its intervention 
in the Left Book Club. 
The Communist Party's call for a multi-class alliance 
against the National Government represented an attempt to 
compromise the political independence of the British 
Labour movement. This displayed a certain defeatism and 
lack of confidence in the organised working class to 
institute effective change; a charge which the Communist 
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Party often levelled at its opponents in the Labour 
movement. 
The CPGB went into 1937 with great confidence 
believing that the Unity Campaign would herald a decisive 
breakthrough for its popular front strategy. However 
events in the Soviet Union in the shape of the second 
Moscow show trial were to undermine support for the Unity 
Campaign and played a part in it almost not being 
launched. 
The Unity Campaign in trouble - January 1937 
The Unity Campaign was due to be launched in Manchester 
at the Free Trade Hall on 24 January 1937. By early 
January, however, it was clear that the Unity Campaign 
was running into increasing problems which threatened to 
derail it before it was officially launched. The Labour 
Party was becoming more than a little disturbed at the 
prospect of one of its affiliated organisations, the 
Socialist League, becoming involved in a major political 
campaign with the Communist Party. 
On 8 January 1937, Labour's National Executive warned 
the Socialist League that it would be disaffiliated if it 
participated in the Unity Campaign. This was followed by 
a circular on 12 January which called on the Labour 
movement not to participate in the Unity Campaign, and 
for loyalty to conference decisions that had rejected a 
united front with the Communist Party. It also made the 
charge, to be repeated on numerous occasions over the 
next few months, that the Unity Campaign could seriously 
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weaken Labour's electoral power for it presaged an 
alliance between the Labour Party and the Liberals. By 
portraying the Unity Campaign as an attempt to compromise 
Labour's political independence and its socialist 
objectives, the circular played up to discontented left 
sentiment in the party-81 
The Daily Herald on 15 January 1937 published an 
article by Reg Groves, which exposed the unconstitutional 
way the Socialist League leadership had acted in signing 
the unity agreement without the approval of its own 
National Council. This together with the NEC's appeal for 
loyalty to the decisions of Labour Party regarding the 
Communist Party, almost led to the League being forced to 
withdraw from the Unity Campaign before it had even been 
launched. At a special conference of the Socialist League 
on 16 January, the Unity Manifesto was approved by a 
narrow margin on a minority vote (56 in favour, 38 
against, with 23 abstentions). 82 
The opponents of the Unity Campaign within the 
Socialist League were concerned that the League's 
participation would lead to its expulsion from the Labour 
Party. At the time, Reg Groves warned that certain 
members of the Executive Committee had contemplated the 
dissolution of the League, in the event of a clash with 
Transport House. 83 As the Daily Herald pointed out, 
Cripps had gained narrow approval for the Unity Campaign, 
'by making the issue a rigid vote of confidence.... and by 
assuring delegates that association of the Socialist 
League with the Unity Campaign did not mean 
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disaffiliation form the Labour Party'. 84 The decision to 
participate in the Unity Campaign was supported by 
representatives of a few hundred members of the Socialist 
League at most, and led to a large section of the 
membership seceding; valuing their Labour Party card more 
than membership of an organisation rapidly heading for 
the political wilderness. 85 
When the Daily Herald announced the existence of the 
secret unity agreement it caused an uproar in the Labour 
movement. Embarrassed by this premature revelation of the 
Unity Manifesto, not due to be publicly unveiled until 18 
January, the Daily Worker responded with an unfounded 
attack on Reg Groves. It accused him of trying to 
undermine the Unity Campaign by leaking the unity 
agreement to Transport House. 86 In a series of articles, 
the Daily Worker described all opponents of the Unity 
Campaign within the Socialist League as Trotskyists; in 
reality Trotskyists only formed a small if influential 
minority in the League. 87 The Daily Worker accused them 
of collaborating with the Labour Party right-wing to 
undermine attempts at working class unity when fascism 
was on the offensive internationally. 88 
The Daily Worker came out with these unfounded charges 
in advance of the second Moscow show trial, due to start 
on 23 January, in an attempt to undermine the credibility 
of those left voices in the Socialist League who were to 
express opposition to the trial. The Trotskyists in the 
Socialist League in conjunction with other lefts such as 
H. N. Brailsford and J. F. Horrabin, were to form a Defend 
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Leon Trotsky committee at this time. 89 The Daily Worker's 
attacks were to be the first of many over the next 
months, suggesting that the Communist Party placed a 
higher premium on defending the Terror in the Soviet 
Union than the unity of the left in Britain. By attacking 
other lefts the Communist Party undermined the 
credibility of its declarations about the Unity Campaign 
being an attempt to unite all working class forces. 
On the eve of the launch of the Unity Campaign the 
Communist Party threatened to withdraw from its planned 
activities. At a meeting of the National Unity Committee, 
Pollitt attacked the ILP for allegedly breaching the 
unity agreement with its `criticism' of the Soviet Union. 
He declared that Communist Party speakers would not share 
platforms with Brockway for his anti-Soviet attitudes. 90 
Not content with the gagging clause in the unity 
agreement which forbade criticism of the Soviet Union, 
Pollitt wanted further measures to guarantee that no 
criticism of the second Moscow show trial came from the 
ILP or Socialist League. Pollitt's attack on the ILP may 
well have reflected his dismay at the condemnation of the 
trial from both the Labour and capitalist press. 91 The 
Unity Campaign was saved from a potential miscarriage by: 
Cripps emphatically dissenting from the attitude of 
Brockway and the New Leader and arrangements were 
made for a further meeting at which the whole 
question of Trotskyism could be put both to the ILP 
and the Socialist League. 92 
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Following this episode the Communist Party's Political 
Bureau, gave instructions for the preparation of articles 
in the Daily Worker attacking the `anti-Soviet' line of 
the New Leader and, `that attempts should be made to get 
some expression in the next issue of Tribune in 
opposition to the line of the New Leader'. 93 Such 
instructions illustrate how the Communist Party injected 
an internecine conflict into the Unity Campaign, which 
was to be seriously undermined by this internal strife. 
They are also a graphic illustration of how the Communist 
Party put the defence of the Stalinist Terror above the 
cause of workers unity in Britain. 
The second Moscow show trial of seventeen old 
Bolsheviks in late January could not have come at a worse 
time for the Communist Party, coinciding as it did with 
the launch of the Unity Campaign. The Communist Party's 
defence of the trial helped to undermine support for the 
Unity Campaign. 
The second Moscow show trial - January 1937 
In line with instructions from Moscow the Communist Party 
made preparations for a campaign in defence of the second 
Moscow show trial. On the eve of the trial N. Raylock, 
possibly a pseudonym, delivered to the leadership a 
secret report on Trotskyism in Britain. Raylock noted 
with alarm the hostile reaction of the Labour and Liberal 
press to the announcement of the forthcoming trial in 
Moscow. The report also described the formation of the 
British Committee for the Defence of Leon Trotsky, whose 
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aim was to expose the falsity of the trial proceedings in 
Moscow. It concluded: 
The Party has decided to take special measures for 
increasing the struggle against Trotskyism as one of 
the most urgent tasks of the CP and the entire 
British working class.... It is necessary for the 
Party to take steps to bring about the ... expulsion 
of the Trotskyists from the ILP and the Socialist 
League. (94) The Party will have to keep careful watch 
to see that the point of the agreement with the ILP 
and the Socialist League on the impermissibility of 
attacks against the policy of the Soviet Union is 
carried out, and in case such attacks do occur to 
consider them as an attempt to break the agreement. 95 
The recommendations of Raylock's report were taken up by 
the Political Bureau on 28 January 1937. This meeting 
gave instructions for the Daily Worker to prepare a four- 
page supplement defending the second Moscow trial, and 
for a new pamphlet attacking `Trotskyism' by Dutt and 
Pollitt. All the districts were instructed to convene 
public meetings in support of the trial once the 
seventeen old Bolsheviks had been executed. 96 
Over the next year scores of articles appeared in the 
Communist Party press defending the Terror and attacking 
those who criticised it. 97 Reports on the struggle 
against `Trotskyism' became a regular feature at meetings 
of the Communist Party leadership. 98 
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It is rather ironic that while Pollitt led the 
campaign in defence of Stalin's Terror in Britain, the 
NKVD had planned a trial at which Pollitt was to have 
been the principal defendant. 99 This may have been 
prompted by Pollitt having the temerity to speak out in 
defence of Petrovsky who was the Comintern agent in 
Britain during the 1920s and had been a close friend of 
his. 100 
It is a relatively simple matter to demonstrate the 
higher priority which the Communist Party gave to the 
defence of the second Moscow show trial than the cause 
of workers unity. In the first two weeks of the Unity 
Campaign twice as much column space in the Daily Worker 
was devoted to defending the Radek-Piatakov trial as to 
the Unity Campaign. 
Previous accounts of the CPGB's support for the Moscow 
trials do not highlight the way in which it tried to 
justify defence of Stalin's court, by portraying the 
struggle against `Trotskyism' as a vital element of the 
international anti-fascist struggle. 101 On the first day 
of the second Moscow show trial the Daily Worker, with 
the headline `TERRORISTS ON TRIAL, ' made the claim: 
This trial is of vital significance to the 
international working class. It represents a mighty 
blow against the international forces of Fascism and 
reaction, working through and in alliance with the 
degenerate counter-revolutionary elements of 
Trotskyism. 
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The article concluded: 
In Britain the workers will readily understand from 
their direct experiences, no less than from the 
experience of other countries, the necessity of 
settling accounts with Trotskyism and clearing out 
this poison from the ranks of the Labour movement. 102 
Unfortunately for the Communist Party the British Labour 
movement rejected its appeals for repressive measures 
against those socialists who criticised Stalinist Russia. 
This, however, did not prevent the Communist Party from 
resorting to a variety of repressive measures to try and 
stifle criticism of the trial. In Hyde Park a Trotskyist 
meeting on the trial was attacked by 500 communists. 103 
At the Political Bureau on 28 January 1937, Idris Cox 
boasted how in South Wales the local Communist Party was 
waging a campaign of intimidation against a NCLC lecturer 
with Trotskyist sympathies, designed to drive, `this 
fellow out'. 104 
Over the next few months the Communist Party injected 
an internecine conflict into the Unity Campaign with its 
persistent attacks on the ILP and those in the Socialist 
League who either criticised or voiced doubts about the 
Radek-Piatakov trial. 105 This assault on critics of the 
trial was widened to include anyone in the Labour 
movement who questioned the judgement of Stalin's court. 
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The Daily Worker waged a bitter polemic against the Daily 
Herald, in response to its criticism of the trial. 106 
The epithets of abuse heaped upon Labour movement 
critics of the Stalinist Terror, together with its 
defence of the executions of old Bolsheviks, combined to 
spread a wave of revulsion against the Communist Party 
throughout the Labour movement; and played a major part 
in undermining support for the Unity Campaign. 107 Pollitt 
himself, in a letter to Arnot who was in Moscow covering 
the trial for the Daily Worker, confirmed the negative 
effect of the show trial upon most British workers: 
Now after the most careful enquiries I find the two 
things on which there is the greatest difficulty in 
getting conviction, is first of all the character and 
completeness of the confessions, secondly why did 
they risk so much and how could such old timers try 
to make an alliance with Fascism. It is this last 
point that is still the hardest to get over. 108 
During its short existence the Unity Campaign was 
undermined by internecine conflict and a vigorous 
campaign of opposition from the Labour leadership. 
Besides this it had to cope with a major handicap in the 
form of its association with the Moscow show trials 
thanks to the CPGB's support for Stalin's Terror. 
The Unity-Campaign-January - May 1937 
On 24 January 1937 the Unity Campaign was launched in 
Manchester by Pollitt, Cripps and Maxton. Following this, 
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meetings with speakers from all three parties were held 
in most major towns and cities. Attempts were made to 
form local unity committees involving sections of the 
Labour movement. 
Compared to the united front campaign of 1936, around 
communist affiliation to Labour, the Unity Campaign made 
unimpressive progress. By late March a mere 18,000 pledge 
cards, supporting the Unity Manifesto, had been received 
by the Unity Campaign Committee. This peaked at 40,000 by 
late May 1937.109 Resolutions of support from labour and 
trade union branches, sent into the Daily Worker, 
numbered under 200. This is in sharp contrast to the 
large swell of support for the Communist Party's united 
front campaign in 1936. By late September 1936 the Daily 
Worker reported nearly 1,500 Labour movement bodies in 
support of communist affiliation to the Labour Party. 110 
The isolation of the Unity Campaign from the Labour 
movement is revealed by internal documents of the 
campaign. In a memorandum to the Unity Campaign Committee 
in April, Pollitt acknowledged its failure to develop a 
base of support within the trade unions. 111 Perhaps the 
best illustration of the Unity Campaign's lack of support 
from the Labour movement is its financial weakness. John 
Aplin, treasurer of the Unity Campaign Committee, in a 
letter to its members on 24 May 1937, noted the campaign 
had a cash deficit of 243 pounds. In addition to this 
95 pounds was owed to printers due to the large number of 
unsold unity pamphlets. Aplin concluded that the campaign 
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was financially bankrupt and suggested a variety of cost- 
cutting measures. 112 
This raises the question: why did the Unity Campaign 
fail to attract widespread support from the Labour 
movement? Several explanations can be offered for this. 
Attacks on the financial weakness of the Unity Campaign 
and the Socialist League and Tribune, the latter two 
being dependent on wealthy patrons to keep then afloat, 
were used to great effect by the Labour Party. 113 
In 1936 the Labour leadership had been relatively slow 
off the mark in its campaign of opposition to the 
Communist Party's affiliation campaign, allowing it to 
build up considerable momentum within the Labour 
movement. Having learnt the lesson from the late start to 
its campaign opposing CPGB affiliation in 1936, the 
Labour leadership in 1937 took strong measures against 
the Unity Campaign before it had even been formally 
launched. 
During the spring and summer of 1937 the Labour Party 
issued several circulars calling on its members not to 
support the Unity Campaign. One of the most effective 
attacks on the Unity Campaign was the circular issued in 
May entitled, The Labour Party And The So-Called Unity 
Campaign. This reiterated the charge that the Unity 
Campaign represented an attempt to compromise the 
political independence of the Labour Party and ally it 
with the enemies of socialism such as the Liberals, who 
had been responsible for undermining the two minority 
Labour Governments. 114 
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These statements were backed up by the launch of 
Labour's Immediate Programme, this was a brief 
declaration of the socialist measures which a Labour 
government would introduce; and was the product of four 
years of discussion. This sold over 300,000 copies in 
pamphlet form, while Your Britain, a sixteen-page 
pictorial presentation of Labour's Immediate Programme 
sold over 400,000 copies. 115 
In addition to this mass socialist propaganda the 
Labour leadership were able to attack the Unity Campaign 
from the left; for the Unity Manifesto had subordinated 
all talk of socialism to questions of foreign policy. 
Clement Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, was able to 
do this very effectively by drawing on the experience of 
the last Labour government: 
The plain fact is that a Socialist Party cannot hope 
to make a success of administering the capitalist 
system because it does not believe in it. This is our 
fundamental objection to all the proposals that are 
put forward for the formation of a Popular Front in 
this country. 116 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1937 Transport House 
used the columns of the Daily Herald to great effect in 
undermining support for the Unity Campaign; it also 
published the pamphlet `The Witchcraft Trial' by the IFTU 
Secretary Frederich Adler, which criticised the first 
Moscow show trial. The Daily Herald linked the communist 
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supporters of the Unity Campaign with the Moscow show 
trials and the execution of the Red Army's general staff 
on the pretext of them being agents of fascism. The 
following comment was typical: 
Old Bolsheviks are being shot against a wall after 
state trials.... The profound belief of British Labour 
that dictatorships do not dissolve, but perpetrate 
themselves, driving opposition to revolution, is 
being proved with terrible accuracy. It is the 
fundamental difference of belief that has determined 
British Labour that it cannot share its movement with 
the Communists. The Moscow Trial will scarcely relax 
that determination. 117 
After the execution of the Red Army generals in June, the 
Daily Herald challenged the Communist Party to lift its 
blanket of silence over the many victims of the Terror: 
They have a daily newspaper. Except for the execution 
of the eight Communist generals, it has told its 
readers nothing of this vast and astonishing 
execution of leading Communist citizens of the Soviet 
Union. 118 
The Communist Party responded to this with a Central 
Committee statement in the Daily Worker on 1 July 1937, 
which can only have further discredited it in the eyes of 
many workers, `Why have we not spoken about the "terrible 
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wave of executions".... The reason the communists have not 
dealt with these events is that they have not taken 
place'. 119 
Against a background of public acrimony between the 
three parties involved in the Unity Campaign, the 
Socialist League at its annual conference in May decided 
to wind up its own organisation, effectively killing off 
the Unity Campaign. By this time the League's membership 
had slumped to 1,600 from 3,000 in January; illustrating 
the detrimental effect of the Unity Campaign's 
association with popular frontism and the Moscow show 
trials. 120 It was widely recognised within the Labour 
movement that the bitter infighting between the ILP and 
the Communist Party had lost the Unity Campaign many 
supporters. Brockway recalls that, `Cripps remarked on 
the irony of unity meetings when at the door members of 
the two parties were selling literature bitterly 
attacking each other'. 121 
The demise of the Unity Campaign June - October 1937 
After the Socialist League's dissolution in May, the 
Unity Campaign carried on in a half-hearted sporadic form 
up until October. Labour supporters of the campaign were 
instructed to form local Labour Unity Committees to carry 
on propaganda in favour of unity up to Labour Party 
conference; while the ILP and Communist Party would 
conduct their own unity propaganda on a separate basis. 
In its last public statement the National Unity Campaign 
Committee made the inflated claim that it had waged, 'one 
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of the most successful campaigns in the history of the 
Labour movement'. 122 
The proposal to disband the Unity Campaign Committee 
and change the format of the campaign came from the 
Communist Party with the approval of Stafford Cripps. 123 
The Communist Party's suggestion that former Socialist 
League members should publicly withdraw from the campaign 
reflected its desire that they continue working within 
the Labour Party to further its popular front designs. 
The decision to disband the Unity Campaign revealed 
the lack of unity of purpose which was the hallmark of 
the campaign since its inception; different organisations 
supposedly campaigning together, but each having its own 
separate agenda to follow. By August the Communist Party 
believed that the doomed campaign was effectively over, 
and decided to withdraw from its activities and focus its 
energies on campaigning for a full-blown popular front. 
The CPGB was abandoning its earlier precondition of there 
being a united front with Labour before any popular front 
movement could come into being. 124 
The Unity Campaign was finished off with the defeats 
it suffered in the autumn at the TUC and Labour Party 
conferences. The Communist Party, through its defence of 
the Terror in the Soviet Union and the repression meted 
out to the POUM in Spain, had provided the most potent 
ammunition with which the TUC and Labour Party could 
attack the Unity Campaign. 
At the TUC in early September, J. Donovan pointed out 
the contradiction which undermined support for the 
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campaign. He noted the irony of the Daily Worker spending 
great energy attacking ILP policy on Spain, whilst 
calling on the Labour movement to support the Unity 
Campaign. 125 
Marchbank for the General Council put matters more 
bluntly yet no less effectively: 
we never hear anything from those acclaiming the 
principles of unity in this country about what takes 
place in Russia. If some of them were to offer the 
same opposition to the movement in Russia as they do 
to the movement here, they would not be given any 
opportunity to reply. A bullet would end their 
days. 126 
At the Labour Party conference in October 1937, Morrison 
replied to the debate on the Unity Campaign to great 
effect: 
Suppose that Mr. Trotsky came to London, and it was 
suggested by the ILP that there should be a United 
Front meeting with Jimmy Maxton, Harry Pollitt, and 
Leon Trotsky as principal speakers.... Would Mr. 
Pollitt appear on a platform with socialist, working 
class Trotsky? He would not. If some of the leaders 
of the POUM in Spain, a working class party, came to 
London, and the ILP wanted another United Front 
platform with them and Mr. Pollitt, Mr. Pollitt would 
not appear. 127 
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The Labour leaders' policy of opposition to the Unity 
Campaign was endorsed by 2,116,000 votes to 331,000; 
conference had rejected unity with the Communist Party 
far more decisively than in 1936. Final confirmation of 
the disastrous effects of the Terror in the Soviet Union 
on the Unity Campaign is provided by leading supporters 
of the campaign itself. Harold Laski in the New York 
Nation for 20 November 1937 admitted: 
There is no doubt the mass executions in the Soviet 
Union in the last two years have greatly injured the 
prestige of Russia with the rank and file of the 
Labour Party. In my judgement, the executions 
undoubtedly cost the supporters of the United Front 
something like half a million votes in the 
Bournemouth Conference. 128 
Reflecting on the defeat of the Unity Campaign in late 
1937 Brockway commented: 
I took the trouble to make enquiries in all parts of 
the country to discover the reasons for the set-back 
which the cause of unity had received at various 
trade union conferences... I was surprised to find how 
general was the explanation, that the series of 
executions in Russia had turned the workers against 
association with the Communist Party. This reaction 
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has gone wide and deep into the ranks of the working 
classes. 129 
The Unity Campaign - what did it achieve? 
Drawing up a balance sheet for the Unity Campaign poses 
the question, what had it achieved? According to Jupp it, 
'led to the creation of a unified Left', and, 'helped to 
gain acceptance for left ideas in the... Labour Party'. 130 
Much more realistic are the reflections of Brockway, 
McNair and Foot, who observed that the Unity Campaign did 
not unify the left in the Labour Party but had the 
opposite effect of leading to its destruction as an 
organised force. Brockway noted that, 'Its result was the 
loss of influence of Cripps, Bevan, Strauss and other 
"Lefts", the strengthening of the reactionary leaders, 
and the disillusionment of the rank and file'. 131 Both 
John McNair of the ILP and Michael Foot lamented the role 
of the Unity Campaign in bringing about the demise of the 
Socialist League. McNair believed, 'The extinction of the 
League was a severe blow to the forces working for 
socialism in the Labour movement'. Foot acknowledged that 
the Unity Campaign's demise rendered the left without, 
`any effective organisation, [and its supporters] found 
themselves hopelessly pitted as individuals against the 
Executive machine'. 132 Hugo Dewar has noted that the 
Unity Campaign led to, `a further weakening of the 
moribund ILP to the benefit of the CPGB'. 133 
Undoubtedly, the organised left within the Labour 
movement emerged from the Unity Campaign as a 
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substantially weaker force. For the first time since the 
formation of the Labour Party there was no organised 
socialist opposition to the right-wing policies of the 
leadership. From 1900 to 1932 this role had been played 
by the ILP; following its split from Labour this mantle 
had been taken up by the Socialist League. By the autumn 
of 1937 the organised left within the Labour movement was 
a severely weakened force following the dissolution of 
the Socialist League and the continuing decline of the 
ILP. The one exception to this being the Communist Party 
for whom participation in the Unity Campaign was not the 
disaster which it had been for the ILP and Socialist 
League. 
The Communist Party had managed to successfully attain 
one of its central objectives in relation to the Unity 
Campaign. It had succeeded in preventing a large block of 
Left opinion from commenting on the Moscow show trials at 
a time of great sensitivity for the Soviet government. 
The Communist Party also emerged from the ruins of the 
Unity Campaign, in a position of organisational and 
intellectual dominance over the rest of the Left. 134 This 
raises the question: did the Communist Party get involved 
in the Unity Campaign with the aim of destroying the 
Socialist League? 
In later years Brockway pondered this question. 135 Reg 
Groves, both in early 1937 and later in his life, 
maintained, `The CP wanted to be rid of the Socialist 
League, with its dangerous potential as a centre for 
revolutionary socialist ideas'. 136 The Daily Herald had 
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forecast, in mid-January 1937, that the League's 
involvement in the Unity Campaign would lead to its 
demise to the advantage of the Communist Party. 137 
At present there is only circumstantial evidence to 
support Groves's allegation. From the start of the unity 
negotiations Pollitt had been aware of the damage which 
involvement in the Unity Campaign could inflict on the 
Socialist League. Let us not forget that Pollitt had, 
supported and possibly persuaded Cripps to dissolve the 
Socialist League in order to prevent mass expulsions from 
the Labour Party. According to the ILP, `it was on the 
advice of the CP that the Socialist League was dissolved. 
It was on the advice of the CP that the joint meetings 
between Labour Unity supporters, the ILP and the CP were 
stopped'. 138 Up until this point Cripps had appeared to 
court confrontation with the Labour Party. Cripps' 
decision faced widespread opposition from within the 
Socialist League; opponents of dissolution included 
Mellor, Groves and Brailsford. Mellor and Groves argued 
for the League to retreat from the Unity Campaign in 
order to remain in the Labour Party. According to Groves 
the vote for dissolving the Socialist League at its final 
conference was a minority one; in that abstentions and 
votes against dissolution outnumbered those for 
dissolution. 139 The Daily Worker did not lament the 
passing of the Socialist League, it celebrated its 
dissolution as a victory over Trotskyism. 140 Meanwhile at 
the final meeting of the National Unity Campaign 
Committee on 1 June 1937, Pollitt had proposed winding up 
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the committee to enable its Labour supporters to carry on 
supporting the Communist Party's popular front campaigns 
at large within the Labour Party. 141 
With the demise of the Unity Campaign the Communist 
Party concentrated its efforts on campaigning for a 
popular front of all forces hostile to the government's 
pro-fascist foreign policy. Yet its efforts in this 
direction were to prove equally fruitless, partly as a 
consequence of the sectarian conflict it had introduced 
into the Unity Campaign, in its defence of the Moscow 
show trials. Pimlott has observed : 
The bitter antagonism created by united front 
activities tainted any other policy favoured by the 
Left-especially if it received enthusiastic Communist 
backing. When the Left switched to the practical 
politics of a progressive electoral alliance which 
should include the Liberals, its arguments fell on 
deaf ears. 142 
The Communist Party will be examined from a local 
perspective in the final section of this chapter. Its 
failings on a national scale, such as the defeat of the 
Unity Campaign and its relative isolation within the 
Labour movement were reflected on a local scale; and can 
be largely attributed to the same causes, such as the 
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defence of the Moscow show trials and the espousal of 
popular frontism. 
The West Yorkshire Communist Party 1936 - 1937 
During this period the West Riding district of the 
Communist Party enjoyed rather mixed fortunes. It 
recorded a modest growth of 40 new members taking its 
membership up to 320 by October 1937. By this time over 
75 per cent of the membership were in employment and 148 
were trade unionists. Of these 56 held trade union 
positions, while four factory groups had been organised- 
three in Leeds and one in Huddersfield. 143 However this 
modest growth in membership and trade union influence was 
not translated into wider political influence within the 
local Labour movement. The poor showing of the Unity 
Campaign in this area is proof of this. 
Besides Leeds and Huddersfield, the rest of the 
branches recorded little progress in any area of 
activity; with perhaps the exception of the Aid-for-Spain 
campaign in which all of the branches participated. At 
the district congress in 1937 it was reported that only 
the Leeds and Huddersfield branches were carrying out 
continuous activity, the other branches were semi- 
active. 144 
One outstanding feature of the district during the 
year was the virtual collapse of the Bradford branch. It 
would appear that the Bradford Communist Party sorely 
missed the strong guiding hand of Maurice Ferguson, 
district organiser from 1932 to the spring of 1935, who 
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left Bradford in July 1936. Under Ferguson's leadership 
the Bradford Communist Party had made significant 
progress in building up an influential position on the 
local Trades Council. 145 
In the summer of 1936 the West Riding district 
acquired a new organiser in the form of Sid Elias of NUWM 
fame. He replaced Ernie Benson of Leeds, for in Benson's 
own words he had not, `set the West Riding on fire. There 
were some improvements but not sufficient for me to kept 
on. '146 Sid Elias however was to enjoy an even shorter 
tenure of office than Benson, for in December 1936 he was 
expelled from the Communist Party. At the Political 
Bureau in December 1936 Elias was expelled, `for having 
offered his services to the Economic League in 1928'. 147 
The West Yorkshire district had lost a very talented 
organiser on the basis of an anti-Communist leaflet put 
out by the Economic League during the hunger march of 
1936; which accused Elias of having offered to provide 
information on the NUWM's activities. Without checking up 
the veracity of this highly dubious evidence the 
Communist Party expelled Elias. As Richard Croucher has 
commented, `Elias denies the accusation to this day, and 
the case against him is indeed not proven'. 148 
Trevor Robinson was then appointed as the new district 
organiser. In the struggle to build the Communist Party 
in the Labour heartlands of West Yorkshire Robinson was 
ably assisted by Marion Jessop of Leeds. During 1937 
Robinson was replaced by Jessop as district organiser, 
for reasons unknown, and she became the first female 
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district organiser in the Communist Party's history. On 
29 October 1937 Jessop gave a detailed report on the West 
Riding district to the Political Bureau in her capacity 
as district organiser. The lack of continuity and 
stability in the district leadership may well have been a 
factor in the district's slow progress during 1937. 
At the Political Bureau on 29 October it was noted 
that Jessop was heavily overworked in her efforts to 
cover such a large district; and that efforts should be 
made to secure an assistant for her. The Political Bureau 
directed Jessop, `To make a special concentration on 
Leeds and Bradford as the two principal cities in the 
West Riding District', and to, `endeavour to get more 
attention paid to workers in the engineering 
industry'. 149 
In her report to the Political Bureau Jessop noted the 
few strengths and many weak points of the district. On 
the all-important front of extending the Communist 
Party's influence in the Labour Party it would appear 
that the West Yorkshire communists made little progress. 
Jessop acknowledged the success of Labour's Socialist 
Crusade Week in the West Riding and that, `Our Party as a 
whole, did not react well to the importance of this 
Crusade, and very few of our comrades actually 
participated in this work'. 150 
In the municipal elections for 1937 the local 
Communist Party branches had squandered another 
opportunity to build the united front on a local scale 
with the Labour Party. This failure to even try and build 
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the united front on a local scale reflected a residual 
sectarianism towards the Labour Party, and was in many 
ways a product of the marginal position of local 
communists within the West Yorkshire Labour movement. 
With the exception of Leeds and Huddersfield, `Our Party 
in the rest of the district has done very little to help 
the Labour Party.... No independent Party activity has 
been conducted'. 151 This failure to build a united front 
with the local Labour Party reflected the position of the 
Communist Party nationally whose campaign for affiliation 
to Labour had been ignored by Transport House during the 
autumn of 1937.152 On both a local and national basis the 
Communist Party met with determined opposition from the 
Labour Party to its united and popular front overtures. 
The West Yorkshire Communist Party appears to have 
been beset by a variety of organisational problems which 
helped produce an inward-looking mentality, where branch 
meetings engaged in, `the eternal discussion of inner 
Party problems', rather than turn outward and discuss the 
problems of local workers and the Labour movement. 153 
This insular mentality reflected the, `many remnants of 
bad sectarian traditions in the Party', and was probably 
reinforced by the siege mentality created by the 
Communist Party's sectarian attacks on Labour movement 
critics of the Moscow show trials. 154 The problems of the 
West Yorkshire Communist Party were typical of a small 
Political group whose position was precarious and which 
lacked any significant influence within the local working 
class. 
I 
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There were however a few bright spots most notably the 
campaign to increase Daily Worker circulation and aid for 
Spain. Sales of the Daily Worker increased from 186 
quires in February 1937 to over 235 quires by October 
1937.155 Jessop noted with satisfaction that with regard 
to Spain, `Some very good work has been done'. 156 In most 
towns the local Communist Party branches had been to the 
forefront in creating cross-party Aid-for-Spain 
committees, which had raised thousands of pounds for 
humanitarian aid to Spain. Fourteen local communists had 
left the district to join the International Brigade. 157 
Three communists from Leeds had been killed fighting on 
the Jarama front in February 1937; these were B. Aaron, 
P. Charlton, and P. Eluis. 158 
At the district congress in 1937 it was recognised 
that the main problem facing the local Communist Party 
was the slow growth of membership and lack of influence 
in the local Labour movement. In trying to ascertain why 
the Communist Party in the West Riding failed to 
establish a significant membership and deeper roots 
within the local Labour movement, a situation reflecting 
the fortunes of the CPGB on a national scale, it will be 
necessary to examine the activities of the main branches 
in the district - Bradford, Huddersfield, and Leeds. 
Bradford Communist Party 
Within a year of Maurice Ferguson's departure from 
Bradford in July 1936, the local Communist Party branch 
had collapsed into a state of semi-activity. By October 
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1937 the local branch was down to 38 members, from 50 
members in 1933. Marion Jessop observed the, `Bad 
political atmosphere in the branch. Inability of comrades 
to utilise any situation that arises.... Lack of political 
discussion at branch meetings. Party not seen [any more] 
as a force in Bradford'. 159 
The declining influence of the Bradford Communist 
Party within the local Labour movement is reflected in 
its position on the Trades Council; on which it had 
previously held a significant influence. 160 After Maurice 
Ferguson's departure from Bradford, the Communist Party 
was left with two delegates on the local Trades Council. 
At the annual meeting of Bradford Trades Council, in late 
January 1937, when only two Party members were present; 
consolation was to be had from the reelection of Tom 
Tynan onto the executive of the Trades Council. 161 
This position of declining influence is further 
illustrated by the series of defeats suffered by the 
Communist fraction in its interventions on the Trades 
Council during 1936-37. When news broke of a BUF rally on 
25 October 1936 the Trades Council suspended standing 
orders at its meeting on 15 October in order to discuss 
holding a counter-demonstration. The Trades Council was 
unable to determine a course of action, reflecting the 
relatively equal strength of the Left and Right at this 
meeting, and referred the matter to a joint meeting of 
the executives of the Trades Council and local Labour 
Party, held the next day. At this meeting it was decided 
not to take part in organising an anti-fascist counter- 
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demonstration to Mosley's meeting. 162 The failure of the 
communist fraction to get the official Labour movement to 
take action against Mosley left the field open for the 
ILP, which organised a counter-demonstration on the 
evening of the BUF rally. 163 At the same meeting of the 
Trades Council and Labour Party executives on 16 October, 
a communist request for a Bradford contingent of marchers 
to join the national NUWM Hunger March to London was 
turned down. 164 
In the New Year the Bradford Communist Party launched 
a local Unity Campaign Committee, in conjunction with the 
ILP and Socialist League. The Bradford Unity Campaign 
committee tried to involve the local Labour movement in 
the campaign and organised a Unity conference for 21 
February 1937. At the Trades Council on 18 February a 
resolution sponsored by the communist fraction and ILP 
delegates, calling for Trades Council participation in 
the local Unity conference, was defeated by a large 
majority, the vote being 38 to 17 against. 165 
The failure of the Unity Campaign to gain any 
significant support in Bradford can be put down to the 
loyalty of the local Labour movement to national policy 
decisions. Throughout 1937 Bradford Trades Council and 
Labour Party closely followed national policy in their 
own deliberations. Pressure to remain loyal to the 
national Labour Party's prohibitions regarding the Unity 
Campaign, would have been reinforced by the split in the 
Bradford Labour Party; which saw three ward Labour 
parties secede and put up candidates against Labour in 
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the municipal elections of 1937. The failure of the local 
Communist Party to offer any assistance to Labour in its 
electoral contests during 1936-37 can only have made the 
position of the local Unity Campaign weaker. 166 An 
additional factor working against the local Unity 
Campaign was the involvement of Roland Hill, President of 
Bradford Trades Council, and Fred Shaw, Yorkshire 
organiser for the NCLC, in the British Committee to 
Defend Leon Trotsky. Their hostility to the Moscow show 
trials and its communist supporters would have greatly 
weakened the attempts of the local Unity Campaign to gain 
Labour movement support. 167 It is worthwhile recalling 
that Hill had previously supported the united front, 
however the Moscow show trials were a powerful influence 
turning him against the united front with the Communist 
Party. 168 
Huddersfield Communist Party 
Until 1935, there was just a handful of communists in 
Huddersfield who worked sporadically in the local League 
Of Youth and the Trades Council. Sometime during 1935-36 
a small but highly active Communist Branch was 
established. 169 During this period the local Communist 
Party successfully penetrated Huddersfield's Labour 
League of Youth branch. Harry Haigh had recruited at 
least four members of the League of Youth to the 
Communist Party by May 1937.170 Meanwhile Gilbert Lawton 
and Laurie Shaw had established a small communist 
fraction on the Trades Council, which by 1937 had 
323 
developed a `good standing' amongst Labour movement 
activists. 171 
By early December 1936 a branch of the Left Book Club 
had been established with Gilbert Lawton as its 
secretary. 172 The local Left Book Club's energetic 
campaigning, particularly over Spain, greatly raised its 
standing in the local Labour movement. This standing had 
risen to such a degree that in September 1937 
Huddersfield Divisional Labour Party agreed to a joint 
meeting with it to discuss Attlee's book, The Labour 
Party In Perspective. 173 
By October 1937 Huddersfield Communist Party had grown 
to 30 members, this reflected the considerable support 
which existed for its united and popular front campaigns 
in the local Labour movement. As had been the case in 
1936, the starting point for the local Communist Party's 
united front campaign in 1937 was the League of Youth. At 
the League of Youth's meeting on 15 February 1937, an 
attempt to put forward a pro-Unity Campaign resolution 
was ruled out of order by the chair. After much wrangling 
a carefully worded resolution supporting the Unity 
Campaign was allowed to be put forward and carried; it 
managed to avoid mentioning the Unity Campaign while 
calling for a united front of all working class 
parties. 174 This resolution was approved by the executive 
of Huddersfield Divisional Labour Party on 23 February 
1937.175 
The League of Youth from this time onwards sent 
delegates to the local Unity Campaign Committee. Its 
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support for the Unity Campaign brought it into repeated 
conflict with the national Labour Party. 176 Undaunted by 
admonishments from J. S. Middleton, the League of Youth 
agreed to sell the YCL's journal Advance outside Unity 
Campaign meetings, attended unity marches in other areas; 
and even put forward one of its members, as assistant 
secretary to the local Unity Campaign Committee. 177 
Further success for the Communist Party in 
Huddersfield came with the decision of the Trades Council 
in March 1937 to send delegates to the local Unity 
Campaign Committee. The Trades Council went so far as to 
agree to a joint propaganda campaign with the local 
Communist Party on the question of arms for Republican 
Spain. 178 
At the height of the Unity Campaign five members of 
the local League of Youth resigned together at a meeting 
on 2 May 1937, declaring their affiliation to the Young 
Communist League. This action was taken to preempt a 
Labour Party inquiry into communist infiltration of the 
local League of youth. 179 Despite this splitting action 
of the local Communist Party the Quarterly General 
Committee of Huddersfield Labour Party was unable to 
arrive at a decision for or against the Unity Campaign 
only two days later on 4 May. 180 The success of the local 
Communist Party in involving sections of the Labour 
movement in the Unity campaign is reflected in the 
repeated declarations of Huddersfield Labour Party, 
calling upon its members not to participate in the Unity 
Campaign. 181 
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The Labour movement of Huddersfield, in the mid 1930s, 
was to the left of national policy on the united front 
with the Communist Party and Spain; and proved fertile 
political ground for the local Communist Party. The 
tolerant attitude displayed towards the campaigning 
activities of the local Communist Party by Labour 
loyalists, and which provided the essential background 
for communist work to succeed, can be ascribed to the 
fact that several of the leading figures of the local 
Labour movement had been long-standing members of various 
Marxist organisations. 182 Huddersfield Communist Party 
does not appear to have suffered unduly from the backlash 
which greeted the Moscow show trials in other parts of 
the country. It even managed to get the Trades Council to 
question the partiality of the Daily Herald's coverage of 
the trials. 183 
Leeds Communist Party 
Following the success of its counter-demonstration at 
Mosley's rally on 28 September 1936, the so-called 
`Battle of Holbeck Moor', the Communist Party in Leeds 
looked forward with confidence to the future. 184 
Unfortunately for the local Communist Party, the kudos of 
having led the northern equivalent to the 'Battle of 
Cable Street' did not significantly improve its standing 
in the local Labour movement. Ever since the TUC's 'Black 
Circulars' of October 1934, the Leeds Communist Party had 
enjoyed little success with its united front overtures to 
the local Labour Party. 185 Over the next year, autumn 
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1936 to autumn 1937, the local Communist Party met with 
little success in its efforts to get Labour movement 
support for the united and popular front campaigns over 
Spain, unemployment, and the Unity Campaign. 
One of the most important reasons for this failure was 
the counter-offensive, led by local Labour and trade 
union officials, against communist penetration of the 
Labour movement in Leeds. This action took various forms, 
the most common being the threat of disciplinary action 
to prevent their members participating in the Communist 
Party's united and popular front campaigns. During 1936- 
37 this counter-offensive found its most public 
expression in the broadsides against the Communist Party 
in the Leeds Weekly Citizen. The themes used most 
frequently to attack the Communist Party were the popular 
front, which was portrayed as an attempt to compromise 
the political independence of the Labour Party, and the 
Moscow show trials. 186 
According to Dr-John Archer, who led a Trotskyist 
group in Leeds Labour Party during the 1930s, he and his 
wife, Mary Barclay, had formed an informal alliance with 
Len Williams who was the local Labour Party organiser; to 
fight off communist penetration of the Labour Party. This 
found practical expression in the reproduction of 
articles by Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov in Leeds 
Weekly Citizen, attacking the Moscow show trials. 187 
In Marion Jessop's reports to the Central Committee in 
September and the Political Bureau in October 1937, she 
noted the informal alliance between Len Williams and the 
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local Trotskyists against the Communist Party. Jessop 
claimed that Mary Barclay was a sub-editor of the Leeds 
Weekly Citizen, an allegation which may well have been 
true for Barclay wrote numerous articles for the Citizen 
criticising the popular front and the Moscow show trials 
under various pseudonyms. Jessop also claimed that Len 
Williams was a Trotskyist. In fact Williams had never 
been a Trotskyist, he had earned the Trotskyist label 
from his clashes with the Communist Party while he was a 
NCLC organiser in South Wales during 1934-35; and from 
his opposition to the Communist Party in Leeds where he 
used the Moscow show trials to great effect in attacking 
Stalinism. At the Central Committee, in December 1937, 
Pollitt singled out Williams for attack, he acknowledged 
the important role Williams had played in blocking the 
Leeds Communist Party's penetration of the local Labour 
Party. 188 
As soon as news broke of the secret unity negotiations 
between the Communist Party, Socialist League and ILP in 
late December 1936, the Leeds Weekly Citizen went on the 
offensive against the proposed Unity Campaign. In an 
editorial on 25 December 1936, it declared that the 
proposed Unity Campaign would be a disruptive force in 
the Labour movement creating divisions over an issue 
already settled by the Labour Party conference. 189 
Both before and after the launch of the Unity 
Campaign, the Leeds Weekly Citizen reproduced articles by 
Trotsky and Leon Sedov, attacking the second Moscow show 
trial, in an effort to undermine local support for the 
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campaign. 190 On 29 January 1937 beside two articles by 
Trotsky criticizing the trial, an editorial in the Leeds 
Weekly Citizen called for the Socialist League to be 
expelled from the Labour Party if it persisted in its 
Unity Campaign with the Communist Party. 191 As the Unity 
Campaign unfolded, the Leeds Weekly Citizen repeatedly 
made the link between the Terror in the Soviet Union and 
the Unity Campaign's communist supporters: 
Who with the slightest knowledge of Communism has any 
doubt about the fate of domestic institutions and 
practices if the Communist Party became the 
government of the country? A free press would be 
suppressed, as would all opposition parties, and 
there would be no right to elect an alternate 
Government. Democracy as we understood it, and for 
which the Labour movement stands, would disappear 
under Communism as it does under Fascism. 192 
After the Unity Campaign was launched on 24 January 1937, 
Len Williams wrote to all the divisional and ward Labour 
parties in Leeds reminding them that any association with 
the Unity Campaign was in breech of conference decisions 
regarding the Communist Party. 193 At the annual meeting 
of Leeds City Labour Party in mid-February 1937, which 
was attended by 170 delegates, a motion supporting the 
Unity Campaign was defeated by a large majority. In the 
face of this defeat the local Unity Campaign only managed 
to gain a few points of support in Leeds Labour Party. 194 
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Its lack of support in the local trade union movement is 
shown by the fact that it could not even get a resolution 
in support of the campaign onto the agenda of Leeds 
Trades Council. 195 
The highpoint of the local Unity campaign was the 
3,000 strong unity rally in Leeds Town Hall on 28 
February 1937, which had Pollitt, Maxton and Bevan as the 
main speakers. 196 Even after the dissolution of the 
Socialist League in May 1937, the local Communist Party 
persisted in supporting the Unity Campaign; organising a 
unity march through Leeds city centre on 11 July. 197 
Despite its failure at getting official support from 
Labour movement bodies for its united and popular front 
campaigns, the local Communist Party did manage to 
establish some unofficial cooperation at a rank and file 
level. In the municipal election campaign of 1937 five 
ward Labour parties, in defiance of Len Williams' 
instructions, did allow local communists to work secretly 
in their election campaigns. 198 
In line with national directives the Communist Party 
in Leeds took up the campaign against 'Trotskyism' with 
considerable zeal. This included organising public 
meetings in defence of the second Moscow show trial. At 
the Central Committee in September Marion Jessop 
declared, 'It is such a burning issue with us that we are 
organising a school at the end of the month to deal with 
the whole question'. The paranoia and complete lack of 
proportion which typified the struggle against 
'Trotskyism' is illustrated by the following comment: 
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In Leeds we have a position where the Trotskyists 
smashed the Labour League of Youth of 50 and the 
local Labour Party is in their hands, and they are 
now ferreting their way into the Borough Labour 
movement. 199 
Not content with just organising public meetings the 
local Communist Party resorted to more direct methods in 
a bid to silence Left critics of the Soviet Union. John 
Archer recalls J. R. Campbell inciting a crowd against him 
in Town Hall Square in Leeds. 200 The lowest point in this 
particular campaign came when the local Communist Party 
circulated a leaflet around Leeds declaring that Mary 
Barclay, a well known local Trotskyist, was an ally of 
fascism. When her employers at Montagu-Burtons got hold 
of this leaflet it led to her dismissal. 201 
Despite the failure of its united and popular front 
campaigns to gain widespread Labour movement support, the 
local Communist Party through its energetic Aid-for-Spain 
campaign did register a significant growth in membership, 
reaching 160 members by October 1937. The Young Communist 
League in Leeds grew to an impressive membership of 120 
making it, 'the best YCL club in the country'. 202 
In assessing the future prospects of the West Riding 
district Marion Jessop believed that a major priority was 
to strengthen its collective leadership; from this would 
flow improvements in the various fields of Party work: 
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One of the biggest achievements of the past has been 
the regular meeting of the District Party Committee 
every fortnight, which has enabled it to begin to act 
as a leadership. We are now discussing the problems 
of the District and beginning to lead the work. 203 
Out of the three main branches in West Yorkshire it would 
appear that the Huddersfield Communist Party had the 
greatest success in involving sections of the local 
Labour movement in its united and popular front 
campaigns. In Bradford the Communist Party collapsed into 
a state of semi-activity due to weak local leadership, 
Maurice Ferguson being a sorely missed figure; while the 
in-fighting in the local Labour movement also served to 
hinder the Bradford Communist Party. The Leeds Communist 
Party also failed to gain much Labour movement support 
for its campaigns due to a policy of anti-communist 
containment vigorously pursued by local Labour loyalists 
and the effect of the Moscow show trials. However its 
Aid-for-Spain campaign did bring in a layer of new 
recruits. 
Conclusion 
The situation of the West Yorkshire Party shared some 
similarities with the position of the Communist Party 
nationally. On both a national and local scale the 
Communist Party played a leading role in the Aid-for- 
Spain movement; this activity accounted for a large 
percentage of new recruits. As shown earlier the 
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Communist Party nationally made the campaign in defence 
of the Moscow show trials one of its main campaigning 
priorities and subsequently paid a heavy political price 
for this; for its support of Stalin's Terror which 
claimed millions of lives in the Soviet Union alienated 
many Labour movement activists. On a local scale too, 
where the Communist Party took up the defence of the 
Terror it played into the hands of its opponents in the 
Labour movement who used the issue to undermine support 
for the united and popular front. 
On both a national and local scale the Communist Party 
had little success with its united front overtures to the 
Labour Party. The limited success of the Communist 
Party's work around the Unity Campaign in Huddersfield 
proved to be something of an exception to this. One 
reason for this being the political environment of the 
local Labour movement which was consistently to the left 
of national policy with regard to the united and popular 
front. While its refusal to implement the `Black 
Circulars' created an atmosphere of political tolerance 
which proved conducive to the campaigning activity of the 
local Communist Party. Interviews with Labour movement 
activists from this period who were opponents and fellow 
travellers of the Communist Party reveal a high degree of 
mutual respect between the rank and file of the local 
Labour and Communist parties. 204 The Huddersfield Labour 
Party organiser Arthur Gardiner often turned a blind eye 
to the cooperation between Labour Party members and 
communists over the Unity Campaign and Spain. 
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It could be argued that international and national 
events prevented a realistic opportunity for success for 
the local Communist Party. Whenever the Communist Party 
met with determined opposition from the Labour Party and 
trade unions to its united and popular front campaigns 
these invariably ended up in failure. Despite this it 
would appear that communist influence in West Yorkshire 
was often the product of highly localised conditions 
which sometimes ran contrary to the national political 
scene. 
The results of the votes on the Unity Campaign at the 
conferences of the TUC and Labour Party, when compared to 
the votes gained for the united front in 1936, show how 
the Communist Party's influence within the Labour 
movement had declined during 1937. Its attempt to 
compromise the political independence of the Labour 
movement through its advocacy of a multi-class popular 
front alliance, together with its defence of the Terror 
in the Soviet Union, were to be instrumental in bringing 
about this declining influence. Compared to the united 
front campaign of 1936, the Unity Campaign was an abysmal 
failure succeeding only in weakening the Labour Left to 
the advantage of the right-wing Labour leadership. For 
the rest of the decade the Labour leadership was to 
suffer no further serious challenges to its policy of 
collaborating with the National Government's rearmament 
plans, as it prepared for the imminent world war. Yet 
through its vigorous humanitarian aid campaign in support 
of Republican Spain and movements such as the Left Book 
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Club, the Communist Party was to enjoy a limited growth 
in membership and growing influence amongst the middle 
class and the intelligentsia. 205 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE POPULAR FRONT 1938-1939 
"In England the Popular Front is only an idea, but it has 
already produced the nauseous spectacle of bishops, 
Communists, cocoa-magnates, publishers, duchesses and Labour 
MP's marching arm in arm to the tune of `Rule Britannia"'. 
George Orwell, 17 February 1938, New English Review. 1 
In the two years leading up to the outbreak of World War 
Two, Europe was convulsed by one crisis after another due to 
the territorial expansion of Germany and Italy. Confronted 
with the advance of fascism in Europe, which presented an 
increasing threat to the Soviet Union, the international 
communist movement campaigned ever more vigorously for a 
military pact between Britain, France and the USSR. This 
strategy dovetailed with the requirements of Soviet foreign 
policy which also called for a military alliance between 
Russia, Britain and France. 
During 1938-39 the CPGB engaged in a succession of 
campaigns all geared towards the objective of getting a 
British government to enter a military pact with the Soviet 
Union. 2 The following chapter will examine the changing 
policies and campaigns of the CPGB which were meant to bring 
about this objective. This study of the popular front 
during 1938-39 will show that as the international situation 
deteriorated there was a steady drift to the right in the 
political outlook of the Communist Party. All talk of 
socialism was abandoned in an attempt to win non-socialist 
allies to help it attain a major reorientation in British 
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foreign policy. The Communist Party found itself linking up 
with non-socialist allies in campaigns largely of an 
electoral character. These served to alienate it even 
further from the majority of the Labour movement, which saw 
the various popular front campaigns as an attempt to 
compromise the political independence of the Labour Party, 
taking it back to the discredited Lib-Lab politics of 
Labour's infancy; as well as the abandonment of socialist 
objectives. 
The strategy and tactics pursued by the Communist Party 
in pursuit of this goal have been the subject of much 
controversy amongst historians. There are those historians, 
such as Bornstein and Richardson, who argue that the popular 
front was a mere electoral manoeuvre and an increasingly 
desperate attempt to form a multi-party coalition powerful 
enough to defeat the government at an election. This 
involved the Communist Party abandoning the last vestiges of 
its revolutionary heritage in an attempt to win the middle 
class over to the popular front. The Communist Party's 
electoral machinations which sought to compromise Labour's 
independence by allying it with anti-appeasement Liberals 
and Conservatives, were instrumental in alienating the 
Labour movement away from popular frontism; thus 
guaranteeing the failure of the anti-government opposition. 
The net effect of this activity was to leave the Communist 
Party an isolated and discredited political force. 3 
350 
In opposition to this interpretation there are those 
historians, such as Branson and Fyrth, who give a positive 
reading of the Communist Party's popular front activity. 
They reject the claim that the popular front was an 
electoral contrivance and assert that the CPGB's activities 
mobilised movements of mass opposition to fascism, such as 
the Aid-for-Spain movement. While admitting that the 
Communist Party never managed to bring about a popular front 
movement powerful enough to defeat the government, they note 
that its activities greatly increased its influence and 
profile. 4 
The evidence presented in this chapter will suggest that 
the Communist Party's popular front campaigning during 1938- 
39 led it to downplay the struggle for socialism and engage 
in an increasingly desperate pursuit of an electoral 
coalition with non-socialist forces. This resulted in an 
electoral combination which tried to compromise the 
independence and socialist programme of the Labour Party. 
The debate raises a number of pertinent questions. Did 
the Communist Party's pursuit of popular frontism involve it 
in class collaboration policies, from which flowed a steady 
rightward drift in its political outlook, the abandonment of 
militant policies and the downplaying of the class struggle? 
Was the pursuit of popular frontism primarily an electoral 
manoeuvre designed to obtain a parliamentary majority, as 
claimed by some historians? Looked at from another angle, 
was the popular front an- attempt at rallying a mass movement 
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of opposition to the government, as claimed by others? Along 
with this, why did the Communist Party fail to achieve its 
main objective of getting a British government to enter a 
military pact with Russia and France? 
These questions raise the related issue of what effect 
did the pursuit of the popular front, a strategy worked out 
in accordance with the requirements of Soviet foreign 
policy, have on its standing in British society? Did it 
weaken or strengthen its influence in British society? 
To fully understand the evolution of the Communist 
Party's policy during this period, it must be placed against 
the background of developments in Soviet foreign policy. 
These developments provided the essential reference point 
from which it took its lead when working out its strategy. 
After a brief appraisal of Soviet foreign policy during 
1938-9, attention will then be focused on the Communist 
Party's attempt to grapple with the difficulties of 
responding to its requirements in the British political 
situation. 
First of all, the evolution of the Communist Party's 
political line will be examined; closely followed by 
scrutiny of several of the major campaigns it conducted. 
Finally, the activities of the communists in the West Riding 
district will be examined to help shed further light on why 
the Communist Party's popular front strategy failed. 
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Soviet Foreign Policy 
During 1938-9 the Soviet government felt increasingly 
disappointed by British and French appeasement of Germany 
and their consequent refusal to enter an anti-fascist pact 
with Moscow. Throughout these years, Litvinov laboured at 
Geneva to achieve collective action against fascist 
aggression. His failure to gain British approval for a pact 
of mutual assistance between London and Moscow led to the 
emergence of isolationist forces in the Soviet government, 
which favoured a retreat into fortress Russia. 
The refusal of Britain and France to countenance any 
resistance to the aggression of the fascist powers 
culminated in the infamous Munich agreement of October 1938. 
In the eight months following this, the Soviet government 
sought a rapprochement with Germany while continuing to 
press Britain and France for a military pact. It was in the 
face of British intransigence to agree to an Anglo-Soviet 
pact that the Soviet government came to a modus vivendi with 
Germany in the form of the Nazi-Soviet pact in late August 
1939. Thus by giving Germany a free hand against Western 
Europe Stalin believed he had gained Russia a temporary 
breathing space from involvement in any European war. 
In the period before the collapse of its pro-Western 
foreign policy the Soviet government realized that without 
British support measures to restrain the fascist powers were 
a non-starter. As Haslam has observed: 
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All Soviet efforts had to be directed towards 
encouraging anti-appeasement elements within the Western 
camp. One obvious focus, as Stalin came to realize, was 
the working class of the bourgeois world. 5 
This would explain Stalin's overture to the West European 
Labour movement in mid February 1938 when he commented in an 
interview: 
The international connections of the working class of 
the USSR with the working class of the bourgeois 
countries must be intensified and strengthened; the 
political assistance of the working class of the 
bourgeois countries to the working class of our country 
must be organized in case of a military attack on our 
country.... 6 
It would appear Stalin believed that the British 
government's appeasement policy `did not represent the 
British people', viewing British foreign policy as open to 
change. The Soviet government took encouragement from the 
growth of the anti-appeasement wing of the Conservative 
Party, believing that collective security could be brought 
about with the likes of Churchill in power.? 
As has already been noted, the CPGB's main objective 
throughout 1938-9 was to help bring about an Anglo-Soviet 
pact to protect Russia's western border from German attack. 
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The next section will show how the Communist Party extended 
the parameters of the popular front ever wider to 
incorporate non-socialist allies; to help bring about an 
electoral combination capable of bringing about the desired 
changes in British foreign policy. 
Evolution of the popular front line 1938-9 
Before looking at how the Communist Party line responded to 
'changes in the international situation it is necessary to 
examine the main premises upon which this policy of class 
collaboration was based. In working out perspectives for a 
British popular front the Communist Party took as its point 
of reference the pivotal role of the National Government in 
preventing an anti-fascist alliance with Russia and France; 
Pollitt stressed to the Central Committee: 
The big thing that comrades have to hammer home is that 
this Government represents the biggest menace to the 
peace of the world.... it is at every turn strengthening 
[foreign] reaction at the same time as it makes separate 
arrangements to prevent any common front against 
Germany. This demands the unity of all progressive 
forces against the National Government in preparation 
for a People's Government. 8 
According to Pollitt, the primary objective of any People's 
Front government was not to address the social and economic 
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ills of Britain but to form an anti-fascist alliance with 
Russia and France: 
I don't care how limited the programme on which that 
Government came to power, so long as the prerequisites 
of that coming to power were association with France and 
the Soviet Union,.... 9 
It is commonly assumed that following the defeat of the 
Unity Campaign in 1937 the Communist Party put all its 
efforts into the popular front which entailed the 
abandonment of any further attempts at affiliating to the 
Labour Party. 10 However, the Communist Party leadership 
realised that for any popular front movement to have any 
chance of success it needed the active support of the Labour 
Party, which was by far the strongest party of the 
parliamentary opposition. If any popular front against the 
government was to be brought into being then the Communist 
Party had to concentrate on getting unity in the Labour 
movement i. e. Communist Party affiliation-to Labour, 
`before 
an effective People's Front is possible, unity must come 
first in the working class organisations'. 11 Once 
affiliation to the Labour Party was achieved the Communist 
Party would then be in a position to win Labour to a policy 
of taking the lead in forming an electoral coalition of 
anti-government forces. 
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This perspective for a popular front was based on a 
profoundly pessimistic analysis of Labour's chances of 
winning the next general election: 
At no time since the end of the war has there been less 
possibility of a Labour Government. For years and years 
we have made propaganda for a Labour Government yet we 
are now further off than ever. 12 
It was felt that the only hope for bringing about changes in 
British foreign policy lay in a multi-class electoral 
coalition to defeat the National Government: 
The only possibility of this government being replaced 
lies in an alliance of the working class, with the 
middle class, the farmers and the anti-fascist sections 
of the bourgeoisie.... 13 
The objectives of such a multi-class electoral coalition 
would be twofold. Firstly, to try and force changes in the 
government's foreign policy in the immediate period, while 
preparing an electoral combination strong enough to defeat 
it at the next general election: 
the whole Labour and Progressive Movement [could] 
develop such power as could force changes in the policy 
of the National Government now, and help prepare the way 
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for its defeat at a coming general election by returning 
a majority of Labour and progressive members to 
Parliament. 14 
In the campaign for a popular front movement to defeat the 
government the only methods considered for bringing this 
about were electoral. In the debates of the Communist Party 
leadership on the popular front there was never any mention 
of any kind of movement of civil disobedience or industrial 
action to bring about the government's defeat. The only 
strategy considered depended upon an electoral combination 
of the Labour Party and the anti-appeasement sections of the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties. The Communist Party 
leadership believed that this was the only way the National 
Government's electoral dominance could be challenged. Noting 
that at the 1935 general election the government obtained 
two million more votes than the opposition parties combined, 
Pollitt argued: 
any kind of perspective of defeating the National 
Government can only be realised in our judgement on the 
basis of this.... that we begin to consider putting the 
possibility, the perspective to the whole democratic 
movement in this country, not a split [opposition] vote 
in a future by-election or general election. 15 
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This simplistic electoral arithmetic was based on the 
unrealistic assumption that political parties representing 
antagonistic social classes could somehow be brought 
together to form an electoral coalition. Subsequent 
experience was to prove how unrealistic this assumption was 
in the British setting; for it was not based on an objective 
appraisal of British politics but determined by the 
requirements of Soviet foreign policy. The CPGB's assessment 
regarding the popular front in Britain, ran contrary to the 
experience of the Labour movement which had struggled over 
thirty years to gain a parliamentary majority for the Labour 
Party as an independent entity; not in alliance with non- 
socialist forces. 
In the second half of August 1937 there was a special 
commission of the Comintern in Moscow held to discuss the 
CPGB's future strategy and tactics following the collapse of 
the Unity Campaign. The decisions taken there were adopted 
by the Central Committee in September 1938 and provided the 
guiding principles of the CPGB's policy up until the 
Austrian crisis of February-March 1938.16 
Throughout the autumn of 1937 the Communist Party 
repeatedly called for its affiliation to the Labour Party as 
the essential precondition for uniting the Labour movement; 
which could then go forward in taking the lead in forming a 
popular front. 17 The Communist Party declared that it would, 
`accept in its full meaning the Constitution of the Labour 
Party... and will abide by all decisions of the Labour Party 
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conferences... ', yet it effectively undermined this by 
calling for, `an electoral agreement between Labour, Left 
Liberal and Communist candidates' in the November municipal 
elections. The Central Committee directed the Party 
membership to, `place in the forefront our campaign for an 
electoral agreement to prevent any splitting of the working 
class and democratic vote'. 18 
During this period the Communist Party revised its 
previous slogan calling for a majority Labour government 
with the demand for a government representing all 
`progressive' forces as something more practical and more 
likely to lead to the defeat of the National Government. By 
January 1938 the campaign for affiliation to Labour, which 
by then had taken the form of the Communist Crusade, was 
calling for the National Government to be replaced by a 
'Labour and Democratic government'. 19 
In order to broaden its appeal to potential non-socialist 
allies the Communist Party began to cast off the last 
vestiges of its revolutionary heritage and dampen down its 
struggle against capitalism. In the first issue of the Daily 
Worker in 1938 the hammer and sickle mast-head along with 
the slogan 'Workers Of The World Unite' disappeared from the 
front page; symbolising its public abandonment of the goal 
of world revolution. Meanwhile the campaign for a 'Labour 
and Democratic government' took on unashamedly patriotic 
tones, which dispensed with the class approach to politics 
previously held by the CPGB. The Central Committee statement 
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issued on 8 January 1938 `Peace Or War - Poverty Or Plenty' 
declared: 
The Communist Party calls upon the British people to 
wipe out the shame; to struggle in 1938 to smash the 
Government which prevents the British people from taking 
their place in the ranks of freedom to which its whole 
history entitles it. 1938 can be a year of great 
change.... if the British people, true to its historic 
traditions... unites its forces and strikes the decisive 
blow for democracy and peace. 20 
As the campaign for the popular front gained renewed 
momentum during the spring of 1938, Dutt openly spelled out 
the implications of the Communist Party's class 
collaboration approach to politics. The anti-fascist crusade 
required that the struggle for socialism be postponed until 
fascism had been defeated; overturning the Marxist formula 
that the struggle against fascism was inextricably linked up 
with the struggle to overthrow capitalism of which it was a 
product. 21 In a reply to Daily Herald criticism of the 
popular front, that the Communist Party was abandoning 
socialism in favour of unprincipled agreements with non- 
socialists, Dutt exclaimed: 
... the aim of socialism 
is not included as an immediate 
object of the common fight. We have no hesitation in 
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declaring that the immediate issue at this moment is not 
socialism. The immediate issue is to defeat the National 
Government... 22 
The CPGB's exclusive concern with foreign affairs and the 
desire to acquire non-socialist allies which flowed from 
this led to a gradual neglect of its industrial activities. 
Up to 1935 the Communist Party placed great emphasis upon 
building militant rank and file movements in the unions. 
This can be illustrated by two quotations from the Communist 
Review. In the March edition of 1933 Shields noted: 
the marked successes which have been recorded with 
regard to the development of the Busmen's Rank and File 
Movement, the Railway Vigilance Movement, and movements 
of a similar character. These advances point the way 
forward along which the movement as a whole can be 
further consolidated and extended. 23 
Meanwhile in October 1933 the Communist Review advocated 
the, `need for the development of all in rank and file 
strike committees initiated by militant branches'. 24 In the 
popular front period which followed cold water was poured on 
the idea of rank and file movements; where these continued 
to exist their activity revealed an emphasis upon utilising 
the trade unions official structures as opposed to the 
previous emphasis upon building up a rank and file structure 
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within the unions to act as an alternative leadership. The 
following quotes from Discussion in 1936 illustrate this 
point. In the June edition Alec Brown commented: 
Similarly, in this question of the rank and file 
movement in the union, it is in the actual day to day 
work of utilising the unions to the full within the 
bounds of their present rules, and of awakening the full 
membership to fully conscious utilisation of the unions, 
that "constitutionalist" and revolutionary meet and 
learn to understand one another. 25 
John Mahon made a similar point revealing an emphasis away 
from building up a revolutionary trade union opposition, 
'Our role as a Party is to give leadership to this whole 
movement and to bury the old conception that we are only 
concerned with the revolutionary minority in the unions'. 26 
As Pearce and Woodhouse have noted where rank and file 
movements continued to exist their activity revealed: 
increasingly narrow concentration on recruitment to the 
unions and propaganda for amalgamation of the unions. 
Exposures of the officials and campaigning for 
democratisation of the unions both faded away. 27 
Nina Fishman has observed how by the late 1930s the 
Communist Party leadership had, `established that the 
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imperative of trade union loyalty superseded the imperative 
of rank-and-filism when they openly clashed'. 29 In her study 
of the London Busmen's Rank and File Movement and the ASSNC 
she has established that they: 
both placed rank-and-filism first. [However] Pollitt and 
Campbell intervened to enforce union loyalty as the 
first imperative. They acted in a way which appeared 
identical to 'reformism' and 'Mondism', contrary to 
bolshevik principles. 29 
During the 1938-9 period the Communist Party's neglect of 
industrial activity became even more pronounced. At the 
fifteenth congress of the CPGB in September 1938 there was 
no formal report on industrial work as such. J. R. Campbell, 
who usually gave this report, concentrated his attention on 
the struggle against `counter-revolutionary Trotskyism'. In 
a report for the ECCI of Comintern in April 1939 Campbell 
admitted: 
While the main resolution at the last Party Congress 
laid down the outlines of a trade union policy adapted 
to the present situation, there are no signs in the 
Daily Worker or in reports from the Party, that this 
policy is being concretely worked out and applied. 30 
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The Central Committee report to the sixteenth congress, 
scheduled for October 1939, noted the effect of the 
Communist Party downplaying the class struggle in order to 
further its popular front campaign: 
The preoccupation on questions concerning War or Peace 
may seem at first to have led to a dampening down of the 
[class] struggle against capitalism at home... in the 
main there has been no real advance made in raising the 
standards of the workers as a whole... In many Districts 
there has been serious neglect of this work and 
opportunities for developing strong organisation in the 
factories have been missed. 31 
Another consequence of the Communist Party's `dampening 
down' of the class struggle was the complete abandonment of 
the struggle against Mosley and his blackshirts. Shortly 
before the war Mosley held a large rally at Earl's Court, 
while on the same day the London YCL organised a hiking 
trip. The only demonstrators outside the BUF rally were a 
group of Trotskyists and a small number of other anti- 
fascists. 32 As Pollitt admitted to the Central Committee in 
June 1939, the lack of opposition to the BUF had contributed 
to an `alarming growth in anti-semitism in this country'. He 
lamented the Communist Party's abandonment of the struggle 
against the blackshirts: 
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... on our anti-fascist propaganda. There is none. We 
cannot at the moment organise another September 9th or 
October 4th. Must face the fact that Mosley is getting 
away with it. The fascist propaganda is catching on... 33 
During the Austrian crisis of February-March 1938, when the 
Western powers stood by and did nothing to interfere with 
Germany's invasion of Austria, the Communist Party broadened 
the boundaries of the popular front still further. The call 
for a Labour and Democratic government was replaced with the 
demand for a, `Peoples Government based on the power of 
organised Labour in alliance with all genuine democratic and 
peace forces'. 34 The Central Committee called on Labour to 
convene: 
an emergency conference of all political organisations 
opposed to war and ready to act decisively to preserve 
peace, and formulate a programme which a People's 
Government could carry through. 35 
Although it was not publicly spelt out this meant a multi- 
class alliance involving Labour in an electoral coalition 
with the Liberals and the anti-appeasement wing of the 
Conservative Party. In a discussion with Morrison, the 
leader of the London Labour Party, arranged by Cripps, at 
the height of the Austrian crisis, Pollitt admitted as much: 
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He [Morrison] put a question to me. Are you aware that 
at the present time, no change of government could take 
place that did not include Churchill, and where would 
you stand? 
In reply I said: We recognize Churchill would have to be 
in any new Government at this stage, that is why we want 
a strong person on the Labour side to take the lead so 
as to be able to hold the key position in the Government 
and guard against Churchill using his position for 
imperialist aims. 36 
This formulae for a popular front government was retained 
throughout the other political crisis of 1938, yet the 
Communist Party never felt confident enough to publicly 
spell out that such a government would include the anti- 
appeasement Tories. It was not until the fall of Republican 
Spain and the German conquest of Czechoslovakia in the 
spring of 1939 that the Daily Worker ran the headline, 
`COMMUNIST APPEAL TO ATTLEE SINCLAIR AND CHURCHILL Urged To 
Defeat Cabinet And Form New Government'. It made the 
following desperate appeal: 
Let Attlee, Sinclair and Churchill get together without 
another minute's delay... to form a new government of the 
People, a Government that will truly represent all the 
Labour and democratic forces of our country, and on this 
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basis establish the Peace Front at home as well as 
abroad. 37 
As the international crisis deepened throughout 1938-9 the 
Communist Party pushed outwards the parameters of the 
popular front in a vain attempt to win non-socialist allies. 
This attempt to win Liberal and Conservative backing for an 
electoral combination against the government involved the 
Communist Party in activity which only served to isolate it 
even further from the mainstream of the Labour movement; 
thus dooming the whole popular front scheme to failure. The 
Communist Party's attempt to put the popular front theory 
into practice will be examined next. 
The popular front in action 1938-9 
The debate over the Communist Party's popular front activity 
has considerable bearing on the following questions which 
shall be explored in this section: Why did the Party fail to 
achieve its popular front objectives? Was the popular front 
an electoral contrivance or an attempt at rallying a mass 
movement of opposition to the government? Did its choice of 
strategy for achieving the popular front have any bearing on 
the movement's ultimate failure? What effect did the pursuit 
of the popular front have on the Communist Party's standing 
and influence? 
During the autumn of 1937 the CPGB's main efforts were 
devoted to an ineffectual propaganda campaign which called 
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on the Labour Party leadership to meet its representatives 
to discuss communist affiliation to Labour. 38 It would 
appear that up to half of the Communist Party branches 
failed to take up this campaign, suggesting a lack of 
enthusiasm from the rank and file who were more concerned 
with things such as the Aid-for-Spain movement and the Left 
Book Club. 39 
In January 1938 this campaign for affiliation to Labour 
was relaunched as the Communist Crusade, with over 200 local 
meetings planned to raise support for this within local 
Labour parties. Expressing the high hopes of the leadership 
for this campaign Pollitt commented: 
We want to see this campaign made a bigger success than 
the whole of the Unity Campaign meetings. This will be 
one of the most important means of stimulating the whole 
drive for unity and affiliation. 40 
The Communist Crusade was launched on 23 January 1938 in 
Aberdeen. It had three interrelated objectives. Firstly, the 
affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labour Party. 
Secondly, to win Labour to a policy of it taking the leading 
role in forming a popular front movement in Britain. 
Finally, to bring about the downfall of the National 
Government and its replacement by a government committed to 
a military pact with the Soviet Union. 41 The Communist 
Crusade manifesto gave little attention to the social and 
369 
economic concerns of British workers, with its attention 
fixed almost exclusively on foreign affairs. 
Undoubtedly it was the advance of fascism on the 
continent which gave the Communist Crusade its main 
stimulus. The German invasion of Austria gave it a very 
pertinent message. Playing upon people's fears at events on 
the continent the Crusade proved to be more successful than 
the Unity Campaign of the previous year. However the Unity 
Campaign unlike the Crusade, faced strong opposition from 
the Labour Party right from its inception. 
While the Unity Campaign brought relatively few recruits 
to the Communist Party and was poorly supported by the 
Labour movement; the Communist Crusade held 200 meetings 
attended by over 62,000 people. It raised over 1,660 pounds 
for the Communist Party and brought 1,500 new recruits into 
its ranks. 42 Despite its organisational successes the 
Communist Crusade failed to bring the Communist Party any 
closer to achieving affiliation to Labour. Yet the large 
amount of popular front propaganda put out during the 
Crusade helped, 'prepare the ground for the favourable 
response to Sydney Elliott's appeal for the United Peace 
Alliance'(UPA). 43 
The Communist Crusade was effectively cut short and 
overshadowed by the emergence of the United Peace Alliance 
in March 1938, which developed as a response to the German 
invasion of Austria. 44 It was during the Austrian crisis of 
February-March 1938 that the Communist Party began to modify 
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its tactics regarding the popular front. It changed the 
emphasis of its popular front activity away from mere 
propaganda towards more practical action designed to bring 
into being a parliamentary combination powerful enough to 
defeat the government. 
At the Central Committee in February 1938 the new 
developments in popular front thinking came to the fore. It 
was noted that if Labour strengthened its electoral position 
in urban areas, the government would still have a clear 
majority due to its electoral domination of the countryside; 
and that in the majority of rural seats the Liberals were 
the main challengers to the government with Labour 
invariably third. Cornforth's speech, which delivered a 
statement on behalf of a Central Committee commission on 
agriculture, summed up the main tenets of the new electoral 
approach to the popular front: 
In many rural areas, Liberalism is something very deeply 
entrenched... Therefore in areas where Liberalism has 
this hold, we have to advocate an alliance of the Labour 
Party with the Liberals against the National Government, 
and such an alliance is all the more feasible because 
one finds in the main the progressive Liberals are 
prepared to support an anti-government policy for the 
land, along much the same lines as the Labour Party. 45 
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The Daily Worker put forward calculations purporting to show 
that only a multi-party electoral coalition had a realistic 
chance of defeating the government. It estimated that for 
Labour to win on its own it was confronted with the task of 
winning government seats which on average had majorities of 
up to 6,000; while a UPA combination would reduce the scale 
of the task considerably, only having to win seats from the 
government which had majorities of up to 2,500.46 
At the height of the Austrian crisis the Central 
Committee issued a manifesto on 19 March 1938, which called 
upon the Labour Party to convene an `emergency conference' 
of all political forces opposed to the government's 
appeasement policy. The task of such a conference would be 
to formulate `a programme which a People's Government could 
carry through'. 47 At a time when the government was in a 
state of turmoil the Communist Party's call for an electoral 
combination to bring about its downfall struck a chord with 
sections of the Labour movement and Liberal Party. As 
Eatwell has observed, to some extent support for the popular 
front derived from disillusionment with the Labour Party's 
failure to mount an effective challenge to the government's 
pro-fascist foreign policy. 48 
On 20 March 1938 Sydney Elliott, editor of the 
Cooperative newspaper Reynolds News, responded to the call 
of the Daily Worker by raising the demand for a United Peace 
Alliance of all groups and individuals opposed to the 
government's appeasement policy. He put forward the view 
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that Labour and its allies could not only force a general 
election; but `they could win a clear majority in the 
Commons immediately'. 49 The central objectives of such a 
popular front government would be a military alliance with 
the Soviet Union and France and the supply of arms to 
Republican Spain. 
This call for a multi-party electoral alliance to defeat 
the government received swift support from Liberal 
newspapers such as the News Chronicle and the Manchester 
Guardian. The Communist Party was quick on the uptake and in 
late March put forward proposals for developing the United 
Peace Alliance into a practical reality. These called for an 
emergency Labour movement conference on the popular front 
which would prepare the way for a conference of all anti- 
government forces. The Daily Worker stressed the point: 
What matters now above all is to carry forward the 
campaign in the Labour organisations. Especially in the 
trade unions decisive responsibility lies at this time. 
Councils of Action of all the Labour, peace and 
democratic forces are being built up in the 
localities. 50 
On the 29 March the Daily Worker announced the formation of 
the first local Council of Action, in Fulham, to help draw 
all 'progressive forces' together in support of Labour's 
candidate in the forthcoming by-election. Local Councils of 
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Action were set up by the Communist Party and its fellow 
travellers in various parts of the country; their purpose 
being to rally voters around those candidates most likely to 
defeat the National Government candidate in by-elections, 
irrespective of their party label. In practical terms this 
meant the CPGB calling for a reversion to the discredited 
Lib-Lab politics of the 1900s; a policy which was anathema 
to most Labour movement activists who recalled the long 
hard struggle to free Labour from the coat tails of the 
Liberal Party. 
The Communist Party believed that Labour's victory in the 
West Fulham by-election on 6 April 1938 to be practical 
confirmation of the new popular front line; claiming that, 
`It was in fact the united front of Labour, Liberals and 
Communists that defeated the government at West Fulham'. 51 
It looked forward with confidence to the Easter conferences 
of the Labour movement. 
At its first major test the United Peace Alliance won an 
unexpected victory which startled the Labour leadership. The 
Cooperative Party annual conference on 17 April 1938 gave 
its support to the United Peace Alliance by 2,340,000 votes 
to 1,547,000.52 As Eatwell has observed: 
the alliance enjoyed considerable rank and file support. 
This support was probably accentuated by the fact that 
the peace alliance was supported by the communists for 
in 1937 the CPGB had decided to take a more active role 
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in the cooperative movement and had quickly succeeded in 
having members elected to official positions in several 
areas. 53 
The CPGB's entrist penetration of the Labour movement seemed 
to be paying handsome dividends. It had over 2,000 of its 
members active in the Cooperative movement and over 2,000 
secretly working inside the Labour Party; which gave the 
Communist Party a powerful lever with which to muster 
support for the United Peace Alliance. 54 
The victory at the Cooperative conference on its first 
outing gave the United Peace Alliance the credibility that 
enabled it to develop considerable momentum within the 
Labour movement. In the three weeks after the Cooperative 
decision, the United Peace Alliance won the support of the 
Shop Assistant's Union, the SWMF with over 250,000 members 
and NUDAW the sixth biggest union with over 150,000 
members. 55 Beside this dozens of local Labour parties, 
particularly smaller and more rural ones where Labour's 
electoral prospects seemed rather bleak, came out in favour 
of the alliance; along with the Tribunite MP's and a youth 
popular front between the Labour League of Youth and the 
YCL. 
Alarmed by the rapidly growing momentum of the United 
Peace Alliance within the Labour movement the Labour 
leadership was forced to act. As Eatwell has observed, the 
NEC appointed a committee to prepare a statement answering 
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the case for a popular front, `in an attempt to stem this 
rising tide of support for the popular front'. 56 This six- 
page pamphlet entitled Labour And The Popular Front, which 
came out on 12 May 1938, served as the principal NEC 
statement against the popular front. Its main arguments can 
be summarised as follows. For Labour to adopt the popular 
front after decades of struggling to establish its viability 
as an independent party would mean it losing its 
independence and once more becoming dependant on the 
goodwill of the Liberal Party which had sabotaged the two 
previous Labour governments. The popular front with its 
class collaboration approach meant giving up the struggle 
for socialism. Finally, the popular front represented the 
politics of defeatism for it assumed that Labour could not 
win an election without non-socialist allies; yet recent 
evidence such as Labour's victories in the Ipswich and 
Fulham by-elections indicated Labour's viability as an 
independent party. 57 
With the Communist Party openly admitting that the 
struggle for the popular front meant postponing the struggle 
for socialism, it gave the Labour leaders a powerful weapon 
with which to attack the United Peace Alliance. As Martin 
Upham has observed, the Labour leaders: 
now had to hand the plausible argument of Socialist 
fundamentalism with which to stem the growing Communist 
influence on the Labour Party. The convenient guise of 
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single-minded crusaders for the Socialist commonwealth 
well suited their intention to remain in unchallenged 
control of the Labour movement. 58 
Confronted with such powerful pieces of propaganda as Labour 
And The Popular Front, the United Peace Alliance needed to 
maintain the momentum developed so far. With the Aylesbury 
by-election scheduled for 19 May 1938, the scene was set for 
a decisive confrontation between the supporters and 
opponents of the popular front. 
The Aylesbury by-election 
On 24 April the mid-Buckinghamshire district Labour Party 
selected Reg Groves, a Trotskyist who had led the opposition 
within the Socialist League to its participation in the 
Unity Campaign and its own dissolution, as its candidate to 
fight the Aylesbury by-election. The Communist Party and its 
popular front allies responded with a campaign designed to 
force the local Labour party to reverse its decision, and 
withdraw its candidate in favour of the United Peace 
Alliance candidate T. Atholl Roberts, a local Liberal. 
Both the Progressive Alliance Group and the South 
Buckinghamshire Unity Committee demanded Labour withdraw its 
candidate and not contest the election. Meanwhile the small 
communist nucleus in the local Labour Party instigated moves 
designed to get Groves to stand down-59 The bitter campaign 
of opposition waged by the Communist Party to the 
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candidature of Reg Groves sprang from a variety of 
influences. Martin Upham has commented, `To the desire for 
an alliance was added distaste for Groves as a 
Trotskyist'. 60 It is worthwhile recalling that Groves was 
one of the leading figures in the `Balham Group' which was 
expelled from the CPGB in August 1932 and became the British 
section of the international Left Opposition led by Trotsky; 
which opposed the united front and popular front policies of 
the Comintern. 61 
On the 5 May the Communist Party, which not so long ago 
had pledged to abide by the constitution and discipline of 
the Labour Party if affiliated, demanded that the local 
Labour party withdraw its candidate and support the Liberal 
who was standing for the United Peace Alliance. It declared, 
`If this decision [to contest the by-election] is carried 
through it will mean that the by-election will be "on a 
plate" for Chamberlain even before the campaign has 
started'. 62 
Reg Groves, with a majority of the local Labour Party 
executive behind him, stood firm in the face of this 
pressure from the popular fronters and Transport House to 
replace him; seeing the by-election campaign as an 
opportunity to demonstrate in practice the erroneous nature 
of the popular front. 63 By 6 May he had spoken at over 30 
meetings which had led to the formation of new Labour Party 
branches in the constituency. 64 
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In return for standing firm against the popular front 
Groves received strong support from the Labour press; while 
dozens of Labour organisations and individual party members 
sent messages of support for his stand in defence of 
Labour's independence and socialist principles. 65 WS Wigham, 
who drove Groves around the constituency has described the 
approach of the campaign: 
Reg Groves has put at every meeting, plainly, soberly, 
but resolutely, the case for turning out the whole 
ruling class, under whatever label, and winning the 
country for rule by those who do the work of the 
country. In a sentence he has fought the election on a 
straight, class struggle, socialist issue. 66 
In recognition of the vigorous socialist fight which Groves 
was putting up, supporters of the popular front such as 
Harold Laski, Ellen Wilkinson and D. N. Pritt spoke on his 
platform. 67 As support for Groves grew both within the 
constituency and the wider Labour movement he faced a bitter 
campaign of opposition from the press supporting the popular 
front. The Manchester Guardian claimed Groves' campaign was 
a futile gesture and that he would lose his deposit. 68 The 
Daily Worker his bitterest enemy among the popular front 
press grew increasingly abusive. On the 9 May Pollitt 
declared that Reg Groves candidature was `disgusting to the 
Labour movement' and argued, `Aylesbury has become the 
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testing ground of the struggle between the forces of unity 
and socialism and the forces of reaction backed by the 
Cliveden set and the Trotskyists'. He called on local Labour 
parties to protest, 'against this cynical attempt to hand 
over a seat to Chamberlain and his fascist friends'. 69 
Dutt took this line of reasoning a step further. On 14 
May 1938 he explained that Labour support for a Liberal who 
stood against the government's appeasement policy was a step 
on the road to socialism, 'The People's Front is the door to 
Socialism'. 70 
The election result came as major disappointment to the 
supporters of the United Peace Alliance and gave a 
tremendous boost to its opponents within the Labour 
movement. The result was as follows: 71 
1935 1938 
Conservative 24,728 21,695 
Liberal 13,622 10,751 
Labour 4,106 7,666 
With the turn out falling from 70.2 per cent in 1935 to 63.1 
per cent in 1938, Groves raised Labour's share of the vote 
from 11 per cent to 19.1 per cent and managed to keep 
Labour's deposit for the first time in that constituency. 
The Conservative vote fell by 3.3 per cent and the Liberal 
vote by 4.8 per cent. 72 The importance of Groves' vote has 
largely been overlooked by historians of the popular front 
period. It marked a turning point in the fortunes of the 
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United Peace Alliance which suffered its first major defeat 
at Aylesbury; and knocked the momentum out of the popular 
front campaign. As Martin Upham has shown : 
The swing against the Tories was greater than the 
average of all pre-Munich by-election results. He 
[Groves] also surpassed the anti-Tory swing of the 
Munich by-elections at Oxford and Bridgwater. 73 
Not surprisingly, the Labour leadership greeted this result 
with acclaim and used it to great effect to discredit the 
United Peace Alliance. The Daily Herald commented: 
Aylesbury did not want a Popular Front. Mid- 
Buckinghamshire traditional Liberal stronghold, gave 
Labour a record vote and an effective answer to those 
who would divert it from its purpose... By the loss of 
nearly 3,000 votes Liberalism drew nearer to the 
political grave.... Congratulations Mr. Groves. And 
goodbye Popular Front. 74 
The New Leader also noted the significance of the result, 
and observed that the supporters of the United Peace 
Alliance: 
expected the result of the Aylesbury by-election to 
present them with a strong argument in their favour. 
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Instead, it has presented an overwhelming argument 
against them. 
The working class movement must ask itself whether it is 
worthwhile dropping its own programme for an alliance 
with a Party which is obviously a spent force. 75 
Even the Daily Worker acknowledged that the result would 
give a boost to those forces opposing the popular front: 
there will be loud cheers at the result in Transport 
House. The increase in the Labour vote will be taken as 
justification for their opposition to the United Peace 
Alliance ... 76 
The result was a crushing answer to the Communist Party's 
argument that Labour needed Liberal allies in order to gain 
electoral ground in rural areas. In campaigning for a non- 
socialist against a highly respected Labour candidate who 
fought the campaign, `on an old-fashioned class war 
platform', (77) the Communist Party inflicted great damage to 
its own standing and that of the United Peace Alliance in 
the Labour movement and, 'destroyed all illusions about it 
in the minds of thousands of the rank and file in the Labour 
Party'. 78 The Aylesbury by-election gave practical 
confirmation to the charges against the popular front made 
by the Labour Party. As the New Leader observed the 
Communist Party had committed a serious mistake which would 
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not be easily forgiven by the Labour movement, 'At Aylesbury 
the Communist Party supported a candidate of a capitalist 
party against the candidate of a working-class party. 
Nothing can excuse or remove that betrayal'. 80 
The popular front in decline 
The Aylesbury by-election undermined the momentum of the 
United Peace Alliance campaign and inflicted serious damage 
on its credibility within the Labour movement. Three weeks 
later at the Cooperative Party annual congress on 8 June 
1938, the United Peace Alliance received another major set- 
back when a motion in its support was defeated by 4,492,000 
votes to 2,382,000.80 This defeat came as something of a 
surprise to the supporters of the popular front considering 
the support given only two months previously to the United 
Peace Alliance by the Cooperative Party's annual conference. 
The popular front was paying a heavy price for its attempt 
to compromise the independence of the Labour Party. 
In July 1938 Pollitt admitted, `genuine fears that the 
Popular Front may split the Labour movement', were an 
important factor in the defeat of the United Peace Alliance 
at the Cooperative congress in June, 'The result was that 
many delegates who were mandated to vote for the Peace 
Alliance voted against it purely on this ground'. 81 
The Aylesbury result and defeat at the Cooperative annual 
congress halted the momentum of the United Peace Alliance; 
following these defeats it endured one defeat after another 
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at the union conferences during the summer of 1938.82 In a 
report for the ECCI of Comintern JR Campbell noted, `On the 
whole the votes for this proposal were slightly less than 
those cast for the united front in 1937, as many trade 
unions were suspicious of any alliance with the Liberals'. 83 
By the end of the summer the United Peace Alliance 
campaign had fizzled out only to see its fortunes briefly 
revived by the Munich crisis in the autumn of 1938. Against 
a background of a government seriously divided between pro 
and anti-appeasement wings, the United Peace Alliance 
managed to get local Labour backing for its candidates in 
the Oxford and Bridgwater by-elections; creating serious 
divisions within the Labour movement in both localities. 84 
The surprise success of Vernon Bartlett at Bridgwater on 
17 November 1938 should not obscure the fact that the 
popular front movement did not enjoy widespread support 
within the Labour movement by this time. Bartlett's victory 
failed to revive the fortunes of the United Peace Alliance, 
for by this time the vast majority of the Labour movement 
had come to accept the arguments of the NEC against the 
popular front. With the outbreak of war expected at any 
moment the Labour Party's exhortations for unity and loyalty 
to the movement served to further undermine support for the 
popular front. 
Early in 1939, alarm at the continuing slide towards 
world war led Stafford Cripps to launch his ineffectual 
petition campaign, designed to get Labour's approval for a 
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popular front. 85 The Communist Party complemented this by 
launching the Communist Crusade For The Defence Of The 
British People, which lasted from January to April 1939. The 
central objective of this campaign was to, `unite all those 
forces which are in opposition to the policy of the National 
Government', and, 'to get Chamberlain out and a new 
government in'. The main priority of the new popular front 
government was to form a military alliance with the Soviet 
Union and France that would restrain the aggressive actions 
of the fascist powers. 86 Compared with the Communist Crusade 
of 1938 this was relatively ineffectual and failed to have 
any impact upon the Labour movement. 87 
The final defeat of the popular front came at the Labour 
Party conference in May 1939; by which time the campaign was 
largely dead as an issue within the Labour movement. The 
motion for the popular front was defeated 2,360,000 to 
248,000.88 In order to fend off the attempt of the popular 
front to compromise the independence of the Labour movement 
the Labour leaders drew upon class struggle arguments, 
posing as champions of the socialist cause. As had become 
customary, Morrison replied to the debate on the popular 
front, on behalf of the NEC: 
Are fascism and war in part, and in substantial part, 
the result of economic forces inherent in the capitalist 
system itself? I believe they are. I believe they have a 
relation to the economics of capitalism, and if that is 
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so, it is a serious thing to abandon, even for the time 
being, our desire to transform the economic system, 
which alone in the long run will really remove the 
fundamental causes of Fascism and war. 89 
The popular front was finally dead as an issue; its demise 
reflected the Labour Party's refusal to compromise its 
political independence with non-socialist allies and abandon 
its socialist programme for the sake of some abstract 
artificial unity. It could be argued that the popular front 
never had a realistic opportunity for success for the Labour 
leadership never regarded it as a viable possibility. Having 
said this, it is important to distinguish between the 
motives of the Labour leadership in opposing the popular 
front and those of many rank and file activists. 
The Labour leadership's opposition to the popular front 
sprang from an intense hostility to communism, fear of 
alienating the trade union leaders, and of demoralising some 
of its `most loyal supporters'. 90 Besides this, they also 
believed that any association with the Communist Party would 
be a huge electoral millstone around Labour's neck. 91 
Concern at the Terror in the Soviet Union also played its 
part, as Pollitt noted when commenting upon a discussion 
with Herbert Morrison: 
The interview concluded with Morrison asking about the 
Moscow trials, and stating that it was this which was 
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the real reason why the Labour Party would not accept 
the affiliation of the Communist Party. 92 
The Labour Party membership on the whole shared the 
antipathy of their leaders towards the Communist Party, with 
memories of the communists 'class-against-class' period 
still relatively fresh. Despite the Communist Party's 
protestations to the contrary, the popular front was widely 
perceived as a reversion to the discredited Lib-Lab politics 
of Labour's political infancy and an abandonment of 
socialism. The following letter to the New Statesman from a 
Labour Party member outlines these objections: 
Over a generation ago, a small body of trade unionists 
and socialists decided that a Parliamentary Party was 
necessary; today we are being asked to reverse that 
decision-the decision that "Liberal Democracy" has 
nothing of final value to offer to the working classes, 
or at least that the achievement of Socialism was not 
possible through cooperation with the Liberal 
Party... Workers... have built up an organisation inspired 
by a belief in Socialism; an organisation that is so 
necessary to win this country for Socialism, and one not 
likely to be cast aside, because some faint hearts fear 
we might not be able to win alone. 93 
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The Communist Party leadership was fully aware of the 
fact that they were facing a difficult task in working 
against the grain of the past history of the Labour 
movement. In July 1938 Pollitt observed: 
Here we need to bear in mind that it is precisely 
amongst those who have built up the trade unions and the 
Labour Party that the feeling of opposition is 
strongest... They remember the fierce struggle with 
Liberalism in the latter part of the last century and 
the beginning of this one, they remember that Liberal 
employers have always been notorious for victimising 
active trade unionists and shop stewards. These are the 
people we have to win for our policy. 94 
In reflecting upon the popular front, the Central Committee 
came to realise that the predominantly electoral character 
of the popular front campaign and the pursuit of class 
collaboration policies which flowed from this, were 
important factors in the Communist Party's lack of progress: 
There was also a tendency to treat the Popular Front as 
a mere electoral alliance... Because of this we tended to 
create the impression that our policy represented 
cooperation with capitalism... Thus we did not succeed in 
convincing many active people in the Labour movement. 95 
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The final part of this chapter will examine the Communist 
Party from a local perspective. Exploring the dichotomy 
between the Party on a national scale and the Party in West 
Yorkshire will help shed further light on the questions: why 
did the popular front campaigns fail? Did these campaigns 
lead to a strengthening or weakening of communist influence? 
The West Riding district 1938-39 
During these years the West Yorkshire Communist Party went 
through a difficult period and struggled to maintain its 
already marginal position within the local Labour movement. 
Between October 1937 and August 1939 the West Riding 
district saw little growth in its membership. The following 
figures illustrate how the local Communist Party failed even 
to keep up with the rather modest growth experienced by the 
Party on a national scale: 96 
CPGB Membership Figures 1937-39 
Oct 1937 Dec 1937 Sep 1938 Jan 1939 May 1939 
W. Riding 320 - 267 317 400 
National - 13,979 15,750 17,256 17,560 
What is striking about these figures is the fact that the 
West Yorkshire Communist Party suffered a severe decline, 
losing a quarter of its membership during the first half of 
1938, when the CPGB nationally experienced a period of rapid 
growth. This is even more puzzling considering that the West 
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Riding district recruited at least 30 new members from the 
Communist Crusade of that year. 97 
This points to a terribly high turnover in the membership 
with the local Communist Party unable to recruit new members 
at a rate fast enough to replace those departing from the 
ranks. However, this particular problem was not exclusive to 
the West Riding district, but was a major headache for the 
Party nationally. At the Central Committee in December 1937 
Pollitt noted with alarm that during the year, `more than 
1,500 members have gone through the Party. The question of 
fluctuation has got to be taken up'. 98 The difference 
between the Party on a national and local scale lay in the 
former's faster recruitment rate which covered up the high 
turnover in members. 
As noted earlier, it would appear that the Communist 
Party's popular front campaigns appealed largely to young 
middle-class professionals. In the West Riding too, the 
majority of new recruits were of this type. 99 The rapid 
decline in membership in West Yorkshire during the first 
half of 1938 may well have indicated widespread 
disillusionment with the Communist Party's turn towards the 
popular front nationally. This may not have appealed to a 
section of the older working-class membership to whom the 
abandonment of the hammer and sickle and all talk of 
socialism was too much to stomach. It is worthwhile pointing 
out that during the Aylesbury by-election when the class 
collaboration approach of the popular front was openly 
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revealed, a section of the Communist Party membership sent 
in protests to the Central Committee at its statement 
supporting the Liberal candidate's stand against Labour; 
despite the fact that Labour's candidate was the 
'Trotskyist' Reg Groves. 100 
Another development which may explain this decline in 
local membership was the re-emergence of Ernie Benson as 
district organiser for several months during the first half 
of 1938. He was appointed to the post to cover for Marian 
Jessop's enforced absence due to a prolonged illness. 101 At 
least one local Party member from this period claims that 
Benson was hopelessly inefficient and that Marian Jessop had 
criticised Benson for being a `lazy Party organiser'. 102 The 
rather limited progress made by the district when under his 
stewardship during 1935-6 adds to these doubts about his 
abilities as an organiser. 
Figures for sales of the Daily Worker confirm this 
picture of the local Communist Party struggling to maintain 
its precarious position. The West Riding district had only 
one Daily Worker readers league, in contrast to London which 
had 20, and it had the lowest Daily Worker circulation of 
the eight industrial districts in the Communist Party. In 
July 1939 this stood at 6,708 sales per day. 103 
In a region where the Labour Party had, by this time, 
established a dominant position amongst the industrial 
working class; and had become the main vehicle for workers 
to express their political voice, the Communist Party faced 
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an uphill task establishing a position of influence in the 
local Labour movement. 104 In 1936 and 1937 the local 
Communist Party attempted to overcome its isolation through 
the various unity campaigns and recorded limited 
progress. 106 Following the defeat of the Unity Campaign of 
1937 the local Communist Party appeared to turn rather 
inward-looking, with less emphasis put upon mass campaigning 
work and an approach taking up concerns common to the Labour 
movement. Springhall in a report to the Central Committee on 
Party organisation noted: 
in the West Riding District, where an examination of a 
whole series of decisions of the meetings over a long 
time, reveals that every question which the comrades 
discussed was purely inner party. Never does the agenda 
indicate that the questions which were affecting the 
whole Labour Movement were discussed in our leading 
Party committees. 106 
This picture of an introspective local Communist Party is 
reinforced by the comments of a Leeds communist, M. Kline, in 
an article for the Party Organiser entitled `Experiences In 
West Riding': 
In our own West Riding District many branches have not 
yet begun to operate simple changes and methods of work 
suggested at the last Party Congress. Open branch 
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meetings are the exception rather than the rule. 
Sometimes they are called open branch meetings but it is 
merely a change in name and not in character and 
content-the old procedure and methods of our sectarian 
days remain. Little effort is made to publicly advertise 
them, to make them attractive, to invite outside 
speakers and sympathisers, to conduct business 
efficiently. 107 
Kline concluded with the following indictment of the local 
Communist Party: 
We still tolerate practices which no self respecting 
worker used to efficiently run T. U. branch meetings 
would tolerate and which often makes members ashamed to 
bring sympathisers along. 108 
Throughout 1938-9 Marian Jessop, struggled to forge a 
collective leadership for the West Riding which could take 
responsibility for supervising the day to day work of the 
local branches, for, 'in the past District Committees would 
meet and discuss the political problems but had nothing to 
do with the practical carrying out of the policies'. 109 To 
help overcome the isolation of the local branches and 
develop the district committee as a collective leadership 
for the area, Marian Jessop had: 
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been trying to get the DPC [District Party Committee] to 
see the district, to go into other branches from their 
own and get to know the problems of the district as well 
as of the branches. Believes this will strengthen the 
branches. 110 
The lack of cadres, people capable of showing initiative and 
intervening in local struggles without being directed by the 
Party to do so, was a major problem for the district as it 
was for the national Party. 111 It held back the West Riding 
District for it prevented the local Communist Party branches 
responding promptly to political issues as they arose: 
A bad situation which exists in the [West Riding] 
branches is the tendency for the branches to take 
decisions and then check them up with the district. That 
even if mistakes are made, we have to strengthen the 
feeling of branch leaderships to be able to take 
decisions on their own. 112 
The lack of cadres within the district is further 
illustrated by the elevation of new members who showed any 
promise to the district committee. Colin Siddons, a teacher 
who joined the Huddersfield Communist Party in October 1938, 
is an example of this. He has claimed that due to the lack 
of competent public speakers within the West Riding district 
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that as soon as he joined he was, `immediately put on the 
branch committee and the West Riding District Committee'. 113 
The one bright spot for the West Riding district during 
1938-9 was its relatively successful youth work. The 
district developed nine branches of the Young Communist 
League which had a total membership of 327 out of a national 
membership of 4,602.114 This is in contrast with the 
national development of the YCL which during 1938-39 lost 
1,000 members, `which is about 25% of the whole 
membership'. 115 Attention will now be focused on the 
campaigning activities of the CPGB branches in Bradford and 
Leeds, in an attempt to shed further light on the poor 
progress of the district. 
Bradford Communist Party 
In the last two years before the war the Communist Party in 
Bradford saw a continuing decline in its influence in the 
local Labour movement. This is illustrated by its position 
on the local Trades Council, on which it once had quite a 
powerful position. 117 This declining influence owed at least 
as much to the effect of the `Black Circular' as it did to 
the lack of appeal of communist campaigns. 
At its first meeting of 1938, Bradford Trades Council was 
confronted with a demand from the TUC General Council to 
instruct two of its branches to withdraw recognition from 
two communist delegates Tom Tynan and Frank Smith. In the 
event of the refusal of their trade union branches to carry 
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out such action then the Trades Council was instructed to 
disaffiliate the respective branches. The Trades Council 
executive maintained its anti-witchhunt policy of tolerating 
delegates of all left-wing opinions, and tried to stall 
action by the TUC; requesting: 
the TUC to give the specific reasons for asking for the 
withdrawal of these delegates; and also that the 
branches be requested to submit a report as to the work 
and standing of these members in their respective 
branches. 117 
The annual meeting of the Trades Council maintained this 
anti-witchhunt stance and allowed the election of three 
communists to its ranks. 118 By 1938 however, the TUC was 
beginning to get tough with trades councils which refused to 
implement the `Black circular'. It sent a reply to Bradford 
Trades Council insisting that it remove communists from its 
ranks or face disciplinary action. 119 
At the Trades Council meeting in February 1938 Tom Tynan, 
despite having the full support of his local ETU branch, 
offered his resignation to avoid getting it and the Trades 
Council into trouble with the TUC. While acceding to Tynan's 
request, the Trades Council placed on record its recognition 
of his services as delegate and Executive Committee 
member. 120 In a gesture of defiance which expressed 
resentment at national interference and attempts to curb its 
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local independence, the Trades Council agreed to send the 
letter of support for Tynan from his local ETU branch to the 
TUC; and put forward a motion to the annual conference of 
Trades Councils, calling for the `Black Circular' to be 
withdrawn. 121 Somewhat inexplicably the case against Frank 
Smith was not pursued by the TUC. Following Tynan's removal 
a number of trade union branches reaffiliated to the Trades 
Council, satisfied that it was at last complying with TUC 
directives regarding the Communist Party. 122 
In a final gesture of defiance the Trades Council allowed 
Tynan to continue reporting on his visit to the USSR, while 
granting him a further 3 pounds for extra expenses incurred 
on the trip. It also passed a resolution which gave all 
affiliated trade union branches permission to receive a 
report from Tynan on his visit to the USSR in 1937, as the 
Trades Council delegate to the celebrations in Moscow of the 
twenty first anniversary of the October Revolution. 123 
It would be misleading to construe Tynan's visit to the 
USSR as Trades Council delegate as expressing support for 
the local Communist Party. Rather it expressed the 
admiration of the local Labour movement for the social and 
economic achievements of the first worker state, as well as 
being a vote of confidence in the abilities of Tynan as a 
local trade unionist. 
With the removal of Tynan the Bradford Communist Party 
maintained a small and ineffective presence on the Trades 
Council; its two remaining delegates had only come onto the 
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Trades Council in 1937. The removal of Tynan, who had gained 
widespread respect during his ten years on the Trades 
Council, and the loss of his knowledge, experience and 
contacts, left the local Communist Party's two remaining 
delegates as rather isolated figures who played little part 
in the deliberations of the Trades Council during 1938-9. 
On the few occasions they tried to get Trades Council 
backing for communist campaigns and policies their attempts 
were rejected out of hand. In early June 1938 the executive 
committee of Bradford Trades Council rejected a communist 
motion calling on it to support the United Peace Alliance. 
The full Trades Council followed this lead and rejected the 
United Peace Alliance by 55 votes to 15.124 The popular 
front was rejected on the grounds that it would compromise 
the independence of the Labour movement and force it into an 
'anschluss', with the Liberals. The Labour movement alone 
was the only force capable of replacing the National 
Government with a socialist Labour government committed to 
collective security against fascist aggression. 125 
At the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis in September 
1938 the Trades Council agreed 43 to 32 not to receive a 
deputation from the local Communist Party to discuss a joint 
anti-war campaign. The same meeting also rejected a 
communist motion calling on the Trades Council to organise a 
local popular front demonstration against the government's 
appeasement policy; this was `defeated by an overwhelming 
vote'. 126 
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During 1939 the Bradford Trades Council was preoccupied 
by the threat of military and industrial conscription. In 
January the Trades Council criticized the TUC for 
participating in the government's national voluntary service 
scheme which was seen as the forerunner of military and 
industrial conscription. 127 By April this opposition was 
translated into action with the Trades Council sending 
delegates to a regional conference of the No Conscription 
League in Leeds. 128 In May it organised a joint campaign 
with the local Labour Party against conscription. 129 By June 
the Trades Council had affiliated to the Labour movement 
based No Conscription League; and become actively involved 
in the activities of the local branch. 130 
The Bradford Communist Party maintained a sectarian 
attitude towards the anti-conscription campaigns of the 
local Labour movement throughout 1939, and refused to 
participate in them. During the Spring of 1939 while the 
CPGB on a national scale was against conscription, the local 
Communist Party participated in the anti-conscription 
campaign of the Peace Pledge Union. 131 Following the 
Communist Party's change of line with regard to conscription 
in May, from one of opposition to one of support for this 
measure; the Bradford Communist Party tried to change the 
anti-conscription policy of the local Labour movement. In 
July 1939 a communist motion calling on the Trades Council 
to disaffiliate from the No Conscription League was lost. 132 
This sectarianism which probably served to isolate the 
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Bradford Communist Party even further from the local Labour 
movement faithfully reflected the carrying out of the 
national Party line of hostility to the `Trotskyist' No 
Conscription League. 133 
While the Bradford Communist Party won little support 
within the local Labour movement for its campaigns, its 
popular front activities enjoyed some limited success 
amongst the wider population. The highlight of the local 
Communist Crusade in 1938 was a meeting addressed by Pollitt 
and Gallacher on 7 March at the Textile Hall, which was 
attended by over 200 people. 134 Meanwhile the Communist 
Crusade of 1939 brought a much needed injection of fresh 
blood into the Bradford Communist Party with over 35 new 
recruits joining the branch. 135 
Despite these very limited attainments the local 
Communist Party remained a long way off from achieving a 
local popular front comprising all the anti-government 
forces. The failure to win the backing of the local Labour 
movement was instrumental in preventing the local popular 
front ever coming to fruition. 
Leeds Communist Party 
During 1938-9 the Leeds Communist Party enjoyed rather mixed 
fortunes in its campaigning activity. Its membership fell 
from 160 to 142, but it managed to maintain a few areas of 
support within the local working class. 137 For example, the 
local Communist Party managed to keep active a workplace 
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branch of twenty members at the massive Montagu-Burton 
factory. 137 Yet, as in Bradford, the popular front campaigns 
were to flounder on the rock of local Labour opposition. 
Following the launch of the Communist Crusade of 1938 in 
late January, Leeds Communist Party tried to gain support 
for this campaign within the local Labour movement. Its 
efforts were focused on building support for the local 
Communist Crusade activities scheduled for Sunday 6 March, 
at which Pollitt and Gallacher were to be the main speakers. 
In the afternoon of 6 March there was to be a reception at 
the Georgian Cafe where Pollitt and Gallacher would meet 
sympathisers and potential recruits; while in the evening 
they were the main speakers at the Communist Crusade rally 
in Leeds Town Hall. 
John Killingbeck, chair of Leeds Communist Party, wrote 
to Leeds Labour Party imploring it to merge its own public 
meeting, also on 6 March, with the Communist Crusade rally 
scheduled for that day. 138 Despite the local Labour Party's 
rejection of a joint meeting, the Crusade rally turned out 
to be quite successful. Over 2,000 people turned up to hear 
Pollitt and Gallacher argue the case for the popular front; 
with 51 pounds being collected and 31 people joining the 
Communist Party on the night. 139 
Following this successful rally the local Communist Party 
sent another letter to Leeds Labour Party, calling upon it 
to merge its Peace and Security campaign with the local 
Communist Crusade to form a local popular front: 
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Into this campaign we appeal to you to draw all working 
class, peace and progressive forces in the town.... The 
convening of such a conference of all such forces in 
Leeds would assist in rallying the whole of the 
population to save peace. If these two campaigns were 
united now into a great People's Crusade they could 
assure the resignation of the National Government. 140 
Claiming that both campaigns shared the common goal of 
collective security the letter concluded, We feel sure that 
there are no halls in Leeds large enough to hold all the 
people who would respond to such a united call for 
peace'. 141 In keeping with NEC pronouncements against the 
popular front the local Labour Party rejected this request. 
The Communist Crusade of 1939 proved to be much less 
successful in Leeds, in sharp contrast to Bradford, with 
only 7 people joining the local Communist Party. 142 
The failure of the Communist Party's popular front 
campaign to gain much support in the Leeds Labour movement 
owed a lot to the strong opposition put up by local Labour 
and trade union officials. This counter-offensive found its 
most potent expression in the broadsides against the 
Communist Party in the Leeds Weekly Citizen. The following 
excerpt is a typical attack on the popular front: 
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Whatever circumstances may determine in the future 
should be its tactics the Labour Party must refuse to 
sacrifice its independence of organization or its policy 
of socialism through democratic means. To do anything 
else would be sheer opportunism and treachery to the 
ideals upon which the Labour movement of this country 
has been built up. 143 
Throughout the spring of 1938 the Leeds Weekly Citizen 
harped on about the damage which the Stalinist Terror in the 
Soviet Union was inflicting upon the socialist cause. 144 It 
also used the third Moscow show trial of twenty one old 
Bolsheviks, headed by Bukharin and Rykov, to great effect in 
attacking the Communist Party and its popular front 
aspirations: 
The present writer has no illusions as to what would be 
the fate of many Left wingers here in Leeds if a 
Stalinist-controlled Popular Front took power here. We 
should be isolated by a press campaign of slander, 
arrested and condemned of a non-existent connection with 
the Fascists... The rest would be a firing squad and 
silence. 145 
In the spring of 1939 the local Labour movement made the 
campaign against conscription its main priority. The 
position of the local Labour movement with regard to 
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conscription was spelt out in an editorial in the Leeds 
Weekly Citizen in late March 1939: 
in view of the betrayal of Abyssinia, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Republican Spain it is almost 
impossible to conceive of British Labour agreeing to any 
measure of compulsion while the present government 
remains in office, for Chamberlain and his friends are 
just as likely to betray democracy here as they have 
abroad. 146 
In April the Trades Council came out against conscription 
and passed a motion which called on the Labour Party to lead 
a national campaign against conscription, and to consider 
withdrawing its representatives from the national voluntary 
service committees, for: 
it was felt that the forces of organised Labour must be 
fully mobilised on this issue, particularly in view of 
the danger that military conscription would prove to be 
no more than the prelude to industrial conscription, and 
thus one more step in a progress towards fascism. 147 
On 22 April 1939 the first meeting of the West Yorkshire No 
Conscription League was held with the local Labour movement 
playing a leading role in its deliberations. At this 
conference attended by 220 delegates were representatives 
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from 39 trade union branches, five trades councils and 
seventeen Labour Party branches. It was agreed to set up 
branches of the No Conscription League in Hull, York, Leeds, 
Bradford, Huddersfield, and Halifax-148 
As in Bradford, the Leeds Communist Party failed to get 
involved or give its support to the local Labour movement 
campaign against conscription which was based around the No 
Conscription League. 149 As noted earlier this refusal to 
support the No Conscription League reflected the Communist 
Party's hostility towards the ILP and Trotskyists who 
allegedly led this movement. The Communist Party regarded 
the activities of the No Conscription League as a threat to 
its campaign for a popular front of `Labour and progressive 
forces' designed to get British foreign policy to support a 
`peace bloc' with France and the USSR. 150 Meanwhile in May 
1939 the Communist Party dropped its policy of opposition to 
conscription following the intervention of the Comintern, 
for the CPGB's opposition to conscription did not accord 
with the foreign policy objectives of Moscow which still 
sought an alliance with Britain. 151 The failure of the Leeds 
Communist Party to get involved in the anti-conscription 
campaign which aroused such depth of feeling only served to 
isolate it further; and to confirm the suspicion felt by 
many in the Labour movement that the Communist Party was 
merely a mouthpiece for the Soviet government. 
Geoff Hodgson, a member of the YCL in Leeds at this time, 
recalls that even when the national Party opposed 
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conscription on paper, the Leeds Communist Party did not get 
involved in the anti-conscription campaign of the local 
Labour movement for the following reason: 
There was in fact a Party line which suggested that if 
you were against fascism, remember Spain had just come 
to an end, one had to set an example. You couldn't have 
young men appearing to avoid being conscripted, indeed 
the Party suggested exactly that people should 
distinguish themselves in what we could do against 
fascism. 152 
For the local Communist Party, the struggle against fascism 
meant participating in measures to defend the nation from 
attack; with the campaign for better ARP facilities in Leeds 
becoming one of its main campaigning priorities. Such an 
attitude illustrates further the depth of the Communist 
Party's political degeneration towards the right of the 
political spectrum; and away from its Leninist heritage of 
opposition to all military measures of a capitalist 
government. 
Throughout 1938-9 the Leeds Communist Party made the 
campaign for better ARP facilities their main priority. 153 
In February 1938 the local Communist Party issued a pamphlet 
Leeds Has A Plan For Health And Happiness which had a large 
section on the need for local air-raid precautions to be 
improved. 154 
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Following the German `Anschluss' with Austria and the 
renewed threat of war the Leeds branch committee 
commissioned H. S. M. Hall, a local Party member who was a 
civil servant, to write a pamphlet on the ARP question. 155 
On Wednesday 6 July 1938 the local Communist Party sent a 
delegation, led by Marian Jessop, to Leeds city council 
presenting their ARP proposals. The deputation also 
presented a petition with 3,250 signatures in support of 
their ARP proposals. 156 The ARP memorandum was a very 
comprehensive document which ran to thirty one pages with 
nine appendices, and was praised by Labour councillors for 
its thoroughness. 157 Ernie Benson recalls, It was a 
striking success, capturing the headlines in the local press 
and featured in every national daily newspaper which 
stressed the estimated cost of 6 million pounds'. 158 
The ARP committee of Leeds city council was so impressed 
by the local Communist Party's ARP memorandum that it 
decided to forward it for consideration to the ARP section 
of the Home Office. 159 However the local council failed to 
adopt the proposals for Leeds claiming their excessive cost. 
Nine months later in April 1939, when war loomed close 
following Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia, the local 
Communist Party issued an updated version of its ARP 
memorandum. This expressed the fear widespread at the time, 
that in the event of war breaking out Britain's cities would 
be razed to the ground by German bombers, as happened at 
Guernica in Spain. According to Ernie Benson this updated 
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version of the ARP memorandum was issued because, 'there was 
a lack of any suitable plan for the evacuation of Leeds 
school children in the event of air raids'. 160 
Beside the ARP issue the other major campaign of the 
local Communist Party was its involvement in the China 
Campaign Committee, which was a front for the Communist 
Party's intervention around the Japanese invasion of 
China. 161 The local branch of this committee sought to raise 
money to send medical supplies to the nationalist forces 
fighting the Japanese and organise a boycott of Japanese 
goods. The local campaign achieved a major breakthrough when 
the Leeds Trades Council agreed to actively support the 
boycott campaign. 162 
Rather than concentrate almost exclusively on the popular 
front like the national Party leadership did, the Communist 
Party in Leeds was involved in a variety of campaigns which 
a enjoyed a measure of success. However they rarely got the 
support of the local Labour movement which prevented these 
campaigns realising their full potential. While maintaining 
its few points of support within the local working class, 
the Leeds Communist Party remained isolated from the 
mainstream of the Labour movement. 
When compared to the branch in Bradford the Leeds 
Communist Party certainly enjoyed more success with its 
campaigning activity. This was reflected in a bigger 
membership and a higher profile. Yet ultimately both 
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branches remained isolated elements on the fringes of local 
Labour politics. 
It would be unfair to blame the local communists for 
their failure to emerge as a much more significant political 
force. On the whole it would be fair to say that inter- 
national events such as the Moscow show trials, and national 
developments such as the vigorous opposition of the Labour 
Party to the popular front, meant that there was little 
chance of success on a local scale. Yet the West Yorkshire 
Communist Party compounded this situation by displaying a 
sectarian attitude towards the anti-conscription campaign of 
the local Labour movement. This refusal to participate in 
the No Conscription Movement, which aroused support on a 
scale not seen for years, lost the West Yorkshire Communist 
Party an opportunity to extend its influence and membership. 
Confronted with Labour's political dominance of the local 
Labour movement, and wider working class, the Communist 
Party branches in the West Riding faced an uphill task in 
establishing themselves as a significant political force. 
Local communists were all too aware of the enormity of the 
task they had set themselves in challenging Labour's 
hegemony over the industrial working class of the West 
Riding. 163 The CPGB leadership itself acknowledged the 
difficult task confronting its members in Labour heartlands 
such as West Yorkshire: 
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There is no doubt about it, we are weak where there are 
Labour majorities and we see this in other parts of the 
country, where the fact that there exists Labour 
majorities is one of the reasons our comrades are in a 
rut. 164 
Working in such a difficult political environment where 
Labour was the main vehicle of political expression for most 
workers, it would appear that the Communist Party branches 
did not share the same obsessive concern with the popular 
front which the national leadership displayed; which took 
its cue from the desire of Moscow for an Anglo-Soviet pact. 
For example in Leeds the local Communist Party branch 
devoted a large part of its efforts towards the issue of ARP 
once the Communist Crusade of 1938 had fizzled out. 
Meanwhile the national leadership devoted its energies 
throughout 1938-39 towards bringing about a popular front 
movement designed to change the direction of British foreign 
policy. The national leadership proved much more responsive 
to the demands of Soviet foreign policy than the local 
Communist Party. 
On both a national and local level the majority of new 
recruits during 1938-9 appear to have been young middle- 
class professionals; attracted by the Communist Party's 
emphasis on the international struggle against fascism to 
save democracy. This reflected the fact that the main 
concern of the Communist Party both nationally and locally 
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lay in the field of foreign affairs, leading to the neglect 
of the social and economic concerns of British workers. 
On both a national and local level the Communist Party 
refused to participate in the activities of the No 
Conscription League which was a Labour movement campaign. 
This sprang from its sectarianism towards the ILP and 
Trotskyists who were involved in this campaign and the 
change in the Communist Party's policy from opposition to 
support for conscription. The Communist Party's failure to 
support this Labour movement campaign of opposition to 
conscription lost it an opportunity to increase its 
influence and support; besides this it would also have 
served to alienate the Party even further from many 
activists in the Labour movement. 
The popular front campaigning of the Communist Party 
proved more successful on a national scale than on a local 
level. In industrial areas such as West Yorkshire local 
members found that the class collaboration policy of the 
popular front had little appeal to the Labour movement and 
the wider working class which was firmly wedded to the 
Labour Party as an independent political force committed to 
socialism. 
Conclusion 
The popular front campaigns of the Communist Party during 
1938-9 undoubtedly raised its profile within British 
society. Beside this had it brought any other benefits to 
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the CPGB? The vote on the popular front at the Labour Party 
conference in May 1939 revealed that the Communist Party 
stood further away than ever from realising this 
objective. 165 The Communist Party's failure to bring about 
the desired change in British foreign policy led to it being 
publicly chastised by Manuilsky at the eighteenth congress 
of the CPSU in March 1939.166 The vote on the popular front 
at Labour Party conference in 1939 also revealed that the 
Communist Party remained as isolated as ever from the mass 
of the British Labour movement. In a report on organisation 
to the Central Committee Springhall admitted, 'many of our 
branches have such a puny membership that they despair of 
being able to influence the course of local politics'. 167 
During the period from May 1937 to June 1939, when the 
campaign for the popular front was at its height the CPGB 
grew from 12,500 members to 17,662, recording a modest 
growth of over five thousand. 168 The most rapid period of 
growth came in the spring of 1938 when the United Peace 
Alliance had developed considerable momentum and was at the 
height of its popularity within the Labour movement. 169 It 
should be recalled that the derailment of the United Peace 
Alliance in May-June 1938 dealt a body blow to the popular 
front from which it never recovered. 
It would appear that the majority of new recruits to the 
Communist Party during 1938-39 were young middle-class 
professionals who found its concentration on foreign affairs 
most appealing. However, it must be added that this 
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statement is largely impressionistic in nature due to the 
lack of official figures to confirm the class background of 
CPGB recruits during this period. The success of the Left 
Book Club is an obvious example of the Communist Party's 
heightened influence amongst the middle class, particularly 
the intelligentsia. 170 
The Communist Party's attempt to broaden its appeal to 
the middle class in order to further the campaign for the 
popular front, and the consequent downplaying of the 
struggle for socialism had the effect of reducing its appeal 
to most workers and helped weaken its influence in most 
working class areas. In a report on organisation presented 
to the Central Committee in June 1939, Rust lamented the 
stagnation in Communist Party membership and its lack of 
influence in most working class areas: 
If we look at the membership of the Party in relation to 
the towns it is obvious we are in a very weak position 
from the standpoint of really influencing the mass of 
the workers there and shows how acute is the problem of 
strengthening the Party. 171 
The Communist Party's campaigns against Trotskyism which led 
to attacks upon respected activists in the Labour movement, 
its defence of the last Moscow show trial in March 1938, 
together with its espousal of a multi-party electoral 
alliance designed to bring about an Anglo-Soviet pact, all 
413 
combined to undermine support for the popular front in the 
Labour movement. 172 For they all served to confirm, `the 
suspicion in left Labour circles that cynical motives 
[i. e. Soviet state policy] quite remote from the interests of 
the working class were at work in determining Communist 
policy'. 173 
The Communist Party's sudden about-turn over its attitude 
to conscription from a position of opposition to one of 
support for this measure, was yet further confirmation of 
the above charge. 174 The Communist Party's obsession with 
`Trotskyism' arising from its defence of the Terror in the 
Soviet Union together with the requirements of Soviet 
foreign policy, for an Anglo-Soviet alliance, explain its 
failure to get involved in the Labour movement campaign 
against conscription up to May 1939.175 The Communist 
Party's sudden conversion to a policy of support for 
conscription in mid-May continued its policy of non- 
participation in the Labour movement's campaign against 
conscription. 176 In March 1939 Pollitt complained to 
Campbell, 'Conscription is coming up everywhere as the real 
red herring to draw attention away from a real political 
fight against Chamberlain'. 177 The Communist Party's failure 
to get involved in the anti-conscription campaign of the 
Labour movement during 1939 served only to strengthen its 
isolation from the organised working class. 
In the summer of 1939 with World War Two approaching the 
defeats of the popular front had left the Communist Party 
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with a stagnant membership, `no clear perspectives', and 
floundering for a campaign to, `get its teeth into as it did 
on the fight and campaign for Spain'. 178 The Communist Party 
was paying a high price for a political strategy largely 
worked out in accordance with the requirements of Soviet 
state policy. Perhaps worst of all, the defeats of the 
popular front had created a mood of pessimism which embraced 
both the CPGB leadership and the membership. In one of his 
last reports to the Central Committee before the war Pollitt 
commented: 
Then the defeat at Southport of the Popular Front 
,... the loss of Czechoslovakia and Spain, have tended to 
create the impression that every thing we put our hands 
to and everything we mobilise the Party comrades to work 
in ... turns out in the long run to be defeated, that we 
have no victories and it has a certain political 
influence in the Party so that many of the comrades, 
myself included, get the impression that we are up 
against a brick wall and we have not found ways and 
means of getting over this wall. 179 
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Conclusion 
The collapse of Stalinism in the Soviet Union has had many 
repercussions; not least of which has been the opening of 
the archives of the CPSU and the Comintern whose 
headquarters were based in Moscow. Since 1991 there has been 
a flood of articles and books in Russia and the West 
rewriting the history of the October Revolution and the 
development of Russian society since 1917. Britain too has 
reaped the benefits of the collapse of Stalinism in the form 
of the returned archives of the CPGB; which present 
historians with an opportunity to not only re-evaluate the 
history of the Communist Party but also to take a fresh 
perspective on other sections of the British Left. 
Despite the lack of published work drawing upon the CPGB 
archives a new generation of historians have been using this 
rich source. Much of this new research, primarily the work 
of PhD students, seeks to question the old mythologies 
concerning the CPGB's development-1 These take a fresh 
perspective on the Communist Party's development and 
question the conventional image of it as a monolithic entity 
bound by the iron discipline of democratic centralism. They 
also explore the previously under-studied area of communist 
activity in the regions; and highlight, to a degree, the 
dichotomy between the policies and activities of the 
national leadership and those pursued by sections of the 
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rank and file, which felt far less constrained by policies 
determined by the interests of Moscow. 
This study offers a fresh perspective on the CPGB and its 
struggle against fascism during the 1930s. It has presented 
some new insights into several areas of the Communist 
Party's activity, which question the historical paradigm 
that surrounds much of its anti-fascist activity. 
Central to the debate over the CPGB's development during 
the years 1933-35 are the following questions: were the 
Communist Party's policies and activities primarily a 
product of British political conditions or were they 
determined in the main by the requirements of Soviet and 
Comintern policy? Alongside this is the question: why did 
the CPGB fail to gain a leading position of influence of 
influence within the Labour movement? 
The CPGB's response to the conflicting requirements of 
British political conditions and the needs of Moscow reveals 
how its anti-fascist strategy and activity were determined 
in the main by the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. 
This led to the Communist Party adopting policies that 
isolated it from the majority of activists in the British 
Labour movement. During 1933-34 the CPGB's membership and 
influence within the Labour movement was held back by its 
sectarian attitude to the Labour Party and its failure to 
intervene at an early stage in the movement against the BUF. 
Meanwhile during the years 1935-39 the Communist Party's 
popular front activities led most Labour movement activists 
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to conclude that it was trying to ensnare the Labour Party 
in a class-collaborationist alliance with non-socialist 
forces. 
Throughout the period 1933-39 the CPGB saw the defence of 
the Soviet Union as its first priority. During these years 
Stalin sought a pact of mutual assistance with Britain to 
help restrain German fascism. The strategic goals of the 
CPGB during this period were two-fold: in the immediate term 
to try and force the National Government to actively pursue 
collective security through the League of Nations. The long- 
term objective was to use the united front and popular front 
to bring about the downfall of the `pro-fascist' National 
Government whose reactionary measures were leading to the 
gradual 'fascisation' of British society and replace it with 
a government favourable to a military alliance with the 
USSR. 2 As the international situation deteriorated the 
Communist Party devoted less and less attention to the 
political and economic concerns of the British working class 
giving credence to the charge that the CPGB was a mere 
mouthpiece of the Soviet government. 
The united front against fascism 1933-34 
This study questions many of the conventional assumptions 
regarding the CPGB's emergence from the sectarianism of the 
'Third Period' during the years 1933-35. Most accounts of 
the Communist Party during this period portray its adoption 
of the united front in a somewhat simplistic manner. They 
428 
assume that following the triumph of fascism in Germany the 
CPGB immediately adopted the united front against fascism 
and assumed the leadership of the movement against the BUF. 3 
The Communist Party's response to the victory of fascism in 
Germany raises several interrelated questions that have not 
been fully answered by studies of the years 1933-35. Did the 
Communist Party's political line faithfully reflect the 
Comintern's sectarian line? If so, what were the 
implications of this for its relationship with the British 
Labour movement? Did the Comintern line help or hinder the 
CPGB in developing an effective anti-fascist strategy that 
would end its political isolation? 
During 1933, and for much of 1934, the CPGB failed to 
formulate an effective anti-fascist strategy and remained in 
its marginal position within the Labour movement. The 
Communist Party's marginal position was largely a product of 
the paralysis that gripped the Comintern, which was lacking 
any direction from the Kremlin, and was effectively left to 
its own devices during 1933 and 1934; and consequently 
played it safe by regurgitating the `social fascist' line of 
the 'Third Period' thereby preventing it from developing an 
effective response to the rise of German fascism. 4 The CPGB 
leadership, lacking any firm guidance from the ECCI, during 
1933 was divided over its approach to the united front 
against fascism; and repeated the ECCI's analysis of German 
fascism as being a temporary phenomenon that would soon be 
overthrown by a revolutionary upsurge of the masses. 5 
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From March 1933 to October 1934 the CPGB was crippled by 
the sectarianism of the `Third Period' line. The emphasis of 
its activity during this period was upon the united front 
from below, with the `social fascist' Labour Party being 
criticised for its failure to actively oppose fascism. Not 
surprisingly the Communist Party remained an isolated force 
within the Labour movement and experienced little growth in 
its membership. 
However, while the leadership of the CPGB was preoccupied 
with the struggle to overthrow the National Government 
sections of its membership linked up with their Labour 
movement counterparts to physically confront the BUF on the 
streets of Britain. This activity was frowned upon by the 
King Street leadership which saw the struggle against the 
BUF as politically irrelevant for it believed the threat of 
fascism in Britain came from the National Government. 6 Yet 
by mid 1934 the Communist Party leadership had changed its 
position in favour of leading a struggle against the BUF. 
The origins of this change can be seen in the interaction of 
several developments: mass pressure from the anti-Mosley 
movement which involved a large number of communists; the 
new thinking in the ECCI as promulgated by Dimitrov which 
favoured a more active opposition to fascism; and the 
realisation of the mobilising potential of the anti-Mosley 
struggle in contrast to the failed policy of the united 
front from below. It was largely thanks to the rank and file 
anti-Mosley movement that the rapid growth of the BUF was 
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brought to a halt in 1934. The 150,000 strong counter- 
demonstration to Mosley's rally on 9 September 1934 in Hyde 
Park was the high point of this movement. 7 
By the autumn of 1934 the ECCI, by then led by Dimitrov, 
had largely abandoned the sectarianism of the `Third 
Period'. In France this led to the united front against 
fascism between the SFIO and the PCF. 8 The CPGB leadership 
in tune with the new thinking sought to adopt the new non- 
sectarian approach in Britain. In October 1934 it gained 
permission from the Presidium of the ECCI to abandon the old 
'Third Period' line and approach the Labour Party for the 
united front from above. 9 
On the 20 October the CPGB in the midst of the municipal 
election campaign performed a spectacular about-turn; from a 
position of outright hostility towards Labour as another 
capitalist party to one of advocating-an electoral pact with 
Labour. 10 The Communist Party stated that the objective of 
such an electoral pact would be to defeat the National 
Government and elect a Labour government favourable to a 
peace pact with the USSR. 
The activities of communists in West Yorkshire reveals 
both ruptures and continuities with the national Communist 
Party line. They took up the struggle against the BUF 
despite the opposition of the CPGB leadership to such 
physical confrontations. In taking up the struggle against 
the blackshirts local communists proved to be far more 
receptive to the concerns of Labour movement activists than 
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the Communist Party leadership, which was preoccupied by the 
international situation. The local branches also displayed a 
degree of individualism when it came to the implementation 
of national directives, which questions the image of the 
CPGB as a monolithic entity bound by the iron discipline of 
democratic centralism. During the years 1933-39 the West 
Yorkshire CPGB branches often adopted only those campaigns 
which they felt would gain an echo in the local Labour 
movement. Yet on occasions local communists also acted in a 
manner that opposed national policy while undermining their 
standing in the Labour movement. In October 1934 when the 
national leadership directed most branches to withdraw from 
the municipal elections the branch in Bradford persisted in 
standing against Labour, while the branch in Leeds which 
appeared the more sectarian in its attitude towards the 
local Labour movement during 1933-34, withdrew its 
candidate standing against Labour. 
On both a national and local scale despite a great deal 
of campaigning effort the Communist Party remained a 
marginal force within the Labour movement by the end of 
1934, with its membership largely stagnant during this 
period. The CPGB leadership saw the Comintern's adoption of 
the popular front as an opportunity to break out of its 
isolation and become a major force on the British political 
scene. 
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The popular front against fascism 1935-39 
The new popular front policies adopted by the Comintern at 
its last congress in 1935 marked a turning point in its 
history. As Trotsky commented at the time, 'The Seventh 
World Congress of the Comintern will go down in history as 
the liquidation congress. Even if all its participants do 
not today recognize the fact... '. 11 The new popular front 
policies represented a fundamental departure from Marxism 
for implicit within them was a rejection of the, 'programme, 
principles, and tactical methods established by Lenin'. 12 
The adoption of the popular front represented the 
Comintern's departure from the goal of world revolution 
which had been established by Lenin in 1919 as its raison 
d'etre. The political degeneration of the Comintern, which 
by this time had become a pawn in the diplomatic manoeuvres 
of Stalin, was to be reflected in the policies and 
activities of its various sections. 
As McDermott and Agnew have noted the popular front era 
of the Comintern, 'has for many years stimulated a rich 
controversy'. 13 It has been claimed that following its 
adoption of the popular front the Comintern abandoned the 
struggle for socialism to further the Soviet Union's search 
for military allies amongst the governments of Western 
Europe. 14 This view has been rejected by scholars who argue 
that far from representing the abandonment of socialism the 
popular front was a long-term tactical device which entailed 
the defence of parliamentary democracy before advancing to 
the struggle for socialism.. 15 
Throughout the years 1935-39 the requirements of Soviet 
foreign policy were to determine the anti-fascist strategy 
of the CPGB and its sister parties more openly than in the 
1933-34 period. During the popular front era the Communist 
Party believed that its first duty was the defence of the 
Soviet Union from fascist attack and devoted a major part of 
its activities to changing the `pro-fascist' direction of 
British foreign policy. The CPGB made adjustments to its 
policies that led it in a rightward direction, in the belief 
that it would help it to form a movement capable of 
replacing the National Government with a popular front 
government favourable to a military alliance with the Soviet 
Union. 
The CPGB's pursuit of popular front policies during the 
years 1935-39 led to it moving to the right of the Labour 
movement. During this period the Communist Party avoided 
mentioning the struggle for socialism while the Labour 
Party, in its propaganda, claimed that the struggle for a 
socialist society was one of its central objectives. Up 
until 1935 the CPGB had put forward the slogan of Soviet 
Power, the last time this was formally adopted into its 
programme was at the Thirteenth Congress in February 1935. 
The new popular front strategy led to this slogan being 
abandoned and the struggle for socialism being replaced by 
the struggle to defend bourgeois democracy. The dropping of 
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the slogan of Soviet Power was no mere tactical device it 
symbolised a far-reaching adjustment in the CPGB's 
orientation towards an accommodation with capitalism and the 
abandonment of the goal of working-class revolution. 
The popular front not only led the CPGB to abandon the 
struggle for socialism in the short term but to dispense 
with the last vestiges of its revolutionary heritage. It is 
hardly surprising that the majority of British workers saw 
little attraction in a party which by 1939 had a programme 
to the right of the Labour Party. 
As McDermott and Agnew have observed the adoption of the 
popular front set in motion a highly contradictory period in 
Comintern history. 16 The CPGB found itself caught in the 
contradictory requirements of having to pursue a policy that 
dovetailed with the interests of Moscow, while trying to 
gain affiliation to the Labour Party. The latter saw the 
CPGB merely as a mouthpiece for the Soviet government, not 
as an indigenous part of the British Labour movement. 
Throughout 1935-39 the CPGB campaigned for affiliation to 
the Labour Party. It saw Labour as the essential cornerstone 
of any popular front coalition, for Labour was, after all, 
the largest opposition party in the House of Commons. Yet 
the Communist Party believed that on its own Labour was not 
strong enough to defeat the National Government with its 
huge parliamentary majority; hence the pursuit of non- 
socialist forces in the Liberal and Conservative parties. 
This attempt to force the Labour movement into a popular 
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front combination with the anti-appeasement wings of the 
Liberal and Conservative parties was to flounder due to the 
determined opposition of the Labour leadership, whose stance 
was readily supported by a clear majority of the Labour 
movement. The heavy defeats suffered by communist 
affiliation and the popular front at Labour conferences 
during 1936-39 illustrate the solid backing which the Labour 
leadership enjoyed amongst the majority of activists in the 
Labour movement. 
The closest the CPGB came to gaining affiliation to 
Labour during this period was in 1936, when it received a 
quarter of the vote at Labour Party conference. 17 At one 
point during the summer of 1936 the affiliation campaign 
appeared to have a slim chance of success. However, the 
campaign of opposition waged by the Labour Party 
successfully played upon fears that communist affiliation 
would lead to Labour becoming entangled in a popular front 
alliance with non-socialists, threatening the Labour 
movement's independence and socialist objectives. This theme 
was repeated to similar effect by the Labour Party in its 
opposition to the Unity Campaign in 1937 and the popular 
front campaigns of 1938-39. 
While much of this territory has been charted by others 
what is less appreciated is the role of the Moscow show 
trials in undermining the united and popular front campaigns 
of the Communist Party. 18 New material in the CPGB archive 
such as that contained in the 1995 Moscow reels show how the 
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Communist Party made the defence of Stalin's Terror one of 
its main priorities. Chapter three of this study illustrates 
how the CPGB's defence of the first Moscow show trial cost 
its affiliation bid tens of thousands of votes at Labour 
Party conference in October 1936. Both the AEU and MFGB 
delegations, mandated to support communist affiliation by 
their annual conferences which took place prior to the first 
Moscow trial in August, split at Labour Party conference 
when it came to the vote. Prior to Labour's conference 
between 850,000 and a million votes seemed committed to 
communist affiliation, yet in the end only 592,000 votes 
were cast in favour of this. 19 
Despite this heavy defeat CPGB propaganda maintained that 
the campaign for affiliation to Labour was a viable 
proposition. The Communist Party believed that pressure from 
Labour movement activists would eventually reach such a 
point of intensity that the Labour Party leadership would be 
forced to concede communist affiliation. However, this 
analysis was based on an incorrect appraisal of how the 
deteriorating international situation would affect the ranks 
of the Labour movement. As the international situation 
gradually worsened during 1937-38 the Labour movement 
rallied round the Labour leadership rather than press for a 
change in policies as the Communist Party expected. The 
CPGB's defence of the Stalinist Terror during 1937-38 and 
its espousal of class-collaboration in the form of the 
popular front merely served to strengthen the determination 
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of most Labour movement activists to stick with the policies 
of the Labour leadership. 
Undeterred by the defeat at Labour Party conference in 
1936 the CPGB sought affiliation by a more circuitous route. 
In 1937 this took the form of the poorly supported Unity 
Campaign. The Communist Party's support for the second 
Moscow show trial in January 1937 and other aspects of the 
Stalinist Terror, such as the suppression of the POUM in 
Spain and the execution of the Red Army general staff in 
June 1937, were to cost the Unity Campaign very dearly. The 
CPGB's defence of the Terror injected an internecine 
conflict into the Unity Campaign which seriously compromised 
it in the eyes of many workers. Leading figures in the Unity 
Campaign such as Harold Laski and Fenner Brockway have noted 
the damage inflicted on the Unity Campaign by its 
association with the Terror, through the CPGB's defence of 
the Moscow show trials. Brockway claimed that this was to 
cost it the support of unions such as the MFGB which had 
voted for communist affiliation at its annual conference in 
1936.20 In November 1937 Laski estimated that, 'the 
executions undoubtedly cost the supporters of the United 
Front something like half a million votes in the Bournemouth 
conference'. 21 
The role of Soviet foreign policy in determining the 
CPGB's popular front strategy became even more apparent 
after the defeat of the Unity Campaign. During the years 
1938-39 the Communist Party's popular front activities 
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became increasingly controversial and alienated many Labour 
movement activists who had previously supported its campaign 
for a working-class united front. The historical debate over 
this period centres around the following questions. Were the 
CPGB's popular front campaigns a mere electoral contrivance, 
or were they a series of mass anti-fascist movements that 
achieved practical results? Did the popular front lead to 
the Communist Party refraining from militant anti-fascist 
activity and to play down the struggle against capitalism 
and the BUF? 
The rapid deterioration in the international situation 
during the years 1938-39 led to frantic efforts by the 
Soviet government to secure a pact of mutual assistance with 
Britain. Equally frantic were the efforts of the CPGB to 
bring about an electoral combination strong enough to defeat 
the National Government at the next general election. 
Chapter five has explored the role of the CPGB in the United 
Peace Alliance and shown how this built up considerable 
momentum within the Labour movement. It also examines the 
Aylesbury by-election whose importance has been largely 
overlooked by historians of the popular, front during this 
period. The United Peace Alliance suffered its first major 
defeat at Aylesbury which undermined the momentum it had 
developed in the Labour movement. 
The Communist Party's attempts to get the Labour Party to 
lead a popular front coalition against the government were 
undermined by its class collaboration policy, which saw it 
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campaigning with anti-appeasement Liberals and Tories 
against Labour candidates. In an attempt to broaden out the 
appeal of the popular front the CPGB abandoned the last 
vestiges of its revolutionary heritage. The dropping of the 
hammer and sickle mast-head from the Daily Worker along with 
the slogan `Workers of the World Unite' was of great 
symbolic importance. It signified to potential non-socialist 
allies of the popular front that the Communist Party had 
severed its ties with its radical past and had become 
politically respectable. Most Labour movement activists 
quite rightly perceived the Communist Party's popular front 
activity as a reversion to the discredited Lib-Lab politics 
of Labour's political infancy. 22 
Besides the attempts at gaining affiliation to Labour and 
the electoral manoeuvres of 1938-39 the era of the popular 
front saw the CPGB refraining from militant anti-fascist 
activity. This is best exemplified by the Party's attitude 
towards the struggle against the BUF during 1935-36. One of 
the most pervasive myths amongst those surrounding the 
CPGB's 'golden era' of the 1930s is that of its leading role 
in the struggle against the BUF which culminated in victory 
over Mosley at the 'Battle of Cable Street' on 4 October 
1936.23 
During 1935-36 tens of thousands of anti-fascists 
confronted the BUF on the streets in an effort to halt its 
anti-semitic activity. While this struggle was going on the 
CPGB leadership was preoccupied by foreign affairs such as 
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Italy's invasion of Abyssinia and the campaign for 
affiliation to Labour. Chapter three examines the charges 
made by Joe Jacobs, which have been largely overlooked by 
historians, that it was only the threat of a split in the 
East London Communist Party that forced the hand of the 
national leadership into sanctioning a campaign to prevent 
Mosley marching through the EastEnd on 4 October 1936.24 The 
eleventh hour decision of the CPGB leadership to reverse its 
decision not to oppose Mosley, in the face of the mass 
resistance being organised to the BUF march by East Enders 
independently of the Party, saved it from a humiliating loss 
of face and a major split amongst its membership. 
Despite the failings of the CPGB leadership the role 
played by thousands of rank and file communists in 
confronting the anti-semitic activity of the BUF deserves 
recognition. Their role in the struggle against the BUF9 
often acting independently of the Communist Party 
leadership, should be acknowledged. The mythology that 
surrounds the Communist Party's role in the struggle against 
the blackshirts is open to serious question. This study 
confirms the findings of Nigel Todd that the growth of the 
BUF was undermined by the activities of a mass movement from 
below. This movement from below, contrary to historical 
mythology, was not led by the CPGB but by communist 
activists and their Labour movement counterparts at a local 
level. Throughout 1933-39 the Communist Party leadership 
were far more concerned with the international struggle 
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against fascism and the need to defeat the National 
Government than the struggle against the BUF which was 
largely seen as politically irrelevant. 
In West Yorkshire too, the local Communist Party played a 
leading role in combatting the BUF9 the counter- 
demonstration they organised at the `Battle of Holbeck Moor' 
is a fine example of this. Despite their role in the 
struggle against the BUF, which ran contrary' to the King 
street view of the BUF being politically irrelevant, local 
communists found themselves hampered by the policies and 
campaigns of the national Party. When local communists 
sought to campaign in favour of the popular front and in 
defence of the Moscow show trials they found that it merely 
played into the hands of their political enemies within the 
local Labour movement who used their support for such issues 
to great effect in discrediting the Communist Party. While 
the campaigning priorities of the local Communist Party did 
not always correspond with those of the Party nationally it 
found itself increasingly isolated by the late 1930s as a 
consequence of the 'Black Circulars' and the class- 
collaboration policies of the national Party which were 
driven by the dictates of Soviet foreign policy. 
Between 1933-39 the CPGB's political trajectory saw it 
move from the left to the right of the Labour movement. It 
had travelled from one extreme to another: from the heights 
of ultra-left sectarianism in 1933 when it had called for a 
Soviet Britain to an intensely patriotic organisation which 
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in September 1939 had called on workers to support the war 
against German fascism. While there is some truth in 
Morgan's observation that the CPGB was hampered by the 
difficulties of operating in a non-revolutionary situation 
this does not fully account for its inability to emerge as a 
leading force within the Labour movement-25 The Communist 
Party paid a heavy political price for working within the 
constraints of an anti-fascist strategy which was determined 
primarily by the needs of the Soviet state. The struggle 
against fascism presented the CPGB with an opportunity to 
emerge as a significant force within the Labour movement, 
especially given the ineffective nature of the Labour 
Party's response to fascism. However, this opportunity was 
squandered by its pursuit of the interests of the Soviet 
government which bore little relation to the concerns of the 
British working class. The CPGB's support for the Moscow 
show trials and its espousal of class-collaboration in the 
form of the popular front are good examples of this. 
The inflated claims made by some scholars for the CPGB's 
importance during this period do not stand up to close 
scrutiny. 26 Despite a small increase in membership and 
growth in influence amongst the middle class intelligentsia 
during 1933-39 the CPGB failed to mount an effective 
challenge to the Labour Party's hegemony over the organised 
working class, and it remained a marginal force within the 
Labour movement. Indeed the Communist Party's sectarianism 
towards the Labour Party during the 1930s helped to confirm 
443 
Labour's position of unrivalled dominance over the British 
Labour movement. The importance of the CPGB during the 
`golden era' of its anti-fascist period lay in the 
activities of its members at a local level in the Aid-for- 
Spain movement and in combatting the BUF. Despite its 
failure to emerge as a leading force in the Labour movement 
by 1939 the CPGB had, by this time, acquired the reputation 
for being a leading light in the anti-fascist movement. This 
reputation owed much more to the militant anti-fascist 
activities of its members on a local scale than the popular 
front campaigns launched by the CPGB leadership that were 
generally perceived as being determined by the interests of 
the Stalinist government in Moscow. 
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Appendix One 
CPGB MEMBERSHIP 1932-39 
NATIONAL 
November 1932 5,600 
September 1933 5,500 
January 1934 5,000 
December 1934 5,800 
February 1935 6,500 
April 1935 7,600 
August 1935 7,500 
January 1936 7,000 
April 1936 7,000 
October 1936 11,500 
May 1937 12,500 
December 1937 13,979 
September 1938 15,750 
January 1939 17,256 
May 1939 17,560 
June 1939 17,662 
July 1939 17,756 
WEST YORKSHIRE 
January 1933 92 
July 1933 162 
December 1933 190 
Bradford 1934 37 
October 1937 320 
September 1938 267 
January 1939 317 
May 1939 400 
There are various difficulties in working out CPGB 
membership figures that are related to the high turnover in 
members and the late payment of dues by the membership. 
These two factors partly explain the fluctuations in the 
CPGB's membership. 
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These figures illustrate one of the main organisational 
problems facing the CPGB which was the high turnover in 
members. They illustrate the fluctuations in membership 
which were related to the various phases of the struggle 
against fascism. During the 1933-34 period the CPGB's 
continuing adherence to the sectarianism of the Third Period 
clearly held it back. The increase in membership during the 
spring of 1935 reflected the CPGB's involvement in the mass 
struggle against part two of the 1934 Unemployment Act. In 
the eight months following the Comintern's Seventh World 
Congress membership actually fell despite the momentum of 
the campaign for affiliation to Labour. There is a close 
correlation between the rise in membership and the worsening 
of the international situation during the late 1930s. It was 
events on the international scene such as the Spanish Civil 
War and the onward march of fascism throughout Europe, that 
were instrumental in leading to an influx of new members 
whose primary concern were foreign affairs. The CPGB's 
concentration on foreign affairs did lead to spurts of 
growth which reflected further downturns in the 
international situation. The Communist Crusade of 1938 which 
coincided with the German invasion of Austria recruited over 
1,500 new members. 
These figures, which I have tried to corroborate where 
possible, have been compiled from the following sources: 
Central Committee Minutes 1933-39; Political Bureau Minutes 
1933-40; CPGB Congress Reports 1935-39; Marty Secretariat 
Minutes 28 October 1936; 1995 Moscow Reel; D. A. Wilson 
Papers; K. Newton, The Sociology of British Communism, 
(London, Penguin, 1969). 
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